Narrative:

The flight to ZZZ was uneventful until the descent. ATC held us high as we transitioned over ZZZ1 which left us extremely high for the approach into ZZZ. When we reported the field in sight for the visual approach we realized that we were far too high to complete an approach successfully and so we coordinated with approach to maneuver in order to add track miles for the descent. We ended up making a 270 degree turn to final which put us level at traffic pattern altitude and slightly offset for the straight in visual to runway 12 at about 10 miles out. Even with the extra track miles to lose altitude; the descent from the mid-20s down to traffic pattern altitude was fairly time compressed. As the captain (pilot flying) maneuvered us fully onto final approach he performed the lvsa procedure as we had the FMC set up with a visual approach to runway 12 and our plan was to fly it like a RNAV approach. During this time; I was busy helping the captain configure and making radio calls (we were talking to both ZZZ2 approach and making CTAF calls). Because of this I failed to notice that when the captain performed lvsa he didn't set a lower altitude. This meant that when we reached the top of descent for the final descent the aircraft did not descend and started getting high on final. I realized what was going on and pointed this out to the captain who left the autopilot on initially and tried to descend to catch the descent path using different vertical modes. However; since the aircraft was slow to respond on the autopilot; we did not catch the final approach path. As we passed 1;000 ft.; I was making a CTAF call but heard the captain call stable. After I finished my radio call; when I went to call 'stable' I noticed that we were not actually stable as we had a vertical speed of 1;600 fpm. I called 'unstable; go-around' and the captain immediately started the go around procedure. We performed a go-around and climbed up to traffic pattern altitude with the speed intervened and holding the configuration at flaps 5. I made a call to CTAF and then contacted approach who offered us the choice of maneuvering visually in the traffic pattern for another attempt at landing or offered to take us out and vector us around for another visual. After consulting with the captain; we decided to just perform a left traffic pattern in visual conditions. The captain flew the traffic pattern while I performed all the necessary checklists and set up the FMC again for a visual to runway 12. When we loaded the visual approach into the FMC it automatically set up an 8 mile fix on final. We turned base about 5 miles from the runway due to terrain further out from the airport and while on the base leg I sequenced the FMS for the captain since we were inside the 8 mile final approach fix. However; by the time the FMS had caught up on its calculations and the captain had made the appropriate selections on the MCP; we were once again getting high on the approach. The captain realized this and again tried to correct the problem with the autopilot on and a vertical mode but once again the aircraft was too slow to respond. This time though the captain realized prior to 1;000 ft. That this approach wasn't going to work out either and leveled off. He suggested we just fly a 360 turn on final to help with the situation and started to turn crosswind. I stated that I was uncomfortable with this and thought we needed to climb back up to traffic pattern altitude at least. The captain agreed that this would be prudent and climbed back up to 3;500 ft. While I got us set up for another attempt. Instead of flying just a 360 turn; the captain ended up flying another small traffic pattern; however; this time the captain flew the pattern and approach with the autopilot off. The captain flew a normal visual pattern and this time we were on path and fully stabilized prior to 1;000 ft. The captain then performed an uneventful landing. Additionally; after landing we had greatdifficulty getting our flight plan closed. We were unable to raise FSS on the ground via radio as expected; then multiple attempted calls to [TRACON] via phone were unsuccessful; and finally after the second phone call to FSS we were finally able to get our flight plan closed. Although it didn't get closed within the 5 minutes of landing that approach had requested because of all the problems we had. In retrospect we let approach rush us in the descent prior to accepting the visual approach into ZZZ; we should have gotten delay vectors so we weren't so rushed going into the approach. Also; it would have been better if we would have taken the option from approach to get vectors around for a second attempt rather than just flying the traffic pattern. This would have given us more time and set us up in a better position for a second approach. Lastly; the autopilot should have been taken off earlier; trying to fly the visual pattern on the autopilot just didn't work. With a tpa of approximately 1;500 ft. AGL; if you start descending late at all there is very little time to correct the problem and be stabilized prior to 1;000 ft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 First Officer reported that an unstabilized approach resulted in a go around.

Narrative: The flight to ZZZ was uneventful until the descent. ATC held us high as we transitioned over ZZZ1 which left us extremely high for the approach into ZZZ. When we reported the field in sight for the visual approach we realized that we were far too high to complete an approach successfully and so we coordinated with approach to maneuver in order to add track miles for the descent. We ended up making a 270 degree turn to final which put us level at traffic pattern altitude and slightly offset for the straight in visual to Runway 12 at about 10 miles out. Even with the extra track miles to lose altitude; the descent from the mid-20s down to traffic pattern altitude was fairly time compressed. As the Captain (Pilot Flying) maneuvered us fully onto final approach he performed the LVSA procedure as we had the FMC set up with a visual approach to Runway 12 and our plan was to fly it like a RNAV approach. During this time; I was busy helping the Captain configure and making radio calls (we were talking to both ZZZ2 approach and making CTAF calls). Because of this I failed to notice that when the Captain performed LVSA he didn't set a lower altitude. This meant that when we reached the top of descent for the final descent the aircraft did not descend and started getting high on final. I realized what was going on and pointed this out to the Captain who left the autopilot on initially and tried to descend to catch the descent path using different vertical modes. However; since the aircraft was slow to respond on the autopilot; we did not catch the final approach path. As we passed 1;000 ft.; I was making a CTAF call but heard the Captain call stable. After I finished my radio call; when I went to call 'stable' I noticed that we were not actually stable as we had a vertical speed of 1;600 fpm. I called 'unstable; go-around' and the Captain immediately started the go around procedure. We performed a go-around and climbed up to traffic pattern altitude with the speed intervened and holding the configuration at Flaps 5. I made a call to CTAF and then contacted approach who offered us the choice of maneuvering visually in the traffic pattern for another attempt at landing or offered to take us out and vector us around for another visual. After consulting with the Captain; we decided to just perform a left traffic pattern in visual conditions. The Captain flew the traffic pattern while I performed all the necessary checklists and set up the FMC again for a visual to Runway 12. When we loaded the visual approach into the FMC it automatically set up an 8 mile fix on final. We turned base about 5 miles from the runway due to terrain further out from the airport and while on the base leg I sequenced the FMS for the Captain since we were inside the 8 mile final approach fix. However; by the time the FMS had caught up on its calculations and the Captain had made the appropriate selections on the MCP; we were once again getting high on the approach. The Captain realized this and again tried to correct the problem with the autopilot on and a vertical mode but once again the aircraft was too slow to respond. This time though the Captain realized prior to 1;000 ft. that this approach wasn't going to work out either and leveled off. He suggested we just fly a 360 turn on final to help with the situation and started to turn crosswind. I stated that I was uncomfortable with this and thought we needed to climb back up to traffic pattern altitude at least. The Captain agreed that this would be prudent and climbed back up to 3;500 ft. while I got us set up for another attempt. Instead of flying just a 360 turn; the Captain ended up flying another small traffic pattern; however; this time the Captain flew the pattern and approach with the autopilot off. The Captain flew a normal visual pattern and this time we were on path and fully stabilized prior to 1;000 ft. The Captain then performed an uneventful landing. Additionally; after landing we had greatdifficulty getting our flight plan closed. We were unable to raise FSS on the ground via radio as expected; then multiple attempted calls to [TRACON] via phone were unsuccessful; and finally after the second phone call to FSS we were finally able to get our flight plan closed. Although it didn't get closed within the 5 minutes of landing that approach had requested because of all the problems we had. In retrospect we let approach rush us in the descent prior to accepting the visual approach into ZZZ; we should have gotten delay vectors so we weren't so rushed going into the approach. Also; it would have been better if we would have taken the option from approach to get vectors around for a second attempt rather than just flying the traffic pattern. This would have given us more time and set us up in a better position for a second approach. Lastly; the autopilot should have been taken off earlier; trying to fly the visual pattern on the autopilot just didn't work. With a TPA of approximately 1;500 ft. AGL; if you start descending late at all there is very little time to correct the problem and be stabilized prior to 1;000 ft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.