Narrative:

Dispatched on aircraft X with 3 MEL items; 25-xx; 28-xx; and 28-xxa. I reviewed the mels in operations. Per 28-xx knew to look for a fueling slip and a form xxxxx; though I was not familiar with that form. Once at the aircraft during preflight we did receive both forms from different fuelers. Release was 14;612; fuel slip showed a total of 14;800 lbs. At the gate the #1 tank showed 7.40; the center 0.00; the #2 tank was blank; and the totalizer was blank. Spending some time attempting to understand the form xxxxx; I discerned it was our aircraft and date; and the stuck tank measured to an equivalent volume of 7400 lbs. So it looked we had a balanced load of empty center and 7400 lbs in each wing tank. I filled in 14.8 in the fuel block on the init reference page; as that block was blank.during pushback and engine start the ground crew reported a fuel leak from the #2 engine. I had him stay connected during the five minute warm up period. By the end of the 5 minutes the leak stopped. Taxi; takeoff; climb; and cruise were normal. ATC gave us 2 shortcuts; one direct zzzzz after ZZZZZ1; then later direct ZZZZZ2. Fuel check at zzzzz was right on. I subsequently did the MEL recommended fuel check using fuel used. That showed 2.7 used by each engine (5.4 total). Deducted from the starting fuel of 14.8 gave us 9.4. Just after that we passed abeam ZZZZZ3; where I recorded 9.2; compared to the miscellaneous 14 prediction of 9.5.shortly thereafter the #2 tank fwd pump low pressure light began to flash. I pointed this out to the first officer (first officer) and commented something like 'well that's not right!' then 'well now why would that be happening?' subsequently that light came on steady; followed by the aft low pressure light beginning to flash. I told the first officer we had a big problem and that we needed to consider that the only fuel we might have available was the #1 tank fuel; as I pointed to the left quantity. We agreed; and at that point the #2 aft lp light came on steady; both mc lights came on; and the #2 engine began rolling back.at this point it appeared we had a right engine failure. We ensured the first officer had the aircraft; he clicked off the automation and managed the yaw and loss of thrust. I reached up and opened the fuel crossfeed. Our estimate was that N1 decreased to about 20-30 %. After a very mild audible and tactile vibration; the right engine began to recover; increasing N1 and N2 and returning to normal thrust and indications. The first officer and I agreed on the diversion to ZZZ which was ahead at 11:30 clock code and by then about 100 miles ahead. I [spoke with] ATC and told them we were diverting to ZZZ. I had been to ZZZ before and knew the station had [company] maintenance. I asked for a series of right 360s to descend. ATC said they had traffic over there; asked if we could take a left vector heading to absorb the altitude loss and I said yes. The first officer continued to manage energy while flying the aircraft. From there it was the normal ACARS miscellaneous [message]; backing up the first officer as he deftly flew the aircraft and got us down expeditiously; running regular checklists; completing non-routine landing consideration tasks; talking to the #1 flight attendant (flight attendant); making pas; etc. The first officer flew a flawless visual approach and spectacular touchdown; backed up by the ILS; to rw xxl.after landing on rw 1XXL and clearing the runway I asked the arff commander if he saw any fuel leaking from the right wing or engine and he said no. Proceeded to gate xx. On the gate the indicating fuel gauges showed 3.52 in the #1 tank; 0.00 in the center tank. No other fuel light had ever annunciated (e.g. 'Low' or 'imbal'). Maintenance was on the jet bridge; boarded on our arrival and we began the conversation; relating the details of what we saw over time. We agreed with their plan to stick the right wing; look for fuel leaks; talk to [maintenance control]; and eventually refuel to a known quantity and stick again. The fueler reported the #2 wing tank was 'bone dry'. We discussedpossible causes of our symptoms: a fuel leak; bad fuel; fuel sticking inconsistencies. They began their work; saying eventually they would be doing an engine start and run to look for leaks; all of which would take some time.in speaking with dispatch to determine a rough fuel load that maintenance could use in their work; [I was asked] to speak to a maintenance manager who was there. The manager asked for a recap; what lights we had; what paperwork we had received in ZZZ1; what RPM the #2 had spooled down to; and asked if we could send him copies of the fuel slip and form xxxxx. I later had the first officer do that. ZZZ maintenance continued to work with us. They reported there was no placard out on the refueling panel for the 28-xxa.I made periodic pas to the passengers. The #1 flight attendant indicated there were some passengers that wanted to deplane. I went up to the gate to retrieve an agent. We discussed the options and mutually decided to deplane everyone. Back on the aircraft calls with dispatch resulted in us learning the aircraft was taken OTS. 3 aml entries were made reporting the fuel tank low pressure lights and subsequent rollback with empty #2 tank upon arrival at gate; the engine rollback; and the pulled cvr circuit breaker.we began to get texts from ZZZ1 chief pilots supporting us and offering assistance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew was dispatched with several MELs regarding fuel system. During flight crew received several fuel warning lights and the right engine rolled back. Crew diverted; landed safely; and learned their right wing fuel tank was empty.

Narrative: Dispatched on Aircraft X with 3 MEL items; 25-XX; 28-XX; and 28-XXA. I reviewed the MELs in OPS. Per 28-XX knew to look for a fueling slip and a form XXXXX; though I was not familiar with that form. Once at the aircraft during preflight we did receive both forms from different fuelers. Release was 14;612; fuel slip showed a total of 14;800 lbs. At the gate the #1 tank showed 7.40; the center 0.00; the #2 tank was blank; and the totalizer was blank. Spending some time attempting to understand the form XXXXX; I discerned it was our aircraft and date; and the stuck tank measured to an equivalent volume of 7400 lbs. So it looked we had a balanced load of empty center and 7400 lbs in each wing tank. I filled in 14.8 in the fuel block on the INIT REF page; as that block was blank.During pushback and engine start the ground crew reported a fuel leak from the #2 engine. I had him stay connected during the five minute warm up period. By the end of the 5 minutes the leak stopped. Taxi; takeoff; climb; and cruise were normal. ATC gave us 2 shortcuts; one direct ZZZZZ after ZZZZZ1; then later direct ZZZZZ2. Fuel check at ZZZZZ was right on. I subsequently did the MEL recommended fuel check using fuel used. That showed 2.7 used by each engine (5.4 total). Deducted from the starting fuel of 14.8 gave us 9.4. Just after that we passed abeam ZZZZZ3; where I recorded 9.2; compared to the MISC 14 prediction of 9.5.Shortly thereafter the #2 tank FWD pump LOW PRESSURE light began to flash. I pointed this out to the FO (First Officer) and commented something like 'well that's not right!' then 'well now why would that be happening?' Subsequently that light came on steady; followed by the AFT LOW PRESSURE light beginning to flash. I told the FO we had a big problem and that we needed to consider that the only fuel we might have available was the #1 tank fuel; as I pointed to the left quantity. We agreed; and at that point the #2 AFT LP light came on steady; both MC lights came on; and the #2 engine began rolling back.At this point it appeared we had a right engine failure. We ensured the FO had the aircraft; he clicked off the automation and managed the yaw and loss of thrust. I reached up and opened the fuel crossfeed. Our estimate was that N1 decreased to about 20-30 %. After a very mild audible and tactile vibration; the right engine began to recover; increasing N1 and N2 and returning to normal thrust and indications. The FO and I agreed on the diversion to ZZZ which was ahead at 11:30 clock code and by then about 100 miles ahead. I [spoke with] ATC and told them we were diverting to ZZZ. I had been to ZZZ before and knew the station had [company] maintenance. I asked for a series of right 360s to descend. ATC said they had traffic over there; asked if we could take a left vector heading to absorb the altitude loss and I said yes. The FO continued to manage energy while flying the aircraft. From there it was the normal ACARS MISC [message]; backing up the FO as he deftly flew the aircraft and got us down expeditiously; running regular checklists; completing non-routine landing consideration tasks; talking to the #1 FA (Flight Attendant); making PAs; etc. The FO flew a flawless visual approach and spectacular touchdown; backed up by the ILS; to RW XXL.After landing on RW 1XXL and clearing the Runway I asked the ARFF commander if he saw any fuel leaking from the right wing or engine and he said no. Proceeded to gate XX. On the gate the indicating fuel gauges showed 3.52 in the #1 tank; 0.00 in the center tank. No other fuel light had ever annunciated (e.g. 'LOW' or 'IMBAL'). Maintenance was on the jet bridge; boarded on our arrival and we began the conversation; relating the details of what we saw over time. We agreed with their plan to stick the right wing; look for fuel leaks; talk to [Maintenance Control]; and eventually refuel to a known quantity and stick again. The fueler reported the #2 wing tank was 'bone dry'. We discussedpossible causes of our symptoms: a fuel leak; bad fuel; fuel sticking inconsistencies. They began their work; saying eventually they would be doing an engine start and run to look for leaks; all of which would take some time.In speaking with dispatch to determine a rough fuel load that maintenance could use in their work; [I was asked] to speak to a maintenance manager who was there. The manager asked for a recap; what lights we had; what paperwork we had received in ZZZ1; what RPM the #2 had spooled down to; and asked if we could send him copies of the fuel slip and form XXXXX. I later had the FO do that. ZZZ maintenance continued to work with us. They reported there was no placard out on the refueling panel for the 28-XXa.I made periodic PAs to the passengers. The #1 FA indicated there were some passengers that wanted to deplane. I went up to the gate to retrieve an agent. We discussed the options and mutually decided to deplane everyone. Back on the aircraft calls with dispatch resulted in us learning the aircraft was taken OTS. 3 AML entries were made reporting the fuel tank LOW PRESSURE lights and subsequent rollback with empty #2 tank upon arrival at gate; the engine rollback; and the pulled CVR CB.We began to get texts from ZZZ1 Chief Pilots supporting us and offering assistance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.