Narrative:

The first officer (first officer) flying with the autopilot on and myself as the pilot monitoring. We were at 4;000 ft with flaps at 15 or 20 and airspeed of 180 kias on a dogleg base vector to final when we heard a muffled boom/bang sound followed immediately by a yaw of the aircraft. This was followed by an EICAS message: rt eng stator and rt eng oil press. Engines indications and subsequent EICAS messages confirmed that the right engine had failed. I [requested priority handling] with ATC and proceeded to perform the engine failure checklist on the qrc while the first officer continued to fly the aircraft. At the point where the qrc said to proceed to the QRH we were on final for runway 22L and descending to 3;000 ft. I made the decision to suspend the checklist at this point and the first officer and I quickly discussed if we were comfortable continuing the approach and landing. We briefed a flaps 20 single engine landing and go-around if it became necessary. The speeds in the FMC were reset for a flaps 20 landing. We continued to configure the aircraft for landing. I then called back to [the] fas and told them that we had lost the rt engine; we would be landing in approximately 2 minutes and to prep the cabin for a possible evacuation. I confirmed with tower that the emergency equipment would be there on landing. On short final we got the aural warning of 'too low; flaps'. We realized this was due to the flaps 20 configuration; single engine landing we were doing I quickly selected the ground proximity flap ovrd switch to ovrd. An uneventful flaps 20; single engine landing was made by the first officer. We rolled out and exited the runway at taxiway north. We had no other abnormal indications and I decided to taxi the aircraft to the gate with the emergency equipment following us. Emergency personnel and station maintenance personnel met the aircraft. They informed us that they could not see any visible signs of damage. We proceeded to debrief station maintenance on what had happened. Calls were made to dispatch; the flight operations and [the] maintenance control engine shop to inform them of the incident.total time from the engine failure to landing was approximately 5 minutes.numerous times in my [xx]+ years at [company]; as well as while flying in the military; the topic of what would you do with an engine failure on final has come up. In virtually every discussion; the consensus was that; barring any adverse conditions or controllability problems with the aircraft; we would continue and land flaps 20 if not fully configured or 25-30 if we were. Having had those discussions made things much easier and contributed to the successful outcome of this incident.after arriving at the gate; the purser informed me that there had been some confusion on their end. When I called back to the fas to inform them of the [situation]; another flight attendant had answered the call. According to the purser; the confusion came when the flight attendant who answered relayed the information to her. By the time we finished briefing maintenance and exited the flight deck the passengers and fas had all deplaned. As a result; we were unable to conduct a debriefing with entire crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported an engine failure occurred while being vectored to final approach. The crew secured the engine and made an uneventful; single-engine landing.

Narrative: The FO (First Officer) flying with the autopilot on and myself as the pilot monitoring. We were at 4;000 ft with flaps at 15 or 20 and airspeed of 180 kias on a dogleg base vector to final when we heard a muffled boom/bang sound followed immediately by a yaw of the aircraft. This was followed by an EICAS MSG: Rt Eng Stator and Rt Eng Oil Press. Engines indications and subsequent EICAS messages confirmed that the right engine had failed. I [requested priority handling] with ATC and proceeded to perform the Engine Failure Checklist on the QRC while the FO continued to fly the aircraft. At the point where the QRC said to proceed to the QRH we were on final for RWY 22L and descending to 3;000 ft. I made the decision to suspend the checklist at this point and the FO and I quickly discussed if we were comfortable continuing the approach and landing. We briefed a flaps 20 single engine landing and go-around if it became necessary. The speeds in the FMC were reset for a flaps 20 landing. We continued to configure the aircraft for landing. I then called back to [the] FAs and told them that we had lost the Rt Engine; we would be landing in approximately 2 minutes and to prep the cabin for a possible evacuation. I confirmed with Tower that the emergency equipment would be there on landing. On short final we got the aural warning of 'Too low; flaps'. We realized this was due to the flaps 20 configuration; single engine landing we were doing I quickly selected the GND PROX FLAP OVRD switch to OVRD. An uneventful flaps 20; single engine landing was made by the FO. We rolled out and exited the runway at Taxiway N. We had no other abnormal indications and I decided to taxi the aircraft to the gate with the emergency equipment following us. Emergency personnel and Station Maintenance personnel met the aircraft. They informed us that they could not see any visible signs of damage. We proceeded to debrief Station Maintenance on what had happened. Calls were made to Dispatch; the Flight Operations and [the] Maintenance Control engine shop to inform them of the incident.Total time from the engine failure to landing was approximately 5 minutes.Numerous times in my [XX]+ years at [company]; as well as while flying in the military; the topic of what would you do with an engine failure on final has come up. In virtually every discussion; the consensus was that; barring any adverse conditions or controllability problems with the aircraft; we would continue and land flaps 20 if not fully configured or 25-30 if we were. Having had those discussions made things much easier and contributed to the successful outcome of this incident.After arriving at the gate; the Purser informed me that there had been some confusion on their end. When I called back to the FAs to inform them of the [situation]; another FA had answered the call. According to the Purser; the confusion came when the FA who answered relayed the information to her. By the time we finished briefing maintenance and exited the flight deck the passengers and FAs had all deplaned. As a result; we were unable to conduct a debriefing with entire crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.