Narrative:

This report serves as a chronology of events that took place onboard an A321 (non-sharklet iae engines; enhanced aircraft) from ZZZ to ZZZ1. It is being written from the perspective of the first officer (first officer).background: a flight had cancelled in ZZZ earlier in the day resulting in this flight being booked to capacity. Weather in the ZZZ terminal area was rain; temperatures below 10C and low IFR conditions. Light and moderate rain echoes (wsi) prevailed to the east of ZZZ; but it was determined that it would not impact our route of flight. The dispatcher for this flight planned a northerly route at FL290 to avoid a SIGMET for severe mountain wave over southern state X as well as moderate turbulence forecasted at the higher altitudes. Departure from ZZZ was routine. We had a total of X sob [souls on board] and our takeoff weight was approximately 195;000lbs. We were cleared to join our filed route and were advised to expect moderate turbulence while climbing through 25;000 to our filed altitude of 29;000. Upon coordination from ATC; we climbed to FL310 to avoid reported areas of turbulence. While initially there was occasional moderate; turbulence conditions and flight visibility improved as we approached ZZZ2. Approaching ZZZ3 at FL310 in mostly smooth visual conditions; the aircraft abruptly shuttered. The pitch changed notably 2 degrees; the first officer screens momentarily blinked and the aircraft climbed/descended slightly. Both the captain and I were suddenly on high alert. Moments later the following ECAM appeared: 'elec gen 2 fault.' the captain and I proceeded with the non-normal methodology. The captain was PF for this leg and he resumed aircraft control with the ap on. I conducted the ECAM actions and follow up. The attempt to reset gen 2 was unsuccessful; noting that the singular time the gen was reset the aircraft shuttered again. (I theorize that this was due to power interruptions to the elacs). Conducting the follow up procedure; the APU was started. The APU began to spool up normally and it was anticipated that the APU would power the buses serving as a second source of power. As the APU came up to speed; I heard multiple relays begin to 'click' from behind our seats. Shortly thereafter; the APU faulted and conducted an auto-shutdown. In discussion of this with the captain; we decided not to attempt another APU start. Looking at the elec page on the lower ECAM; we noted that all buses were powered; main galley was shed; and GEN1 had picked up the entire electrical load. There were no other ecams for the remainder of the flight. At this point the aircraft was being powered by a single electrical source which was an emergency condition. This was confirmed by the QRH procedure which stated to landing at the nearest suitable airport. The captain and I began to assess our diversion options. To gain situational awareness relative to our geographic location and the weather system behind us; I attempted to pull up weather using the ipad. As I did this; I noticed my ipad was no longer connected to [the] flight deck. It was assumed that the aircraft's wireless network at this point was load-shed. To assist us with this decision making further; I then sent the following text message to our dispatcher via ACARS (this is not verbatim; but it is something close to what I believe I sent). 'Emergency. Engine 2 gen fault; APU failed to start; we are single gen operations. Need to divert.' at this point it was expected that the dispatcher would assist us with choosing the best suitable airport for landing given the condition of the aircraft. The following ACARS exchange took place:dispatch: 'copy message... You lost both APU and engine gen... Where you want to divert... Disp xyz.'pilots (not verbatim): we stated that we were thinking of either ZZZ4 or ZZZ5.dispatch: 'neither ZZZ4 or ZZZ5 is in C70 for airbus but doesn't matter with emergency... You want me to call ZZZ5.'after this message both the captain and I began to assess which airport would be more suitable. The captain referenced the diversion guide and noted that both KZZZ5 and KZZZ4 were listed as adequate. We considered ZZZ6; but it was significantly south and in an area of the turbulence and mountain wave.since we were overweight (now 187;000 lbs) we conducted a landing assessment. Given the field elevation at ZZZ4; along with its runway length; our landing assessment at flaps 3 came to 9091 feet. This distance exceeded the runway length available. KZZZ5; which was still 80 miles ahead; offered us a [longer] runway with two ILS approaches. The weather was also good VFR (230/12 10sm FEW085 9/m09); the field elevation was not as high; and there were two ILS approaches available for landing. In consideration of the potential for a gen 1 loss resulting in an emergency elec configuration; combined with weather and terrain issues; the captain and I concluded that a diversion to KZZZ5 was the safest course of action. We informed the dispatcher that we had chosen KZZZ5. The following ACARS message was received:dispatch: 'ZZZ5 isn't qualified to work airbus he said...ZZZ4 is mainline; do you want to go there...'I responded that we were too heavy to land in ZZZ4 and that the landing distance was too excessive. We had chosen KZZZ5.dispatch: 'copy new destination is ZZZ5... Operations frequency is XXX.XXX'the captain and I discussed this again; and we reaffirmed amongst ourselves that KZZZ5 is the safest choice; despite there being little services there upon landing. We concluded that we would deal with this issue later; that the most important issue at hand is to land the aircraft safely with; hopefully; at least 1 generator still working. At this point the captain made a PA announcement and also began coordinating with the flight attendants. I took aircraft control (briefly) and informed ATC that we needed to divert to KZZZ5 due to an electrical issue. When [notifying ATC]; I provided sob and fob (fuel on board). ATC was already aware that we were working an issue and knew that we were actively deciding the most suitable airport. We entered the new destination into the mcdu and set up for the approach. We conducted the non-normal landing considerations to make sure nothing was forgotten. Approaching KZZZ5; both the captain and I felt we needed more time to prepare for the overweight landing. We elected to hold on a waypoint of the approach to complete the checklist. This also enabled us to burn additional weight. We felt that this was a safe decision; and worst case the runway was in sight and we would be able to land visually if needed. As we entered the hold at zzzzz (xxr) we began the overweight landing checklist. Given the time compression; I struggled to find the correct page in the QRH. Eventually I found it and began to go through each item. There were two challenges associated with this checklist (in addition to trying to find it).1) slowing the aircraft below green dot to vls in order to lower flaps 1 without a flap overspeed. This was accomplished without issue.2) when deciding whether to land flaps 3 or flaps full we referenced the table on page X. Given the field elevation I used the 4;000 feet column. With the temperature of 9'c I determined that to land flaps full we would need to be below 181;000. We were at 182;000; but given the fuel burn while holding it was decided that we would be below 181;000 lbs once accepting the approach; therefore we could safely land using flaps full. In the holding pattern; we made one final PA to the passengers that they would be seeing arff equipment and to not be alarmed. The ensuing landing was uneventful. We used the max available runway and the brake temps remained below 400 degrees.upon clearing the runway; I called the station ops from the frequency the dispatcher provided us. The manager answered and told us we were to park at [gate] and that they had never worked an airbus before.upon parking at [gate]; the jetway pulled up to the L1 door.the manager knocked on the cockpit window to ask us how to open the L1 door. All doors were disarmed and we told him to lift up the handle; which he did. Now the question to be asked was about deplaning the aircraft. The captain was largely involved with this process. The station manager was told by someone in [hub] that the aircraft would need to be deplaned using the rear exit due to cg issues; otherwise a tail-stand would need to be found. Both the captain and I had never heard of this before. In addition; the airport would need to bring air-stairs to the aircraft and the passengers would have to walk outside on the ramp area and up the jet-bridge stairs in order to access the terminal. After much back and forth between [hub] and ZZZ5; it was determined that the passengers could exit out the L1 door; but should be accomplished very slowly. Some passengers elected to remain on board; while most deplaned. The KZZZ5 station team is to be commended. The remaining crew had come to airport to assist; as most were on their day off. In total; we had approximately 6 station personal to service the entire aircraft. Once the passengers deplaned; the captain recognized that there was little offerings inside the terminal for food and refreshment. The captain decided to order 40 pizzas along with 20 2L soft drinks in order to keep the passengers calm and respectful of the assistance we were trying to provide. This decision proved to be highly effective; as the passengers were very appreciative of our efforts over the ensuing 5 hours. After coordination with the scheduling; dispatch and maintenance; it was determined that [company] would send a rescue A321 from ZZZ7 to KZZZ5 to pick up our passengers and bring them the rest of the way to ZZZ1. After review of our duty limits; we were limited in our duty day (even with extension) so the inbound crew would take these passengers to ZZZ1. During these coordinating efforts; the captain made an entry into the maintenance logbook. The entry reflected the failed generator; APU fault and overweight landing. Maintenance control informed us that despite landing overweight; there would be no inspection required since the airbus amm did not require one. The write-up and load report were delivered to maintenance control via email. After further review the next day; there was concern that a separate write up with the overweight landing was needed. Maintenance control reiterated that this was not needed since no inspection was required. After review of the fom; the captain made a separate entry and the maintenance technicians flown in from ZZZ7 signed off the write up. In order to provide a gate for this A321; the station needed to push our aircraft to the hardstand. This involved a high amount of coordination because the station did not have a tug nor tow-bar to do this job. A former [company] employee who used to be in ZZZ7 now worked for [other company] in KZZZ5 and assisted us with this effort. He was able to find the appropriate tug and tow-bar for the job. A second issue came up. The A321 departing ZZZ7 would incur a 3-hour catering delay. In order to reduce this turn-around time on the passengers; the dispatcher asked us to remove all the galley carts from the aircraft in order to service the inbound A321. We did so and placed the galley carts in the jet-bridge. The ramp crew did not know how to open the cargo doors. After consultation with maintenance we resolved this issue as well and the ramp crew was able to unload all the baggage from the forward and aft cargo holds (beginning with the aft first). While all this was taking place; the pizza and drinks arrived for the passengers. It should be noted that at this point all the fas [flight attendants] were eager to get to the hotel. They were visibly angry from their exchanges with crew scheduling and did nothing during this entire process to assist with the passengers on the aircraft nor in the terminal. Upon receiving their hotel information

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew reported that the Number 2 Generator faulted in flight; and APU would not start; requiring a diversion and overweight landing.

Narrative: This report serves as a chronology of events that took place onboard an A321 (non-sharklet IAE Engines; enhanced aircraft) from ZZZ to ZZZ1. It is being written from the perspective of the First Officer (FO).Background: A flight had cancelled in ZZZ earlier in the day resulting in this flight being booked to capacity. Weather in the ZZZ terminal area was rain; temperatures below 10C and low IFR conditions. Light and moderate rain echoes (WSI) prevailed to the east of ZZZ; but it was determined that it would not impact our route of flight. The Dispatcher for this flight planned a northerly route at FL290 to avoid a SIGMET for severe mountain wave over southern State X as well as moderate turbulence forecasted at the higher altitudes. Departure from ZZZ was routine. We had a total of X SOB [Souls on Board] and our takeoff weight was approximately 195;000lbs. We were cleared to join our filed route and were advised to expect moderate turbulence while climbing through 25;000 to our filed altitude of 29;000. Upon coordination from ATC; we climbed to FL310 to avoid reported areas of turbulence. While initially there was occasional moderate; turbulence conditions and flight visibility improved as we approached ZZZ2. Approaching ZZZ3 at FL310 in mostly smooth visual conditions; the aircraft abruptly shuttered. The pitch changed notably 2 degrees; the FO screens momentarily blinked and the aircraft climbed/descended slightly. Both the Captain and I were suddenly on high alert. Moments later the following ECAM appeared: 'ELEC GEN 2 FAULT.' The Captain and I proceeded with the non-normal methodology. The Captain was PF for this leg and he resumed aircraft control with the AP on. I conducted the ECAM actions and follow up. The attempt to reset GEN 2 was unsuccessful; noting that the singular time the GEN was reset the aircraft shuttered again. (I theorize that this was due to power interruptions to the ELACS). Conducting the Follow up procedure; the APU was started. The APU began to spool up normally and it was anticipated that the APU would power the buses serving as a second source of power. As the APU came up to speed; I heard multiple relays begin to 'Click' from behind our seats. Shortly thereafter; the APU faulted and conducted an Auto-Shutdown. In discussion of this with the Captain; we decided not to attempt another APU start. Looking at the ELEC page on the lower ECAM; we noted that all buses were powered; main galley was shed; and GEN1 had picked up the entire electrical load. There were no other ECAMs for the remainder of the flight. At this point the aircraft was being powered by a single electrical source which was an emergency condition. This was confirmed by the QRH procedure which stated to landing at the nearest suitable airport. The Captain and I began to assess our diversion options. To gain situational awareness relative to our geographic location and the weather system behind us; I attempted to pull up weather using the iPad. As I did this; I noticed my iPad was no longer connected to [the] flight deck. It was assumed that the aircraft's wireless network at this point was load-shed. To assist us with this decision making further; I then sent the following text message to our Dispatcher via ACARS (this is not verbatim; but it is something close to what I believe I sent). 'EMERGENCY. ENG 2 GEN FAULT; APU FAILED TO START; WE ARE SINGLE GEN OPS. NEED TO DIVERT.' At this point it was expected that the Dispatcher would assist us with choosing the best suitable airport for landing given the condition of the aircraft. The following ACARS exchange took place:Dispatch: 'COPY MSG... YOU LOST BOTH APU AND ENG GEN... WHERE YOU WANT TO DIVERT... DISP XYZ.'Pilots (not verbatim): We stated that we were thinking of either ZZZ4 or ZZZ5.Dispatch: 'NEITHER ZZZ4 OR ZZZ5 IS IN C70 FOR AIRBUS BUT DOESN'T MATTER WITH EMERGENCY... YOU WANT ME TO CALL ZZZ5.'After this message both the Captain and I began to assess which airport would be more suitable. The Captain referenced the diversion guide and noted that both KZZZ5 and KZZZ4 were listed as adequate. We considered ZZZ6; but it was significantly south and in an area of the turbulence and mountain wave.Since we were overweight (now 187;000 lbs) we conducted a landing assessment. Given the Field Elevation at ZZZ4; along with its runway length; our landing assessment at Flaps 3 came to 9091 feet. This distance exceeded the runway length available. KZZZ5; which was still 80 miles ahead; offered us a [longer] runway with two ILS approaches. The weather was also good VFR (230/12 10sm FEW085 9/m09); the field elevation was not as high; and there were two ILS approaches available for landing. In consideration of the potential for a GEN 1 loss resulting in an EMER ELEC Configuration; combined with weather and terrain issues; the Captain and I concluded that a diversion to KZZZ5 was the safest course of action. We informed the Dispatcher that we had chosen KZZZ5. The following ACARS message was received:Dispatch: 'ZZZ5 ISN'T QUALIFIED TO WORK AIRBUS HE SAID...ZZZ4 IS MAINLINE; DO YOU WANT TO GO THERE...'I responded that we were too heavy to land in ZZZ4 and that the landing distance was too excessive. We had chosen KZZZ5.Dispatch: 'COPY NEW DEST IS ZZZ5... OPS FREQ IS XXX.XXX'The Captain and I discussed this again; and we reaffirmed amongst ourselves that KZZZ5 is the safest choice; despite there being little services there upon landing. We concluded that we would deal with this issue later; that the most important issue at hand is to land the aircraft safely with; hopefully; at least 1 generator still working. At this point the Captain made a PA announcement and also began coordinating with the Flight Attendants. I took aircraft control (briefly) and informed ATC that we needed to divert to KZZZ5 due to an electrical issue. When [notifying ATC]; I provided SOB and FOB (Fuel on Board). ATC was already aware that we were working an issue and knew that we were actively deciding the most suitable airport. We entered the new destination into the MCDU and set up for the approach. We conducted the Non-Normal landing considerations to make sure nothing was forgotten. Approaching KZZZ5; both the Captain and I felt we needed more time to prepare for the overweight landing. We elected to hold on a waypoint of the approach to complete the checklist. This also enabled us to burn additional weight. We felt that this was a safe decision; and worst case the runway was in sight and we would be able to land visually if needed. As we entered the hold at ZZZZZ (XXR) we began the overweight landing checklist. Given the time compression; I struggled to find the correct page in the QRH. Eventually I found it and began to go through each item. There were two challenges associated with this checklist (in addition to trying to find it).1) Slowing the aircraft below green dot to VLS in order to lower FLAPS 1 without a FLAP overspeed. This was accomplished without issue.2) When deciding whether to land FLAPS 3 or FLAPS Full we referenced the table on page X. Given the field elevation I used the 4;000 feet column. With the temperature of 9'C I determined that to land Flaps Full we would need to be below 181;000. We were at 182;000; but given the fuel burn while holding it was decided that we would be below 181;000 lbs once accepting the approach; therefore we could safely land using Flaps Full. In the holding pattern; we made one final PA to the passengers that they would be seeing ARFF equipment and to not be alarmed. The ensuing landing was uneventful. We used the max available runway and the brake temps remained below 400 degrees.Upon clearing the runway; I called the Station Ops from the frequency the Dispatcher provided us. The manager answered and told us we were to park at [gate] and that they had never worked an Airbus before.Upon parking at [gate]; the jetway pulled up to the L1 door.The manager knocked on the cockpit window to ask us how to open the L1 door. All doors were disarmed and we told him to lift up the handle; which he did. Now the question to be asked was about deplaning the aircraft. The Captain was largely involved with this process. The station manager was told by someone in [hub] that the aircraft would need to be deplaned using the rear exit due to CG issues; otherwise a tail-stand would need to be found. Both the Captain and I had never heard of this before. In addition; the airport would need to bring air-stairs to the aircraft and the passengers would have to walk outside on the ramp area and up the Jet-Bridge stairs in order to access the terminal. After much back and forth between [hub] and ZZZ5; it was determined that the passengers could exit out the L1 door; but should be accomplished very slowly. Some passengers elected to remain on board; while most deplaned. The KZZZ5 station team is to be commended. The remaining crew had come to airport to assist; as most were on their day off. In total; we had approximately 6 station personal to service the entire aircraft. Once the passengers deplaned; the Captain recognized that there was little offerings inside the terminal for food and refreshment. The Captain decided to order 40 Pizzas along with 20 2L soft drinks in order to keep the passengers calm and respectful of the assistance we were trying to provide. This decision proved to be highly effective; as the passengers were very appreciative of our efforts over the ensuing 5 hours. After coordination with the Scheduling; Dispatch and Maintenance; it was determined that [company] would send a rescue A321 from ZZZ7 to KZZZ5 to pick up our passengers and bring them the rest of the way to ZZZ1. After review of our duty limits; we were limited in our duty day (even with extension) so the inbound crew would take these passengers to ZZZ1. During these coordinating efforts; the Captain made an entry into the maintenance logbook. The entry reflected the failed generator; APU fault and overweight landing. Maintenance Control informed us that despite landing overweight; there would be no inspection required since the Airbus AMM did not require one. The write-up and load report were delivered to Maintenance Control via email. After further review the next day; there was concern that a separate write up with the overweight landing was needed. Maintenance Control reiterated that this was not needed since no inspection was required. After review of the FOM; the Captain made a separate entry and the Maintenance technicians flown in from ZZZ7 signed off the write up. In order to provide a gate for this A321; the station needed to push our aircraft to the hardstand. This involved a high amount of coordination because the station did not have a tug nor tow-bar to do this job. A former [company] employee who used to be in ZZZ7 now worked for [other company] in KZZZ5 and assisted us with this effort. He was able to find the appropriate tug and tow-bar for the job. A second issue came up. The A321 departing ZZZ7 would incur a 3-hour catering delay. In order to reduce this turn-around time on the passengers; the Dispatcher asked us to remove all the galley carts from the aircraft in order to service the inbound A321. We did so and placed the galley carts in the jet-bridge. The ramp crew did not know how to open the cargo doors. After consultation with Maintenance we resolved this issue as well and the ramp crew was able to unload all the baggage from the forward and aft cargo holds (beginning with the aft first). While all this was taking place; the pizza and drinks arrived for the passengers. It should be noted that at this point all the FAs [Flight Attendants] were eager to get to the hotel. They were visibly angry from their exchanges with crew scheduling and did nothing during this entire process to assist with the passengers on the aircraft nor in the terminal. Upon receiving their hotel information

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.