Narrative:

The airport was utilizing runway 8 as the active runway and runway 17 as the secondary inactive runway. I was working local control and the ground controller taxied an aircraft to runway 17 for departure. Per our procedure the ground controller told me runway 17 was now my control and I used the memory aid to note that (flipping the runway 17/35 inactive bar over). I assumed the runway was clear of all vehicles and runway crossings when ground control gave me control of the runway. I still scanned the runway before clearing an aircraft for takeoff. Aircraft X called me for departure from runway 17; I scanned the runway; cleared him for takeoff and told him no delay for traffic inbound to runway 8. After I cleared aircraft X; aircraft Y began crossing at a taxiway. I did not observe this because I was looking forward at aircraft X to ensure everything was spaced well with my runway 8 arrival. That taxiway is to your back when you are looking out towards runway 17. The ground controller had forgotten about the crossing when he gave me control of the runway so did not tell aircraft Y to hold short. Aircraft X ended up aborting takeoff after they were well into the takeoff roll because he saw the aircraft on the runway. I was very alarmed and immediately looked back to see aircraft Y half way across the runway.runway incursions appear to be quite common at this airport. Between the pilots and the controllers getting it wrong I would say we have an alarming number. We have procedures in place to prevent this from happening. The procedure that would have helped in this particular incident is the one that requires you to keep the flight strip with you at ground until all runways have been crossed. I believe this was followed. With an incident this significant it shows how strange it is that pns does not require runway crossings/change in control to be done on a recorded line. There is nothing recorded that says the ground controller gave me control of the runway. I think adding that step may make controllers less complacent and really think about everything they have going on before handing a runway over. It is another layer of accountability that should absolutely be incorporated into our procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PNS Local Controller reported they cleared an aircraft for takeoff while another aircraft had been cleared to cross the same runway by the Ground Controller. Flight crews reported the runway conflict as well and departing aircraft safely aborted the takeoff.

Narrative: The airport was utilizing Runway 8 as the active runway and Runway 17 as the secondary inactive runway. I was working Local Control and the Ground Controller taxied an aircraft to Runway 17 for departure. Per our procedure the Ground Controller told me Runway 17 was now my control and I used the memory aid to note that (flipping the Runway 17/35 Inactive bar over). I assumed the runway was clear of all vehicles and runway crossings when Ground Control gave me control of the runway. I still scanned the runway before clearing an aircraft for takeoff. Aircraft X called me for departure from Runway 17; I scanned the runway; cleared him for takeoff and told him no delay for traffic inbound to Runway 8. After I cleared Aircraft X; Aircraft Y began crossing at a taxiway. I did not observe this because I was looking forward at Aircraft X to ensure everything was spaced well with my Runway 8 arrival. That taxiway is to your back when you are looking out towards Runway 17. The Ground Controller had forgotten about the crossing when he gave me control of the runway so did not tell Aircraft Y to hold short. Aircraft X ended up aborting takeoff after they were well into the takeoff roll because he saw the aircraft on the runway. I was very alarmed and immediately looked back to see Aircraft Y half way across the runway.Runway incursions appear to be quite common at this airport. Between the pilots and the controllers getting it wrong I would say we have an alarming number. We have procedures in place to prevent this from happening. The procedure that would have helped in this particular incident is the one that requires you to keep the flight strip with you at Ground until all runways have been crossed. I believe this was followed. With an incident this significant it shows how strange it is that PNS does not require runway crossings/change in control to be done on a recorded line. There is nothing recorded that says the Ground Controller gave me control of the runway. I think adding that step may make controllers less complacent and really think about everything they have going on before handing a runway over. It is another layer of accountability that should absolutely be incorporated into our procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.