Narrative:

15 minutes before reaching zzzzz waypoint; at FL320; we received a right hydraulic qty EICAS message. I asked the first officer to get the QRH while I checked the status page. Once on the page I witnessed the right hydraulic level stating .43RF. After completing the QRH I called the flight attendant to wake up the mechanic and the other captain and have them come to the flight deck. Then we sent a message to company via ACARS. While this was going on we were talking to ZZZ and just entered our north atlantic crossing at zzzzz waypoint. We let ZZZ know that we might have to turn around and proceed to our ETOPS alternate; which was ZZZZ1 airport. They told us to keep them advised. Shortly after the other captain came in and sat at the observer seat while the mechanic sat behind me. I brought them up to speed on the current situation and had the other captain call company via satcom. The mechanic took a look at the status page and at this time the hydraulic quantity was at .38RF. At the rate of loss I had the first officer tell ZZZ that we would like to proceed to ZZZ1. Moments later we were give a turn to our new destination airport. I then informed the flight attendant that we were going to our alternate airport; that it was not an emergency but we did lose one of our hydraulic systems; and that we would be landing in about 30-40 minutes. The captain sitting at the observer seat advised me that company would like us to perform the hydraulic system pressure (right only) checklist in order to prevent damaging the pumps; and hopefully to stop the hydraulic leak. Our mechanic agreed with this plan. After performing the checklist we stopped the leak at .35RF. Moments later; [company] requested that we proceed to ZZZ2 airport instead of ZZZ1. Since we had a lot of fuel to burn; in order to be under max landing weight; and the weather was fine in ZZZ2; we proceeded to our new destination airport after calling ATC. This is when we noticed that the brake source light was on; which confused all of us since we still had our center hydraulic system working just fine so we should have alternate brakes. We followed the QRH and with the reserve breaks and steering switch in the brake source light was still on. We then had the company calculate and send us the landing performance for runway 24 into ZZZ2; besides the right side main brakes reaching to 7 before cooling there were no further problems. We were able to taxi off the runway under our own power.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain reported that a hydraulic system failure resulted in a diversion.

Narrative: 15 minutes before reaching ZZZZZ waypoint; at FL320; we received a R HYD QTY EICAS message. I asked the First Officer to get the QRH while I checked the status page. Once on the page I witnessed the right hydraulic level stating .43RF. After completing the QRH I called the Flight Attendant to wake up the Mechanic and the other Captain and have them come to the flight deck. Then we sent a message to company via ACARS. While this was going on we were talking to ZZZ and just entered our North Atlantic crossing at ZZZZZ waypoint. We let ZZZ know that we might have to turn around and proceed to our ETOPS alternate; which was ZZZZ1 airport. They told us to keep them advised. Shortly after the other Captain came in and sat at the observer seat while the mechanic sat behind me. I brought them up to speed on the current situation and had the other Captain call company via SATCOM. The Mechanic took a look at the status page and at this time the hydraulic quantity was at .38RF. At the rate of loss I had the first officer tell ZZZ that we would like to proceed to ZZZ1. Moments later we were give a turn to our new destination airport. I then informed the Flight Attendant that we were going to our alternate airport; that it was not an emergency but we did lose one of our hydraulic systems; and that we would be landing in about 30-40 minutes. The Captain sitting at the observer seat advised me that company would like us to perform the Hydraulic System Pressure (R only) checklist in order to prevent damaging the pumps; and hopefully to stop the hydraulic leak. Our mechanic agreed with this plan. After performing the checklist we stopped the leak at .35RF. Moments later; [company] requested that we proceed to ZZZ2 airport instead of ZZZ1. Since we had a lot of fuel to burn; in order to be under max landing weight; and the weather was fine in ZZZ2; we proceeded to our new destination airport after calling ATC. This is when we noticed that the BRAKE SOURCE light was on; which confused all of us since we still had our center hydraulic system working just fine so we should have alternate brakes. We followed the QRH and with the reserve breaks and steering switch in the BRAKE SOURCE light was still on. We then had the company calculate and send us the landing performance for runway 24 into ZZZ2; besides the right side main brakes reaching to 7 before cooling there were no further problems. We were able to taxi off the runway under our own power.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.