Narrative:

Operating flight XXXX we executed the xxxxx arrival planning for runway xxc that was being advertised on the arrival d-atis. The winds were appropriately 210/200 @19 G31. We discussed the possibility of landing on runway xxc with auto-brakes 4 and max thrust reversers. The captain stated that he didn't think that was a good idea because of the strong crosswind and rather to just rely on the brakes vs TR due to the crosswind component and cited the ZZZ runway incident. I agreed and we planned on using idle TR and auto-brakes 4. However the captain computed the performance with wet runway and flaps 30; although on the d-atis there was no ficon (field condition report) or mention of wet-runway conditions; but justified his using those performance that with the NOTAMS for wet runway that were 6 hours old. I mentioned to him that due to the gusty winds I thought it would be a good idea to use flaps 25 due to the possibility of flap relief and was told 'it wouldn't be a problem.' once we got closer to the terminal area; the new ATIS stated runway xyr was now in use and I asked for performance and again stated I would like flaps 25 because of the wind gust component and our weight so close to flaps 30 speed. The captain again programmed the performance with wet runway although there was no ficon or mention of wet runway on the ATIS; and used flaps 30. I explained to him that 'if we hit flap relief below 1;000; we would be unstable and would have to go around and I thought that would be an issue due to the gusty winds.' I was again ignored and the captain computed the performance for flaps 30 with maximum automatic brakes.at appropriately 800 ft. On the first ILS to xyr we got the flaps relief EICAS message and I called 'unstable go-around.' we executed a go around that was uneventful and was given a heading and told to climb to 5;000 ft. The go around went fine and I again expressed concern for the flaps 30 speeds vs 25; as well as the wet runway performance that I thought was unnecessary; and I was told 'flaps 30; even if we get the flaps relief below 1;000 we will continue' I told the captain 'I was not comfortable with that and if necessary we could use runway xxc if we had to go around again.' this time the captain elected to use the braking action good on performance; although there was no ficon; and told me that flaps 25 was not an option and to stop 'over-controlling the throttles' even though our reference speed plus gust additive was 165 kts. And flaps 30 speed was 180. On the 2nd ILS to xyr we again got the flaps relief at appropriately 600 ft. And I again called 'unstable go around' and hit the toga switch. The captain said 'I have the controls; and that I (me) was absolutely right for going around but we were going to land anyways' I replied with 'your controls' and noted the fuel was appropriately 13.4T. The captain started to explain his reasoning for landing and I told him ''we could talk about on the ground.' he then dove for the runway unstable and landed on runway xyr after the autopilot had already started initiating a go around and increasing toga thrust. After landing the taxi in was uneventful; and after shutdown he replied that 'he hoped I wasn't upset' in which I replied that I was; and that I was going to file a report. The captain then said he was going to have to file a lot of paperwork and said he was sorry for taking the controls.I think the culture of captains not valuing their first officers' experience and ideas has become toxic at [company name]; and there needs to be a change. This particular captain had taken the time to explain a lot of valuable information before and during the flight; clarifying the fcom; the new 'briefing the glass' procedure; de-ice procedure etc. Which I was very appreciative of; however I think he took on the role that he was the teacher and that I had nothing to offer him as a pilot no matter my experience level or knowledge base.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 flight crew reported a disagreement between the Captain and First Officer on the landing flap configuration resulting in two go-arounds.

Narrative: Operating Flight XXXX we executed the XXXXX arrival planning for Runway XXC that was being advertised on the arrival D-ATIS. The winds were appropriately 210/200 @19 G31. We discussed the possibility of landing on Runway XXC with auto-brakes 4 and max thrust reversers. The Captain stated that he didn't think that was a good idea because of the strong crosswind and rather to just rely on the brakes vs TR due to the crosswind component and cited the ZZZ runway incident. I agreed and we planned on using idle TR and Auto-brakes 4. However the Captain computed the performance with wet runway and flaps 30; although on the D-ATIS there was no FICON (Field Condition report) or mention of wet-runway conditions; but justified his using those performance that with the NOTAMS for wet runway that were 6 hours old. I mentioned to him that due to the gusty winds I thought it would be a good idea to use flaps 25 due to the possibility of FLAP RELIEF and was told 'it wouldn't be a problem.' Once we got closer to the terminal area; the new ATIS stated Runway XYR was now in use and I asked for performance and again stated I would like flaps 25 because of the wind gust component and our weight so close to flaps 30 speed. The Captain again programmed the performance with wet runway although there was no FICON or mention of wet runway on the ATIS; and used flaps 30. I explained to him that 'if we hit flap relief below 1;000; we would be unstable and would have to go around and I thought that would be an issue due to the gusty winds.' I was again ignored and the Captain computed the performance for flaps 30 with MAX AUTO brakes.At appropriately 800 ft. on the first ILS to XYR we got the Flaps Relief EICAS message and I called 'unstable go-around.' We executed a go around that was uneventful and was given a heading and told to climb to 5;000 ft. The go around went fine and I again expressed concern for the flaps 30 speeds vs 25; as well as the wet runway performance that I thought was unnecessary; and I was told 'FLAPS 30; even if we get the flaps relief below 1;000 we will continue' I told the Captain 'I was not comfortable with that and if necessary we could use Runway XXC if we had to go around again.' This time the Captain elected to use the BRAKING ACTION GOOD on performance; although there was no FICON; and told me that flaps 25 was not an option and to stop 'over-controlling the throttles' even though our REF speed plus gust additive was 165 kts. and flaps 30 speed was 180. On the 2nd ILS to XYR we again got the Flaps Relief at appropriately 600 ft. and I again called 'unstable go around' and hit the TOGA switch. The Captain said 'I have the controls; and that I (me) was absolutely right for going around but we were going to land anyways' I replied with 'your controls' and noted the fuel was appropriately 13.4T. The Captain started to explain his reasoning for landing and I told him ''we could talk about on the ground.' He then dove for the runway unstable and landed on Runway XYR after the autopilot had already started initiating a go around and increasing TOGA thrust. After landing the taxi in was uneventful; and after shutdown he replied that 'he hoped I wasn't upset' in which I replied that I was; and that I was going to file a report. The Captain then said he was going to have to file a lot of paperwork and said he was sorry for taking the controls.I think the culture of Captains not valuing their First Officers' experience and ideas has become toxic at [company name]; and there needs to be a change. This particular Captain had taken the time to explain a lot of valuable information before and during the flight; clarifying the FCOM; the new 'Briefing the Glass' procedure; De-ice procedure etc. Which I was very appreciative of; however I think he took on the role that he was the teacher and that I had nothing to offer him as a pilot no matter my experience level or knowledge base.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.