Narrative:

My day started in lga; day 5 of 5 on reserve. I flew the first leg which was a non-event and the first officer (first officer) seemed very sharp and I gained some confidence in him. The first officer flew the return leg to lga and the flight was uneventful from takeoff all the way through the descent which again instilled confidence for me in the first officer. We were vectored for the visual approach to runway 22 and ATC brought us in kind of tight. There was a crosswind from the right; which delayed our intercept with the localizer. The first officer did not notice this and I realized we would be high if he didn't start down with setting a lower altitude and using fpa (flight path angle) to start descending. This is where the approach completely fell apart for the first officer. After I vocalized that the first officer needed to set a lower altitude and start descending; it took him 5-10 seconds to process what I said; and by that time we were high. At that point; the first officer completely shut down and I realized he became very flustered; overwhelmed; and tunnel vision set in. I began calling for all his gear; flaps; checklist; and speeds. We were configured by 1000ft but when I looked down we were doing 1400ft per min around 700ft. I said watch your descent rate; the first officer then froze again so I nudged the controls to bring us within limits. The first officer then completely blew through the glide slope on the bottom end; the aural glideslope alert sounded to which the first officer promptly responded correcting. With his prompt response; I thought he would level off to get back on glideslope. That is not what happened as the aural glideslope alert continued to sound. I then nudged the controls to level the aircraft and bring us back onto the correct glideslope.we were visual the whole time and I had the runway right in front of me so I allowed the approach to continue. The first officer then landed the plane pretty hard and side loaded. I took the flight controls at 60kts and taxied to the gate without incident. Now to review on what happened... As a new captain; this the first time I've flown with an first officer whose flying was not so good and an first officer who completely feel behind the airplane. After the first leg; I believed this first officer was sharp and this approach at the end caught me completely off guard. It was a beautiful day outside and a completely normal operation which added to me getting caught off guard. In the moment; I believed the safest action was to coach the first officer down to landing and nudge the flight controls as needed. After reflecting on what happened; I was completely wrong. I should've called a go around and allowed the first officer to restart the approach from scratch. Considering the state the first officer was in; I don't believe he would've done the required items on a go around; but regardless I should've called it and coached him through the go around as needed. This was a big learning experience for me and one I will take with me going forward.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain reported that an unstabilized approach was flown after an ATC vector to a short final ILS approach course.

Narrative: My day started in LGA; day 5 of 5 on reserve. I flew the first leg which was a non-event and the First Officer (FO) seemed very sharp and I gained some confidence in him. The FO flew the return leg to LGA and the flight was uneventful from takeoff all the way through the descent which again instilled confidence for me in the FO. We were vectored for the visual approach to Runway 22 and ATC brought us in kind of tight. There was a crosswind from the right; which delayed our intercept with the localizer. The FO did not notice this and I realized we would be high if he didn't start down with setting a lower altitude and using FPA (Flight Path Angle) to start descending. This is where the approach completely fell apart for the FO. After I vocalized that the FO needed to set a lower altitude and start descending; it took him 5-10 seconds to process what I said; and by that time we were high. At that point; the FO completely shut down and I realized he became very flustered; overwhelmed; and tunnel vision set in. I began calling for all his gear; flaps; checklist; and speeds. We were configured by 1000ft but when I looked down we were doing 1400ft per min around 700ft. I said watch your descent rate; the FO then froze again so I nudged the controls to bring us within limits. The FO then completely blew through the glide slope on the bottom end; the aural glideslope alert sounded to which the FO promptly responded correcting. With his prompt response; I thought he would level off to get back on glideslope. That is not what happened as the aural glideslope alert continued to sound. I then nudged the controls to level the aircraft and bring us back onto the correct glideslope.We were visual the whole time and I had the runway right in front of me so I allowed the approach to continue. The FO then landed the plane pretty hard and side loaded. I took the flight controls at 60kts and taxied to the gate without incident. Now to review on what happened... As a new captain; this the first time I've flown with an FO whose flying was not so good and an FO who completely feel behind the airplane. After the first leg; I believed this FO was sharp and this approach at the end caught me completely off guard. It was a beautiful day outside and a completely normal operation which added to me getting caught off guard. In the moment; I believed the safest action was to coach the FO down to landing and nudge the flight controls as needed. After reflecting on what happened; I was completely wrong. I should've called a go around and allowed the FO to restart the approach from scratch. Considering the state the FO was in; I don't believe he would've done the required items on a go around; but regardless I should've called it and coached him through the go around as needed. This was a big learning experience for me and one I will take with me going forward.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.