Narrative:

Departing tpe for sfo communication difficulty caused our aircraft to intercept the 052 degree right instead of the 072 degree right. This put us in the arrival route of an inbound widebody transport. The controller issued turn instructions to both aircraft and we passed well clear (2-3 mi) and intercepted the 072 degree right. I think that this was an avoidable incident, caused in part by company SOP. The captain programmed the flight plan into the FMC, the flying first officer verified the route. The augment first officer's were performing additional duties and were not involved in checking. Later the first officer called for the clearance which was different from the flight plan. The captain evidently didn't copy or understand the change. The FMC was never programmed for takeoff. The captain (PNF) was in map monitoring FMC route on his navigation display. The first officer (PF) was in VOR looking at raw data. Takeoff was normal through the turn to 090 degree called for on the departure. The two augment first officer's were monitoring ATC and performing traffic watch. Controller issued instructions to intercept a '0?2 degree right'. The captain thought it was 052 degree which was what he saw on the nd and didn't question the controller. The first officer continued through the 052 degree toward the 072 degree which is what he expected from his clearance. At this point none of the 4 guys in the cockpit knew that there was any confusion about the departure. The fact that the chinese controller had been hard to understand was passed over because the instructions followed the expected pattern. Three of the 4 pilots were expecting a departure on the 052 degree right per the flight plan and were looking at a navigation display (captain's) that confirmed the route. The only pilot expecting the 072 degree right was the first officer who was looking at a VOR display (a correct procedure) that doesn't announce the desired intercept path. The captain instructed the first officer to return to an intercept the 052 degree right. Conditions were day, VFR, with a very alert (for international operations standards) flight crew. Very competently aided by a skilled controller. Had this been night, IFR, tired with a less observant controller, we could have been a midair statistic. I think a review of pre-departure FMC procedures is in order, along with more regimented communication procedure. The workload in this environment is intense it is a very poor characteristic of this aircraft (widebody transport) that it cannot fly a VOR right on autoplt. Give me a break. The heavy transport aircraft autoplt can do that!

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR PLT MISINTERPRETATES SID OFF TPE AND COMES IN CLOSE PROX TO AN INBOUND WDB.

Narrative: DEPARTING TPE FOR SFO COM DIFFICULTY CAUSED OUR ACFT TO INTERCEPT THE 052 DEG R INSTEAD OF THE 072 DEG R. THIS PUT US IN THE ARR RTE OF AN INBND WDB. THE CTLR ISSUED TURN INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH ACFT AND WE PASSED WELL CLR (2-3 MI) AND INTERCEPTED THE 072 DEG R. I THINK THAT THIS WAS AN AVOIDABLE INCIDENT, CAUSED IN PART BY COMPANY SOP. THE CAPT PROGRAMMED THE FLT PLAN INTO THE FMC, THE FLYING F/O VERIFIED THE RTE. THE AUGMENT F/O'S WERE PERFORMING ADDITIONAL DUTIES AND WERE NOT INVOLVED IN CHKING. LATER THE F/O CALLED FOR THE CLRNC WHICH WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE FLT PLAN. THE CAPT EVIDENTLY DIDN'T COPY OR UNDERSTAND THE CHANGE. THE FMC WAS NEVER PROGRAMMED FOR TKOF. THE CAPT (PNF) WAS IN MAP MONITORING FMC RTE ON HIS NAV DISPLAY. THE F/O (PF) WAS IN VOR LOOKING AT RAW DATA. TKOF WAS NORMAL THROUGH THE TURN TO 090 DEG CALLED FOR ON THE DEP. THE TWO AUGMENT F/O'S WERE MONITORING ATC AND PERFORMING TFC WATCH. CTLR ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERCEPT A '0?2 DEG R'. THE CAPT THOUGHT IT WAS 052 DEG WHICH WAS WHAT HE SAW ON THE ND AND DIDN'T QUESTION THE CTLR. THE F/O CONTINUED THROUGH THE 052 DEG TOWARD THE 072 DEG WHICH IS WHAT HE EXPECTED FROM HIS CLRNC. AT THIS POINT NONE OF THE 4 GUYS IN THE COCKPIT KNEW THAT THERE WAS ANY CONFUSION ABOUT THE DEP. THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE CTLR HAD BEEN HARD TO UNDERSTAND WAS PASSED OVER BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWED THE EXPECTED PATTERN. THREE OF THE 4 PLTS WERE EXPECTING A DEP ON THE 052 DEG R PER THE FLT PLAN AND WERE LOOKING AT A NAV DISPLAY (CAPT'S) THAT CONFIRMED THE RTE. THE ONLY PLT EXPECTING THE 072 DEG R WAS THE F/O WHO WAS LOOKING AT A VOR DISPLAY (A CORRECT PROC) THAT DOESN'T ANNOUNCE THE DESIRED INTERCEPT PATH. THE CAPT INSTRUCTED THE F/O TO RETURN TO AN INTERCEPT THE 052 DEG R. CONDITIONS WERE DAY, VFR, WITH A VERY ALERT (FOR INTL OPS STANDARDS) FLT CREW. VERY COMPETENTLY AIDED BY A SKILLED CTLR. HAD THIS BEEN NIGHT, IFR, TIRED WITH A LESS OBSERVANT CTLR, WE COULD HAVE BEEN A MIDAIR STATISTIC. I THINK A REVIEW OF PRE-DEP FMC PROCS IS IN ORDER, ALONG WITH MORE REGIMENTED COM PROC. THE WORKLOAD IN THIS ENVIRONMENT IS INTENSE IT IS A VERY POOR CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS ACFT (WDB) THAT IT CANNOT FLY A VOR R ON AUTOPLT. GIVE ME A BREAK. THE HVT ACFT AUTOPLT CAN DO THAT!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.