Narrative:

While inflight at 36;000 ft.; EICAS 'hydraulic 2 lo qty' illuminated. No QRH checklist was available. We monitored hydraulic system 2 level at 20% and decreasing approximately 2% every 15 mins. Contacted dispatch and maintenance via commercial radio to discuss system problem. Told by maintenance to monitor and report any other problems. Dispatch recommended continuing to ZZZ and ZZZ1 may become a diversion point if system failed. Continued to monitor system and the level decreasing. First officer (first officer) and [I] thoroughly discussed options and possible totally system failure and our planned course of action. Once in contact with center; asked for priority handling and quickest route to airport. On final course once the landing gear was extended 'hydraulic pump 2 fail' illuminated. We broke off approach the visual approach and completed QRH checklist for the failed pump. Once the checklists were completed and we quickly re-briefed we asked for second visual approach and safety landed.immediately after landing; multiple red warnings and yellow cautions illuminated and I took the airplane. I noted limited braking and no nose wheel steering on the aircraft. I safely slowed the aircraft using moderate braking and we exited the runway using rudder steering on a high speed exit. We stopped on the taxiway and told ground we need to run some checklists. We completed the checklists but all the failures were associated with the hydraulic system level being at zero. I then noticed excessive brake temperatures and contacted ground control for aircraft crash rescue to inspect aircraft for hot brakes. We started the APU and shut down both engines. Aircraft crash rescue inspected aircraft and confirmed no abnormalities; we contacted ZZZ ops for aircraft tow to gate. Tow team safely towed to gate and we deplaned. Maintenance met us at the gate and we entered the failure into the aircraft log book. I then contacted dispatch; soc and the duty officer. During this situation we continuously updated the flight attendant's (flight attendants); passengers and ops. During our commercial radio conversation with maintenance; they really provided no guidance which I understand is our policy. They simply stated to monitor it and call them back if it got worse. This was also dispatch's guidance. I'm not sure if this situation was briefed up to a supervisor and if it was it may have changed the guidance. After the call; I've started coming up with what to do next as I watched the level go to 20% to zero during the last hour of the flight but still had no other EICAS messages. We had thoroughly briefed and discussed in detail for every possible failure and our course of action. Even though the system had not failed; I was concerned it would. We got priority handling from ATC and I had briefed them on the situation. Because it had not failed; I choose not to [request priority handling]. In hindsight; [requesting priority handling] may have further expedited our arrival and approach. I had a feeling that the large surge in system pressure during the landing gear extension would cause the hydraulic 2 pump to fail. And on final once we placed the gear down; it did. We calmly broke off the approach and completed our already thoroughly pre briefed QRH checklist. At that time I only had 2 cyan messages on the EICAS and we had no other abnormalities or aircraft problems that made me feel a [priority handling request] was needed. We did not change our aircraft configuration during the missed approach while completing checklists and coming around for the second approach. All systems were normal; but I knew we needed to land soon as any further hydraulic system 2 issues would surely drive us to more QRH checklists and possible loss of aircraft systems. On short final; all was normal and we safety landed; I suspected that other messages would come up as the wow switches closed; and they did; a lot of them. I was already at the ready and took the aircraft from the first officer once on the ground. I used moderate to more than moderate braking to safety slow and stop the aircraft. I chose to exit the runway on the high speed using only rudder steering as we had no nose wheel steering. Once clear; I set the emergency parking brake and called for the top red messages which was the reverser failure which I could hear the #2 engine reverser was still deployed. After that we ran a spoiler fail checklist and I told the first officer to stop as all the messages were associated with the hydraulic system 2 level being at zero and I noticed the increasing brake temperatures. I called for crash fire rescue as a precaution. We started the APU and shut down both engines. I made a PA to let the flight attendant's and passengers know our situation. Crash rescue inspected our aircraft; including the brakes; and noted no issues. We had already called ZZZ ops and asked to be towed in. The tow was ready and towed us into the gate. Once parked; we started deplaning and I started all my phone calls. The first officer said goodbye to the passengers as they deplaned. I asked if the flight attendant's wanted to debrief and if they were ok; and they just said we are fine called dispatch; who notified soc and the duty officer.maintenance was there at the aircraft right as I parked. We had called maintenance for a consult prior to leaving ZZZ about possible fluid on one of the lines on the nose gear. They had told me that it was torque fluid and not to worry. This was never put into the aircraft logbook. Once parked I could see the maintenance personnel immediately inspecting the nose wheel area for the possible leak; the leak we not there; the leak was found in the left hand elevator area. I wrote up the discrepancy and handed the aircraft over to maintenance. In hindsight when I called for the original consult for possible fluid on the nose gear; a logbook entry should have been made. [Requesting priority handling] was always on my mind; but with only cyan messages and maintenance's guidance to monitor it and to call them back if it got worse; I never did; I should have and I think we may have gotten to the airport faster; though I knew the landing gear extension; regardless of when I did it; would cause further system issues. Rolling the emergency vehicles and declaring was not something I was felt we were at during the event; until we landed and further systems failures manifested. Declaring and rolling the trucks would have been a more conservative approach and what I would have done knowing what I know now. Given all that happened; safety and being conservative was always our #1 priority and felt we handled the situation very well. I think that dispatch and maintenance could have provided better in flight guidance and a supervisor should have been notified. An inflight diversion to ZZZ1 while I still had fluid was a something I considered and dispatch mentioned; but maybe I should have made the decision for them. Watching the level go from 20% to zero and knowing the issues to come was unnerving.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E175 captain reported decreasing hydraulic system #2 fluid at cruising altitude that lead to a hydraulic pump failure on final.

Narrative: While inflight at 36;000 ft.; EICAS 'HYD 2 LO QTY' illuminated. No QRH checklist was available. We monitored HYD SYS 2 level at 20% and decreasing approximately 2% every 15 mins. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via Commercial Radio to discuss system problem. Told by Maintenance to monitor and report any other problems. Dispatch recommended continuing to ZZZ and ZZZ1 may become a diversion point if system failed. Continued to monitor system and the level decreasing. FO (First Officer) and [I] thoroughly discussed options and possible totally system failure and our planned course of action. Once in contact with Center; asked for priority handling and quickest route to airport. On final course once the landing gear was extended 'HYD PUMP 2 FAIL' illuminated. We broke off approach the visual approach and completed QRH checklist for the failed pump. Once the checklists were completed and we quickly re-briefed we asked for second visual approach and safety landed.Immediately after landing; multiple red warnings and yellow cautions illuminated and I took the airplane. I noted limited braking and no nose wheel steering on the aircraft. I safely slowed the aircraft using moderate braking and we exited the runway using rudder steering on a high speed exit. We stopped on the taxiway and told Ground we need to run some checklists. We completed the checklists but all the failures were associated with the hydraulic system level being at zero. I then noticed excessive brake temperatures and contacted Ground Control for aircraft crash rescue to inspect aircraft for hot brakes. We started the APU and shut down both engines. Aircraft crash rescue inspected aircraft and confirmed no abnormalities; we contacted ZZZ ops for aircraft tow to gate. Tow team safely towed to gate and we deplaned. Maintenance met us at the gate and we entered the failure into the aircraft log book. I then contacted Dispatch; SOC and the Duty officer. During this situation we continuously updated the FA's (Flight Attendants); passengers and ops. During our Commercial Radio conversation with Maintenance; they really provided no guidance which I understand is our policy. They simply stated to monitor it and call them back if it got worse. This was also Dispatch's guidance. I'm not sure if this situation was briefed up to a supervisor and if it was it may have changed the guidance. After the call; I've started coming up with what to do next as I watched the level go to 20% to zero during the last hour of the flight but still had no other EICAS messages. We had thoroughly briefed and discussed in detail for every possible failure and our course of action. Even though the system had not failed; I was concerned it would. We got priority handling from ATC and I had briefed them on the situation. Because it had not failed; I choose not to [request priority handling]. In hindsight; [requesting priority handling] may have further expedited our arrival and approach. I had a feeling that the large surge in system pressure during the landing gear extension would cause the hydraulic 2 pump to fail. And on final once we placed the gear down; it did. We calmly broke off the approach and completed our already thoroughly pre briefed QRH checklist. At that time I only had 2 cyan messages on the EICAS and we had no other abnormalities or aircraft problems that made me feel a [priority handling request] was needed. We did not change our aircraft configuration during the missed approach while completing checklists and coming around for the second approach. All systems were normal; but I knew we needed to land soon as any further hydraulic system 2 issues would surely drive us to more QRH checklists and possible loss of aircraft systems. On short final; all was normal and we safety landed; I suspected that other messages would come up as the WOW switches closed; and they did; a lot of them. I was already at the ready and took the aircraft from the FO once on the ground. I used moderate to more than moderate braking to safety slow and stop the aircraft. I chose to exit the runway on the high speed using only rudder steering as we had no nose wheel steering. Once clear; I set the emergency parking brake and called for the top red messages which was the reverser failure which I could hear the #2 engine reverser was still deployed. After that we ran a spoiler fail checklist and I told the FO to stop as all the messages were associated with the hydraulic system 2 level being at zero and I noticed the increasing brake temperatures. I called for crash fire rescue as a precaution. We started the APU and shut down both engines. I made a PA to let the FA's and passengers know our situation. Crash rescue inspected our aircraft; including the brakes; and noted no issues. We had already called ZZZ ops and asked to be towed in. The tow was ready and towed us into the gate. Once parked; we started deplaning and I started all my phone calls. The FO said goodbye to the passengers as they deplaned. I asked if the FA's wanted to debrief and if they were ok; and they just said we are fine called Dispatch; who notified SOC and the duty officer.Maintenance was there at the aircraft right as I parked. We had called Maintenance for a consult prior to leaving ZZZ about possible fluid on one of the lines on the nose gear. They had told me that it was torque fluid and not to worry. This was never put into the aircraft logbook. Once parked I could see the maintenance personnel immediately inspecting the nose wheel area for the possible leak; The leak we not there; The leak was found in the left hand elevator area. I wrote up the discrepancy and handed the aircraft over to Maintenance. In hindsight when I called for the original consult for possible fluid on the nose gear; a logbook entry should have been made. [Requesting priority handling] was always on my mind; but with only cyan messages and Maintenance's guidance to monitor it and to call them back if it got worse; I never did; I should have and I think we may have gotten to the airport faster; though I knew the landing gear extension; regardless of when I did it; would cause further system issues. Rolling the emergency vehicles and declaring was not something I was felt we were at during the event; until we landed and further systems failures manifested. Declaring and rolling the trucks would have been a more conservative approach and what I would have done knowing what I know now. Given all that happened; safety and being conservative was always our #1 priority and felt we handled the situation very well. I think that Dispatch and Maintenance could have provided better in flight guidance and a supervisor should have been notified. An inflight diversion to ZZZ1 while I still had fluid was a something I considered and Dispatch mentioned; but maybe I should have made the decision for them. Watching the level go from 20% to zero and knowing the issues to come was unnerving.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.