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B737 captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1740617 |
| Time | |
| Date | 202004 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B737-800 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Takeoff |
| Route In Use | Vectors |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Horizontal Stabilizer Trim |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97 Flight Crew Type 12000 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Departed ZZZ runway xx; flaps 5. Reaching 1;000 ft.; I called for flaps 1 and subsequently attempted activation of the electric trim switch. Left yoke stab trim did not function. Asked first officer to try his yoke trim switch. Neither trim switches functioned. Ran QRH procedure for stabilizer trim inoperative. ATC was notified of flight control problem and [priority handling requested]. A large amount of questions were asked during the initial run of the QRH. The QRH gives a condition: both of these occur:loss of electric trim through autopilot.loss of electric trim through the control switches.as we got vectored off the departure procedure and distracted by ATC questions pertaining to the nature of our [situation]; I didn't fully hear the initial reading of the condition calling for both of the above. As I had a heavy yoke from the takeoff configuration; I choose not to negative G unload the aircraft and turn on the autopilot. By not turning on the autopilot; I wasn't able to fully comply with the QRH conditions. QRH was continued and stab trim cutout switches were selected to cutout. With the cutout switches in cutout; the autopilot was not available.during our debrief and review of the QRH procedures it was discovered that the QRH called for loss of both items; loss of autopilot and flight control switches.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 Captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.
Narrative: Departed ZZZ Runway XX; Flaps 5. Reaching 1;000 ft.; I called for flaps 1 and subsequently attempted activation of the Electric Trim switch. Left yoke stab trim did not function. Asked First Officer to try his yoke trim switch. Neither trim switches functioned. Ran QRH procedure for Stabilizer Trim Inoperative. ATC was notified of flight control problem and [priority handling requested]. A large amount of questions were asked during the initial run of the QRH. The QRH gives a condition: Both of these occur:Loss of electric trim through autopilot.Loss of electric trim through the control switches.As we got vectored off the departure procedure and distracted by ATC questions pertaining to the nature of our [situation]; I didn't fully hear the initial reading of the condition calling for both of the above. As I had a heavy yoke from the takeoff configuration; I choose not to negative G unload the aircraft and turn on the autopilot. By not turning on the autopilot; I wasn't able to fully comply with the QRH conditions. QRH was continued and Stab Trim Cutout switches were selected to cutout. With the Cutout switches in cutout; the autopilot was not available.During our debrief and review of the QRH procedures it was discovered that the QRH called for loss of both items; loss of autopilot and flight control switches.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.