Narrative:

I was working the moped sector (ZTL). This sector is south of the spring sector, which is south of ZID airspace. Small transport checked on my frequency at 12 mi south of the spring sector, under my airspace, climbing to 10000'. Moped's airspace in this area is 11000-FL230. I climbed the aircraft to 16000'. I then handed the aircraft off to the ZID, but at the time thought I had handed the aircraft off to the spring sector. ZID took the handoff. When I looked at the data block again, it was no longer alternating ground speed and the handoff sector. Believing that spring had the handoff, I switched the small transport to the spring sector. The aircraft did not acknowledge for the frequency and did not change frequencys. The aircraft flew across slc 46 west/O their knowledge and west/O ATC service. Because of a problem with the ZID computer, the data block went into a coast track and then jumped to another target with the same code. The ZID controller, thinking that he did not get a handoff of the aircraft, called sector 46 ZTL to ask about the small transport. Sector 46 said they did not know the small transport. All investigation followed to determine what had happened. There was no traffic for small transport and evasive action was not required. Factors that contributed to the situation were: 1) incorrect input to handoff the aircraft. 2) small transport did not listen to the frequency change. 3) controller did not catch the readback. 4) controllers at sector 46 did not see the limited data block. 5) ZID did not realize he ha handoff. 6) ZID computer problem with data block. Suggestions to prevent: 1) check feasibility of not allowing internal sector to hand off to another center. 2) increase length of time from 1 min, that the data block shows to whom handed off. 3) force data block to next sector. When a handoff is not accomplished. Supplemental information from acn 170823: I started the briefing at approximately XA25Z to the d-side trner and trnee and then, at approximately XA26Z, another controller came on the sector to relieve me for the radar position. I started the briefing over again for the radar controller and the d-side trner and trnee. It was apparently during the briefing that the alleged incident began for the aircraft entering the bristol/spring sector west/O a handoff. I was signed on position for approximately 1 min and 17 seconds of the alleged incident conducting a position relief briefing according to the new FAA procedures, which in my opinion, does not allow me the flexibility or responsibility to scan for possible mode C intruders entering my airspace for the 1 min and 17 seconds that I was there.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ARTCC RADAR CTLR FAILED TO MAKE A POINTOUT TO ADJACENT SECTOR ON SMT, CLIMBED THE ACFT AND HANDOFF TO ADJACENT ARTCC, BUT PUT ACFT ON WRONG FREQ.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE MOPED SECTOR (ZTL). THIS SECTOR IS S OF THE SPRING SECTOR, WHICH IS S OF ZID AIRSPACE. SMT CHKED ON MY FREQ AT 12 MI S OF THE SPRING SECTOR, UNDER MY AIRSPACE, CLBING TO 10000'. MOPED'S AIRSPACE IN THIS AREA IS 11000-FL230. I CLBED THE ACFT TO 16000'. I THEN HANDED THE ACFT OFF TO THE ZID, BUT AT THE TIME THOUGHT I HAD HANDED THE ACFT OFF TO THE SPRING SECTOR. ZID TOOK THE HDOF. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE DATA BLOCK AGAIN, IT WAS NO LONGER ALTERNATING GND SPD AND THE HDOF SECTOR. BELIEVING THAT SPRING HAD THE HDOF, I SWITCHED THE SMT TO THE SPRING SECTOR. THE ACFT DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE FOR THE FREQ AND DID NOT CHANGE FREQS. THE ACFT FLEW ACROSS SLC 46 W/O THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND W/O ATC SVC. BECAUSE OF A PROB WITH THE ZID COMPUTER, THE DATA BLOCK WENT INTO A COAST TRACK AND THEN JUMPED TO ANOTHER TARGET WITH THE SAME CODE. THE ZID CTLR, THINKING THAT HE DID NOT GET A HDOF OF THE ACFT, CALLED SECTOR 46 ZTL TO ASK ABOUT THE SMT. SECTOR 46 SAID THEY DID NOT KNOW THE SMT. ALL INVESTIGATION FOLLOWED TO DETERMINE WHAT HAD HAPPENED. THERE WAS NO TFC FOR SMT AND EVASIVE ACTION WAS NOT REQUIRED. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE SITUATION WERE: 1) INCORRECT INPUT TO HDOF THE ACFT. 2) SMT DID NOT LISTEN TO THE FREQ CHANGE. 3) CTLR DID NOT CATCH THE READBACK. 4) CTLRS AT SECTOR 46 DID NOT SEE THE LIMITED DATA BLOCK. 5) ZID DID NOT REALIZE HE HA HDOF. 6) ZID COMPUTER PROB WITH DATA BLOCK. SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT: 1) CHK FEASIBILITY OF NOT ALLOWING INTERNAL SECTOR TO HAND OFF TO ANOTHER CENTER. 2) INCREASE LENGTH OF TIME FROM 1 MIN, THAT THE DATA BLOCK SHOWS TO WHOM HANDED OFF. 3) FORCE DATA BLOCK TO NEXT SECTOR. WHEN A HDOF IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 170823: I STARTED THE BRIEFING AT APPROX XA25Z TO THE D-SIDE TRNER AND TRNEE AND THEN, AT APPROX XA26Z, ANOTHER CTLR CAME ON THE SECTOR TO RELIEVE ME FOR THE RADAR POS. I STARTED THE BRIEFING OVER AGAIN FOR THE RADAR CTLR AND THE D-SIDE TRNER AND TRNEE. IT WAS APPARENTLY DURING THE BRIEFING THAT THE ALLEGED INCIDENT BEGAN FOR THE ACFT ENTERING THE BRISTOL/SPRING SECTOR W/O A HDOF. I WAS SIGNED ON POS FOR APPROX 1 MIN AND 17 SECS OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT CONDUCTING A POS RELIEF BRIEFING ACCORDING TO THE NEW FAA PROCS, WHICH IN MY OPINION, DOES NOT ALLOW ME THE FLEXIBILITY OR RESPONSIBILITY TO SCAN FOR POSSIBLE MODE C INTRUDERS ENTERING MY AIRSPACE FOR THE 1 MIN AND 17 SECS THAT I WAS THERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.