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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1704299 |
Time | |
Date | 201911 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Cargo Door |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Company MEL xxxxx-cargo door-opening electrical control system-MEL reference # xxxxx mmel. This deferral is used to defer the electrical system that activates the hydraulic opening/closing of cargo doors. When this deferral is used; it triggers additional [company] MEL xxxxx-yellow system electric pump-MEL reference # xxxxx (mmel 29-xx-xx rev 26) which mandates that the (fully functional) Y elec hydraulic pump switch be placed to off and remain so. I presume this was done out of a preponderance of caution for the ground personnel.my issue is with company's mandatory trigger of XXXXX1 when xxxxx is used. There is a warning on A320 flight manual page 3.xx.X that states that if the aircraft starts to move with the parking brake handle on; pilots are to attempt to use brake pedals to stop movement. If that doesn't work; the pilots are to press the Y elec pump switch to on and try the brake pedals again. If we are on an aircraft that has used MEL xxxxx; we also have MEL XXXXX1 despite the fact that the pump is fully functional. Now the captain must use emergency authority to use the Y elec pump switch to deal with the uam (unintended aircraft movement). Just a reminder; uams are a big safety issue with us.the FAA mmel 52-xx-xx for the electric cargo door system does not require that the yellow electric hydraulic pump be deferred as well. Company has effectively prioritized ground safety when the aircraft is static over flight safety when the aircraft is in motion. I submit that flight operations has the higher priority; and that we shouldn't be forced to use emergency authority to use a system that is fully functional and whose use is governed by a warning;'...when operating procedures; techniques; etc.; could result in personal injury or loss of life; if not carefully followed.'
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 Captain reported concerns over a Minimum Equipment List procedure.
Narrative: Company MEL XXXXX-Cargo Door-Opening Electrical Control System-MEL REF # XXXXX MMEL. This deferral is used to defer the electrical system that activates the hydraulic opening/closing of cargo doors. When this deferral is used; it triggers additional [Company] MEL XXXXX-Yellow System Electric Pump-MEL REF # XXXXX (MMEL 29-XX-XX Rev 26) which mandates that the (fully functional) Y ELEC HYD pump switch be placed to OFF and remain so. I presume this was done out of a preponderance of caution for the ground personnel.My issue is with Company's mandatory trigger of XXXXX1 when XXXXX is used. There is a WARNING on A320 Flight Manual page 3.XX.X that states that if the aircraft starts to move with the parking brake handle ON; pilots are to attempt to use brake pedals to stop movement. If that doesn't work; the pilots are to press the Y ELEC PUMP switch to ON and try the brake pedals again. If we are on an aircraft that has used MEL XXXXX; we also have MEL XXXXX1 despite the fact that the pump is fully functional. Now the captain must use emergency authority to use the Y ELEC PUMP switch to deal with the UAM (Unintended Aircraft Movement). Just a reminder; UAMs are a big safety issue with us.The FAA MMEL 52-XX-XX for the electric cargo door system does NOT require that the yellow electric hydraulic pump be deferred as well. Company has effectively prioritized ground safety when the aircraft is static over flight safety when the aircraft is in motion. I submit that flight operations has the higher priority; and that we shouldn't be forced to use emergency authority to use a system that is fully functional and whose use is governed by a warning;'...when operating procedures; techniques; etc.; could result in personal injury or loss of life; if not carefully followed.'
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.