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Attributes | |
ACN | 1728265 |
Time | |
Date | 201911 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fuselage |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207 Flight Crew Total 8800 Flight Crew Type 477 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
On departure from ZZZ single pilot with no passengers under part 91; IMC; light rain and smooth air climbing through 11;400 feet to assigned altitude; I encountered microburst. The aircraft indicated a stabilized climb speed of 125 kts the instantaneously indicated about 260 kts (vne is 188 kts) of pfd 1; pfd 2 and standby instruments. What I believe was torsional tail flutter also occurred. The microburst or wind shear event lasted about thirty seconds then normal flight returned.upon safely landing I contacted piper; for guidance on appropriate inspection as outlined by piper factory engineers. The safety issue of potential structural damage to my aircraft; a piper M500 has never been addressed by company nor aircraft manufacturer after several documented verbal and written correspondence with both parties. With the history of structural failure of the PA-46 series; especially; the turbine powered versions I would expect some form of established engineering order readily available for owners and operators of this aircraft because of the performance envelope.we have gone to extremes to find a corrective action in the form of reasonably inspection to assure safety of flight; but company and aircraft manufacturer are refusing to support their product thus creating a safety problem that will most likely present in the future as an inflight structural failure. Their position is that if they handle or touch the aircraft; when there is structural failure both parties will have shared financial liability. As of today; the companies' position is stating aircraft X is safe for flight without any further inspections.these companies are voluntarily negligent in assuring the structural integrity of aircraft X as is required by crash fire rescue equipment's; federal and state law. Please assess the urgency this matter needs.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PA-46 pilot reported an inability to get the aircraft manufacturer to provide technical guidance for required inspection procedures following an in flight structural failure.
Narrative: On departure from ZZZ single pilot with no passengers under Part 91; IMC; light rain and smooth air climbing through 11;400 feet to assigned altitude; I encountered microburst. The aircraft indicated a stabilized climb speed of 125 kts the instantaneously indicated about 260 kts (Vne is 188 kts) of PFD 1; PFD 2 and Standby Instruments. What I believe was torsional tail flutter also occurred. The microburst or wind shear event lasted about thirty seconds then normal flight returned.Upon safely landing I contacted Piper; for guidance on appropriate inspection as outlined by Piper factory engineers. The safety issue of potential structural damage to my aircraft; a Piper M500 has never been addressed by Company nor Aircraft Manufacturer after several documented verbal and written correspondence with both parties. With the history of structural failure of the PA-46 series; especially; the turbine powered versions I would expect some form of established Engineering Order readily available for owners and operators of this aircraft because of the performance envelope.We have gone to extremes to find a corrective action in the form of reasonably inspection to assure safety of flight; but Company and Aircraft Manufacturer are refusing to support their product thus creating a safety problem that will most likely present in the future as an inflight structural failure. Their position is that if they handle or touch the aircraft; when there is structural failure both parties will have shared financial liability. As of today; the Companies' position is stating Aircraft X is safe for flight without any further inspections.These Companies are voluntarily negligent in assuring the structural integrity of Aircraft X as is required by CFR's; federal and state law. Please assess the urgency this matter needs.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.