Narrative:

On the morning of (date); a nice day as far as the weather was concerned; we were cleared to taxi into [gate]. I was recently warned by ramp control to avoid blasting the firehouse with jet blast when taxing into that gate. We've been warned before as a pilot group regarding the dangers of jet blast particularly in the gate area of lax. As we taxied past [spot] I noticed a crew of marshallers gathered at the bottom of [gate] on the ramp. I anticipated them taking positions to guide us into the gate as we got closer. As [gate] faces the firehouse; I wanted to keep the engines at idle as we made our right turn to the gate. I judged the plane had enough momentum to take us to the gate without pushing up the engines which would blast the firehouse with jet blast. The marshallers did not take their positions as rapidly as I had anticipated. I did not see any equipment inside the safety lines so I chose to idle the plane into the gate. As we got closer to the gate the central marshaller held up his wands crossed indicating for me to stop. Given that all equipment was outside safety lines I thought he would quickly uncross the wands and start to guide me in. I didn't want to stop the plane at this point for that would necessitate me pushing up the throttles to get the plane going again and thereby jet blasting the firehouse. The marshaller eventually did uncross his wands and guided me in to the gate.in retrospect; I should have stopped the plane at the marshaller signal. My concern for the firemen in the firehouse and the damage that jet blast could cause them was perhaps misplaced in this instance. As a pilot; in spite of what we see or think we see; we must depend on and work with our ground crews to keep our operation safe as possible for all concerned. Going forward I recommend that when we taxi into [gates] we wait abeam [gate] until our marshalling crew is in position. That way we can power past the firehouse with our engines' jet blast going west; away from the firehouse. We would then be able to use minimal power going into those gates.I recommend that when we taxi into [gates] we wait abeam [gate] until our marshalling crew is in position. The ground crew should be anticipating us waiting for them to get into position so they are ready and waiting to do so when they see our arrival abeam [gate]. That way we can power past the firehouse with our engines' jet blast going west; away from the firehouse. We would then be able to use minimal power going into those gates.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported that a miscommunication with the ground crew at the gate caused them to deviate from instructions.

Narrative: On the morning of (date); a nice day as far as the weather was concerned; we were cleared to taxi into [gate]. I was recently warned by ramp control to avoid blasting the firehouse with jet blast when taxing into that gate. We've been warned before as a pilot group regarding the dangers of jet blast particularly in the gate area of LAX. As we taxied past [spot] I noticed a crew of marshallers gathered at the bottom of [gate] on the ramp. I anticipated them taking positions to guide us into the gate as we got closer. As [gate] faces the firehouse; I wanted to keep the engines at idle as we made our right turn to the gate. I judged the plane had enough momentum to take us to the gate without pushing up the engines which would blast the firehouse with jet blast. The marshallers did not take their positions as rapidly as I had anticipated. I did not see any equipment inside the safety lines so I chose to idle the plane into the gate. As we got closer to the gate the central marshaller held up his wands crossed indicating for me to stop. Given that all equipment was outside safety lines I thought he would quickly uncross the wands and start to guide me in. I didn't want to stop the plane at this point for that would necessitate me pushing up the throttles to get the plane going again and thereby jet blasting the firehouse. The marshaller eventually did uncross his wands and guided me in to the gate.In retrospect; I should have stopped the plane at the marshaller signal. My concern for the firemen in the firehouse and the damage that jet blast could cause them was perhaps misplaced in this instance. As a pilot; in spite of what we see or think we see; we must depend on and work with our ground crews to keep our operation safe as possible for all concerned. Going forward I recommend that when we taxi into [gates] we wait abeam [gate] until our marshalling crew is in position. That way we can power past the firehouse with our engines' jet blast going west; away from the firehouse. We would then be able to use minimal power going into those gates.I recommend that when we taxi into [gates] we wait abeam [gate] until our marshalling crew is in position. The ground crew should be anticipating us waiting for them to get into position so they are ready and waiting to do so when they see our arrival abeam [gate]. That way we can power past the firehouse with our engines' jet blast going west; away from the firehouse. We would then be able to use minimal power going into those gates.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.