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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1740283 |
Time | |
Date | 202004 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types |
Narrative:
Initial pairing was brought to my attention the night prior. After reviewing the assignment and forecast winter weather for the following day; an earlier commute was needed to deal with icing conditions. Having left my residence at XA00 for an XD00 hours show; I encountered winter weather driving condition along with a longer commute. Arriving at ZZZ by XD00 hours I noticed the first delay with the flight being pushed until XF00 hours.the captain and I boarded the aircraft a little after XG00 hours. While entering the forward galley we observed a pool of liquid coming out of the right oven. Maintenance and catering were both notified and a fix was attempted. At approximately XH00 hours maintenance began a series of unusual activity. Running both engines at the gate as well as removing equipment from the cabin. This was our first indication that the aircraft was not ready for ferry. During this time we were in communication with dispatch and maintenance control trying to secure a maintenance ferry document. At approximately xi:40 we were advised the departure was being pushed until xn:30 hours for deep cleaning. The captain and I walked over to the hotel for lunch and received a room at approximately XJ00 hours. Agreeing to meet in the lobby at xl:30 hours for our new departure; a nap was not taken as we continued to try and track down hotel accommodations for later that night; get information for a point of contact in ZZZ1 and confirm transportation for travel to ZZZ2.at xl:45 hours we were advised of a new departure time of xo:30 as the plane was still not ready for ferry; due to maintenance sign off and ferry documentation. By xo:45 the captain was at his decision point as a disagreement between dispatch and maintenance control had developed preventing the ferry documentation being provided for a legal departure. At approximately XP00 hours I reviewed my own fitness and determined I was still at least 2 hours from departure and dealing with winter weather and maintenance. I felt I would not be able to get suitable sleep until approximately XV00 hours and this was pushing the limits to my own fitness in dealing with the threats of flying late at night; icing/weather challenges and the threat of fearing and aircraft vs. Normal line operations. It was then that I decided a fatigue call would be the safest course of action.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier flight crew reported many delays encountered to get a flight going that eventually departed the next day.
Narrative: Initial pairing was brought to my attention the night prior. After reviewing the assignment and forecast winter weather for the following day; an earlier commute was needed to deal with icing conditions. Having left my residence at XA00 for an XD00 hours show; I encountered winter weather driving condition along with a longer commute. Arriving at ZZZ by XD00 hours I noticed the first delay with the flight being pushed until XF00 hours.The Captain and I boarded the aircraft a little after XG00 hours. While entering the forward galley we observed a pool of liquid coming out of the right oven. Maintenance and catering were both notified and a fix was attempted. At approximately XH00 hours maintenance began a series of unusual activity. Running both engines at the gate as well as removing equipment from the cabin. This was our first indication that the aircraft was not ready for ferry. During this time we were in communication with dispatch and Maintenance Control trying to secure a Maintenance Ferry Document. At approximately XI:40 we were advised the departure was being pushed until XN:30 hours for deep cleaning. The Captain and I walked over to the hotel for lunch and received a room at approximately XJ00 hours. Agreeing to meet in the lobby at XL:30 hours for our new departure; a nap was not taken as we continued to try and track down hotel accommodations for later that night; get information for a point of contact in ZZZ1 and confirm transportation for travel to ZZZ2.At XL:45 hours we were advised of a new departure time of XO:30 as the plane was still not ready for ferry; due to maintenance sign off and Ferry Documentation. By XO:45 the Captain was at his decision point as a disagreement between Dispatch and Maintenance Control had developed preventing the Ferry Documentation being provided for a legal departure. At approximately XP00 hours I reviewed my own fitness and determined I was still at least 2 hours from departure and dealing with winter weather and maintenance. I felt I would not be able to get suitable sleep until approximately XV00 hours and this was pushing the limits to my own fitness in dealing with the threats of flying late at night; icing/weather challenges and the threat of fearing and aircraft vs. normal line operations. It was then that I decided a fatigue call would be the safest course of action.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.