Narrative:

Denver approach said to expect visual approach runway 34R in denver. We briefed the ILS for same runway. We were turned onto final much sooner than expected; just outside corde at 210 KIAS. There was a tailwind at altitude. Approach was using us as a weather [reconnaissance] as we may have been the 1st aircraft not to see the field when approach control expected us to. They were asking lots of questions about visibility ceiling and if we could see den. The approach ended up being very compressed and stabilized approach requirements at the FAF and 1;000 feet were not met. Flaps 30 and +15/-5 KIAS wasn't met until 500 feet. At 1;000 ft. We were fast; not completely configured for landing; with no landing checklist complete. We were in VMC conditions with the runway insight from the FAF inbound.the first officer admitted to be way behind the aircraft during the debrief. He missed the 1;000 feet and 500 feet calls. The calls were made with the captain/PF (pilot flying) initiating them. I stated that I will go-around if not meeting all stable approach criteria by 500 feet. The first officer (first officer) seemed by me to agree. At 500 feet all stabilized approach criteria were met; and we landed without incident.the approached was debriefed at length. Both of us were extremely uncomfortable after the fact that we had indeed violated the stable approach criteria SOP. An approach report was generated by ACARS after block in.while flying and in the moment; I knew a go around was very possible; and stated that fact; but felt I had until 500 feet to get the remaining criteria stabilized. Post flight; it became more apparent that the first officer didn't agree with my assessment and interpretation of the stabilized approach SOP. I didn't adequately recognize how behind the first officer was. I should have recognized this by the missed call outs; lack of verbalization and response to my comments between 1;000 and 500 feet; and the eventual late landing checklist. I feel I inappropriately focused on the 500 ft. Reject gate and missed the overall bigger picture situational awareness that we needed to execute a go around and try the approach again. I was fixated on hitting the 500 feet gate while missing the overall situation and how task saturated we both were. In essence I missed what captains are expected and required to do such a situation. While debriefing; we agreed that the first officer was not comfortable and that he could easily have demanded a go-around. We also agreed; that I should have gone around based on the aircraft state at the 1;000 feet report altitude. It was a terrible example for a captain to set.bottom line is that we found ourselves in a difficult state; and even though we at least partially recognized it; I didn't properly apply CRM skills and [error management] as well as a captain of my experience should have and could have. We both regret our performance but have learned a great deal from it. The debriefing has been extensive; we will both grow better as a result of the experience; the debriefing; and writing a report for it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported conducting an unstable approach to a landing at DEN; rather than executing a go-around.

Narrative: Denver approach said to expect Visual Approach Runway 34R in Denver. We briefed the ILS for same runway. We were turned onto final much sooner than expected; just outside CORDE at 210 KIAS. There was a tailwind at altitude. Approach was using us as a weather [reconnaissance] as we may have been the 1st aircraft not to see the field when approach control expected us to. They were asking lots of questions about visibility ceiling and if we could see DEN. The approach ended up being very compressed and stabilized approach requirements at the FAF and 1;000 feet were not met. Flaps 30 and +15/-5 KIAS wasn't met until 500 feet. At 1;000 ft. we were fast; not completely configured for landing; with no landing checklist complete. We were in VMC conditions with the runway insight from the FAF inbound.The FO admitted to be way behind the aircraft during the debrief. He missed the 1;000 feet and 500 feet calls. The calls were made with the Captain/PF (Pilot Flying) initiating them. I stated that I will go-around if not meeting all stable approach criteria by 500 feet. The FO (First Officer) seemed by me to agree. At 500 feet all stabilized approach criteria were met; and we landed without incident.The approached was debriefed at length. Both of us were extremely uncomfortable after the fact that we had indeed violated the stable approach criteria SOP. An approach report was generated by ACARS after block in.While flying and in the moment; I knew a go around was very possible; and stated that fact; but felt I had until 500 feet to get the remaining criteria stabilized. Post flight; it became more apparent that the FO didn't agree with my assessment and interpretation of the stabilized approach SOP. I didn't adequately recognize how behind the FO was. I should have recognized this by the missed call outs; lack of verbalization and response to my comments between 1;000 and 500 feet; and the eventual late landing checklist. I feel I inappropriately focused on the 500 ft. REJECT gate and missed the overall bigger picture situational awareness that we needed to execute a go around and try the approach again. I was fixated on hitting the 500 feet gate while missing the overall situation and how task saturated we both were. In essence I missed what Captains are expected and required to do such a situation. While debriefing; we agreed that the FO was not comfortable and that he could easily have demanded a go-around. We also agreed; that I should have gone around based on the aircraft state at the 1;000 feet report altitude. It was a terrible example for a Captain to set.Bottom line is that we found ourselves in a difficult state; and even though we at least partially recognized it; I didn't properly apply CRM skills and [Error Management] as well as a Captain of my experience should have and could have. We both regret our performance but have learned a great deal from it. The debriefing has been extensive; we will both grow better as a result of the experience; the debriefing; and writing a report for it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.