Narrative:

I was the captain on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We arrived [at] the airplane for the first flight of the day (for us and the airplane) and began preparing for departure. During my before start flow I discovered the park brake pressure to be zero. This was confirmed by moving the mfd (multi-function display) into reversionary mode to show an actual value which displayed '0'. I called maintenance control and advised them of the brake pressure issue. The controller directed me to fsm [section] low park brake pressure. We completed procedure; returned to the flight deck; continued with our normal checklists; and departed for ZZZ1.I was [the] pm (pilot monitoring) for this flight. When my first officer called 'gear up' I selected the gear up and observed three red gear light indications for the mains and the nose gear and also noticed that the gear were not traveling. My first thought was to look up and I observed the alternate landing gear release door panel to be open. I communicated this to my first officer but because we were below acceleration height we continued normally. All of the appropriate flows were completed at acceleration height and I instructed my first officer to continue climbing but level off at 10;000 ft. Which was our initially assigned altitude from ATC but also it was a safe altitude to still have the gear down if the checklist wasn't complete yet. I also instructed my first officer to keep the airspeed below 200 KIAS. I contacted ATC and told them that we needed a level off at 10;000 ft. And they allowed us to do so. I also called the flight attendants and told them we were working on getting the gear up and that there was nothing wrong with the airplane. I completed the landing gear fails to retract checklist; the gear retracted normally; and we continued to ZZZ1; the landing gear operated and indicated normally for the remainder of the flight and there was no further incident on this flight.upon landing in ZZZ1 I contacted maintenance control again to advise them of what happened and they advised me to make a log entry in the logbook so they could inspect the landing gear.now I would like to give some further background on the situation. First; we had this airplane the night before from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and the airplane was a ron. The airplane did not fly again till we got back out to the airport to fly back to ZZZ1. Going back to the zero park brake pressure issue; this was not shocking to me because this airplane had documented issues with the park brake pressure from a couple days prior. I will paraphrase the write up by saying that it was noted that the park brake pressure decreased rapidly after engine shutdown. Maintenance had inspected the system for leaks and observed the pressure for two hours and had no findings. When we parked the night before I observed the park brake pressure to be relatively normal immediately following shut down. Now having gotten back out to the airplane and seeing the park brake pressure at zero; I wasn't terribly surprised. If you look at [the] procedure in the fsm you'll notice there's a warning box prior to any items stating the need to brief the ground crew to remain clear of the main landing gear doors. I did so but in doing so I was now physically standing in the flight deck and not sitting in my seat. My first officer and I briefly went over the procedure before we did anything so we would know what to expect. This is the first time in nearly 4 years of employment that I have had to do this procedure. We were going line by line through the procedure (or so we thought) and we thought we had done everything completely. It's obvious I missed step 3 otherwise I wouldn't be writing this report. The final step is to return the handle to the flight deck; which we did; then we continued with our normal checklists.everything above considered; I messed up. There were at least two opportunities for me to trap this error and I missed them. I take full responsibility for the situation. To be completely honest; we were a little behind in our duties because of having to complete the park brake pressure procedure. Both my first officer and I went out to the engine nacelle to complete this procedure since neither one of us had done it before. It was a learning experience for both of us and it was really cool to finally get to do something we learn so much about and get pounded in our heads in ground school. At the point of discovering the park brake pressure we were in the middle of our before start duties. Upon returning to the flight deck we finished the before start flows and checklist. Being that we were a little pressed for time we were under added pressure so I missed the landing gear alternate doors item on the before start checklist. I'm not one to sit here and point fingers and make excuses but being candid; we were more hurried than normal; this was immediately following a relatively short overnight; a morning show (which I'm normally a pm guy and bid away from morning trips; but I was assigned this overnight as part of all of the rescheduling going on); and all of the added stress from everything currently going on in the world. Just a lot of external pressures. I understand it's my job to protect the operation from those pressures but we aren't perfect and this is something I have to take responsibility for. Going forward; this was huge reminder for me regarding the importance of checklist discipline and really making sure that we aren't distracted from the task at hand whether that's reading a procedure line by line that's literally black and white to really making sure I'm paying attention and visually verifying the checklist items as we complete the checklist.I have just a couple recommendations. Firstly; I believe this to be an isolated issue and this was really me just being stupid and missing something easy. I don't believe this to be something that could be systemic so I don't believe major changes to the operation for the whole pilot group are necessary. That being said; I would like to see an additional step added to the end of [the] procedure to verify that the alternate release doors have been closed. I was doing all of the steps with my ipad in hand outside of the airplane. After I read step 7 and we completed it I didn't think any further about the procedure. Granted; had I not overlooked step 3 I wouldn't be writing this report; but it would be nice for there to be a verification/reminder step to double check and make sure those panels got closed after releasing the gear doors. One last recommendation; and this is extremely nit picky; the procedure has us use the pump handle in the flight deck. We did so since that's what the manual instructed us to do but everything we get taught in ground school and the placard inside the right engine nacelle say to use the pump handle that's located in the upper right side nose compartment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 Captain reported landing gear failed to retract when selected up; caused by the alternate gear release panel cover being open.

Narrative: I was the Captain on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We arrived [at] the airplane for the first flight of the day (for us and the airplane) and began preparing for departure. During my before start flow I discovered the park brake pressure to be zero. This was confirmed by moving the MFD (Multi-Function Display) into reversionary mode to show an actual value which displayed '0'. I called Maintenance Control and advised them of the brake pressure issue. The Controller directed me to FSM [section] Low Park Brake Pressure. We completed procedure; returned to the flight deck; continued with our normal checklists; and departed for ZZZ1.I was [the] PM (Pilot Monitoring) for this flight. When my First Officer called 'Gear Up' I selected the gear up and observed three red gear light indications for the mains and the nose gear and also noticed that the gear were not traveling. My first thought was to look up and I observed the alternate landing gear release door panel to be open. I communicated this to my First Officer but because we were below acceleration height we continued normally. All of the appropriate flows were completed at acceleration height and I instructed my First Officer to continue climbing but level off at 10;000 ft. which was our initially assigned altitude from ATC but also it was a safe altitude to still have the gear down if the checklist wasn't complete yet. I also instructed my First Officer to keep the airspeed below 200 KIAS. I contacted ATC and told them that we needed a level off at 10;000 ft. and they allowed us to do so. I also called the flight attendants and told them we were working on getting the gear up and that there was nothing wrong with the airplane. I completed the Landing Gear Fails To Retract checklist; the gear retracted normally; and we continued to ZZZ1; the landing gear operated and indicated normally for the remainder of the flight and there was no further incident on this flight.Upon landing in ZZZ1 I contacted Maintenance Control again to advise them of what happened and they advised me to make a log entry in the logbook so they could inspect the landing gear.Now I would like to give some further background on the situation. First; we had this airplane the night before from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and the airplane was a RON. The airplane did not fly again till we got back out to the airport to fly back to ZZZ1. Going back to the zero park brake pressure issue; this was not shocking to me because this airplane had documented issues with the park brake pressure from a couple days prior. I will paraphrase the write up by saying that it was noted that the park brake pressure decreased rapidly after engine shutdown. Maintenance had inspected the system for leaks and observed the pressure for two hours and had no findings. When we parked the night before I observed the park brake pressure to be relatively normal immediately following shut down. Now having gotten back out to the airplane and seeing the park brake pressure at zero; I wasn't terribly surprised. If you look at [the] procedure in the FSM you'll notice there's a warning box prior to any items stating the need to brief the ground crew to remain clear of the main landing gear doors. I did so but in doing so I was now physically standing in the flight deck and not sitting in my seat. My First Officer and I briefly went over the procedure before we did anything so we would know what to expect. This is the first time in nearly 4 years of employment that I have had to do this procedure. We were going line by line through the procedure (or so we thought) and we thought we had done everything completely. It's obvious I missed step 3 otherwise I wouldn't be writing this report. The final step is to return the handle to the flight deck; which we did; then we continued with our normal checklists.Everything above considered; I messed up. There were at least two opportunities for me to trap this error and I missed them. I take full responsibility for the situation. To be completely honest; we were a little behind in our duties because of having to complete the park brake pressure procedure. Both my First Officer and I went out to the engine nacelle to complete this procedure since neither one of us had done it before. It was a learning experience for both of us and it was really cool to finally get to do something we learn so much about and get pounded in our heads in ground school. At the point of discovering the park brake pressure we were in the middle of our before start duties. Upon returning to the flight deck we finished the before start flows and checklist. Being that we were a little pressed for time we were under added pressure so I missed the landing gear alternate doors item on the before start checklist. I'm not one to sit here and point fingers and make excuses but being candid; we were more hurried than normal; this was immediately following a relatively short overnight; a morning show (which I'm normally a PM guy and bid away from morning trips; but I was assigned this overnight as part of all of the rescheduling going on); and all of the added stress from everything currently going on in the world. Just a lot of external pressures. I understand it's my job to protect the operation from those pressures but we aren't perfect and this is something I have to take responsibility for. Going forward; this was huge reminder for me regarding the importance of checklist discipline and really making sure that we aren't distracted from the task at hand whether that's reading a procedure line by line that's literally black and white to really making sure I'm paying attention and visually verifying the checklist items as we complete the checklist.I have just a couple recommendations. Firstly; I believe this to be an isolated issue and this was really me just being stupid and missing something easy. I don't believe this to be something that could be systemic so I don't believe major changes to the operation for the whole pilot group are necessary. That being said; I would like to see an additional step added to the end of [the] procedure to verify that the alternate release doors have been closed. I was doing all of the steps with my iPad in hand outside of the airplane. After I read step 7 and we completed it I didn't think any further about the procedure. Granted; had I not overlooked step 3 I wouldn't be writing this report; but it would be nice for there to be a verification/reminder step to double check and make sure those panels got closed after releasing the gear doors. One last recommendation; and this is extremely nit picky; the procedure has us use the pump handle in the flight deck. We did so since that's what the manual instructed us to do but everything we get taught in ground school and the placard inside the right engine nacelle say to use the pump handle that's located in the upper right side nose compartment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.