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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1699919 |
Time | |
Date | 201911 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
We accepted a release and subsequently departed without an alternate with weather in the taf that should have required an alternate and the associated fuel. We discovered the error enroute to ZZZ when we noticed the poor forecast in the most recent weather and looked back to compare that against our release. We immediately contacted dispatch via ACARS to discuss options. Dispatch advised they were surprised the release went out before they could add the alternate and the fuel as they had done for several other ZZZ flights. We further discussed fuel on board and the possibility of using ZZZ1 or ZZZ2 as an alternate or using exemption 10;000 lbs. We briefly lost ACARS communication during this process; but we were able to restore ACARS and reach a joint decision based on our fuel on board to divert to ZZZ3 to refuel and continue to ZZZ. We advised ATC; flight attendants; and passengers of the diversion; landed in ZZZ3 and subsequently departed for ZZZ after refueling without issue. I believe origins for this error lie in the airborne holding we were assigned on our inbound flight from ZZZ4 to ZZZ5 due to vip movement. This holding resulted in a significant arrival delay; cutting our scheduled turn time for our ZZZ leg down to about 20 minutes during which we also were completely changing out the cabin crew as well. This led to us feeling time pressured to accomplish our tasks to turn the aircraft for our ZZZ departure. During the turn I set [briefer] to download the flight briefing for ZZZ and immediately went outside to do my walk around. When I returned; I looked at the weather summary dots for the destination and not noticing anything; I pulled the release and other documentation from dispatch. I saw no alternate listed there and with the time crunch; I continued on with my preflight preparations without looking further at the weather in the release under the assumption that if I hadn't noticed any indication of poor weather in [briefing] and there was no alternate listed on the release that we were appropriately planned and filed. The captain was also task saturated during this time with his responsibilities during the turn; resulting in neither of us catching the dispatch error. The most obvious would be to slow down and make sure I take the time needed to fully evaluate the flight paperwork during such high pressure quick turn scenarios; even if this may result in a longer than 'published' turn time. Base on our conversation with dispatch during the event I was left with the impression that some of the 'sending' of the flight release is automated and can occur without the dispatcher giving final direct send approval. If that is the case; I would suggest either removing that function of their software automation and asking the dispatcher manually responsible for the send command for a release or equip the automation with some ability to error check before sending paperwork on its own.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A319 First Officer reported being dispatched without proper fuel load nor an alternate; resulting in a diversion.
Narrative: We accepted a release and subsequently departed without an alternate with weather in the TAF that should have required an alternate and the associated fuel. We discovered the error enroute to ZZZ when we noticed the poor forecast in the most recent weather and looked back to compare that against our release. We immediately contacted Dispatch via ACARS to discuss options. Dispatch advised they were surprised the release went out before they could add the alternate and the fuel as they had done for several other ZZZ flights. We further discussed fuel on board and the possibility of using ZZZ1 or ZZZ2 as an alternate or using exemption 10;000 lbs. We briefly lost ACARS communication during this process; but we were able to restore ACARS and reach a joint decision based on our fuel on board to divert to ZZZ3 to refuel and continue to ZZZ. We advised ATC; flight attendants; and passengers of the diversion; landed in ZZZ3 and subsequently departed for ZZZ after refueling without issue. I believe origins for this error lie in the airborne holding we were assigned on our inbound flight from ZZZ4 to ZZZ5 due to VIP movement. This holding resulted in a significant arrival delay; cutting our scheduled turn time for our ZZZ leg down to about 20 minutes during which we also were completely changing out the cabin crew as well. This led to us feeling time pressured to accomplish our tasks to turn the aircraft for our ZZZ departure. During the turn I set [briefer] to download the flight briefing for ZZZ and immediately went outside to do my walk around. When I returned; I looked at the weather summary dots for the destination and not noticing anything; I pulled the release and other documentation from Dispatch. I saw no alternate listed there and with the time crunch; I continued on with my preflight preparations without looking further at the weather in the release under the assumption that if I hadn't noticed any indication of poor weather in [briefing] and there was no alternate listed on the release that we were appropriately planned and filed. The Captain was also task saturated during this time with his responsibilities during the turn; resulting in neither of us catching the dispatch error. The most obvious would be to slow down and make sure I take the time needed to fully evaluate the flight paperwork during such high pressure quick turn scenarios; even if this may result in a longer than 'published' turn time. Base on our conversation with Dispatch during the event I was left with the impression that some of the 'sending' of the flight release is automated and can occur without the Dispatcher giving final direct send approval. If that is the case; I would suggest either removing that function of their software automation and asking the Dispatcher manually responsible for the send command for a release or equip the automation with some ability to error check before sending paperwork on its own.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.