Narrative:

Climbing through FL300 an EICAS message displayed fuel xfer inoperative. There was 480 lbs in the tank. I told the pm (pilot monitoring) we should run the QRH for fuel xfer inoperative. I explained that I had had this message previously with the company and that at some point with fuel trapped in the ventral tank it becomes critical. I again called for the QRH. As a line check airman on IOE with a new captain I did not make a third request. I pulled the QRH and began reading. (The plane was on ap (autopilot) and we were in the climb and had 5;000 feet till level off) I instructed the pm to speak with ATC advise we were not declaring but might be diverting. Also to get in contact with dispatch and ask for guidance. After reading the QRH we selected a different pump. It worked for a few seconds and failed again. As I read further I saw the fuel number of 3131 lbs. As it was night and we were a bit tired. This may have contributed to reading this as 3;131 lbs. In the wing tank as the number did not say 3131 lbs. Total or 1;500~ lbs a side. I saw 3;700 lbs. In each wing and decided at that moment since we weren't 20 minutes outside of ZZZ with ZZZ1 being another hour and a half away with an alternate of ZZZ3. I'd better not chance it and begin to divert. I observed the plane level at FL350 and then handed the QRH to the observer as he was a C5 first officer and asked that he read it to catch anything I had missed. The pm was attempting to send an ACARS...I explained that might not be the most efficient mode of communication right now and asked to use ZZZ2 radio (airinc). As he got his ipad out I tuned the frequency which I knew by heart and gave them a call. When connected with dispatch I explained the situation. That both pumps had failed and we had fuel trapped. I asked for their input. They put us on hold and asked what the nature was again. I explained the situation again. After a few minutes with no decision I told them we were planning to divert and it was either ZZZ3 or ZZZ. ZZZ4 was closer by far but their input was ZZZ which we followed. We did not declare with ATC as it was not a full emergency and began the return to ZZZ. The jumpseater had caught a step in the QRH for the override knob which we then selected. The ventral began vacating. At this point the crew agreed to continue the diversion as it was the safest option. I asked to run the QRH for overweight landing. I asked the jumpseater to monitor the vsi on touchdown and explained the landing and runway exit plan. We taxiied to the gate and swapped planes and continued to ZZZ1.after the fact it is easy to identify that I had taken on too much responsibility during the event. Unfortunately this is a side effect of having been single pilot for months on end. I had called for a checklist and that had not been done. So I began taking care of the issue alone. I did my best to include our jumpseater to increase safety and including dispatch with our call. The duty manager did call after we were on the ground to inform us that it was better for the passenger if we had continued to ZZZ1. However; even though the situation was not an emergency as the PF (pilot flying). I decided it was better to return to a field where I knew the field conditions then to continue over an hour and a half to a field with a filed alternate and possibly putting ourselves into an emergency. Unfortunately due to the workload I did miss the override pump on the QRH which we later caught with the help of the jumpseater. Having a third person available to me and one versed in our planes was a resource I think the crew used well. Next time given this failure (being that it was not an immediate emergency) I would give the captain in training more time to get on the same page. However; as a rather new line check airman I think my desire to ensure safety versus treating it as an exercise was warranted. Suggestions are welcome.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 flight crew reported diverting because of a fuel transfer problem.

Narrative: Climbing through FL300 an EICAS message displayed FUEL XFER INOP. There was 480 lbs in the tank. I told the PM (Pilot Monitoring) we should run the QRH for FUEL XFER INOP. I explained that I had had this message previously with the company and that at some point with fuel trapped in the ventral tank it becomes critical. I again called for the QRH. As a Line Check Airman on IOE with a new Captain I did not make a third request. I pulled the QRH and began reading. (The plane was on AP (autopilot) and we were in the climb and had 5;000 feet till level off) I instructed the PM to speak with ATC advise we were not declaring but might be diverting. Also to get in contact with Dispatch and ask for guidance. After reading the QRH we selected a different pump. It worked for a few seconds and failed again. As I read further I saw the fuel number of 3131 lbs. As it was night and we were a bit tired. This may have contributed to reading this as 3;131 lbs. in the wing tank as the number did not say 3131 lbs. total or 1;500~ lbs a side. I saw 3;700 lbs. in each wing and decided at that moment since we weren't 20 minutes outside of ZZZ with ZZZ1 being another hour and a half away with an alternate of ZZZ3. I'd better not chance it and begin to divert. I observed the plane level at FL350 and then handed the QRH to the observer as he was a C5 FO and asked that he read it to catch anything I had missed. The PM was attempting to send an ACARS...I explained that might not be the most efficient mode of communication right now and asked to use ZZZ2 radio (AIRINC). As he got his iPad out I tuned the frequency which I knew by heart and gave them a call. When connected with Dispatch I explained the situation. That both pumps had failed and we had fuel trapped. I asked for their input. They put us on hold and asked what the nature was again. I explained the situation again. After a few minutes with no decision I told them we were planning to divert and it was either ZZZ3 or ZZZ. ZZZ4 was closer by far but their input was ZZZ which we followed. We did not declare with ATC as it was not a full emergency and began the return to ZZZ. The jumpseater had caught a step in the QRH for the override knob which we then selected. The ventral began vacating. At this point the crew agreed to continue the diversion as it was the safest option. I asked to run the QRH for overweight landing. I asked the jumpseater to monitor the VSI on touchdown and explained the landing and runway exit plan. We taxiied to the gate and swapped planes and continued to ZZZ1.After the fact it is easy to identify that I had taken on too much responsibility during the event. Unfortunately this is a side effect of having been single pilot for months on end. I had called for a checklist and that had not been done. So I began taking care of the issue alone. I did my best to include our jumpseater to increase safety and including Dispatch with our call. The duty manager did call after we were on the ground to inform us that it was better for the passenger if we had continued to ZZZ1. However; even though the situation was not an emergency as the PF (Pilot Flying). I decided it was better to return to a field where I knew the field conditions then to continue over an hour and a half to a field with a filed alternate and possibly putting ourselves into an emergency. Unfortunately due to the workload I did miss the override pump on the QRH which we later caught with the help of the jumpseater. Having a third person available to me and one versed in our planes was a resource I think the crew used well. Next time given this failure (being that it was not an immediate emergency) I would give the Captain in training more time to get on the same page. However; as a rather new Line Check Airman I think my desire to ensure safety versus treating it as an exercise was warranted. Suggestions are welcome.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.