Narrative:

During the initial take-off of a multi-engine training flight; the instructor retarded the mixture of the left engine to simulate an engine failure on takeoff. As the flying pilot; I executed the first two steps of the published emergency procedure (1. Throttles to idle; 2. Apply maximum braking) upon aural recognition of the loss of power along with a significant (45-60 degree) yaw to the left. To counteract the left yaw; full right rudder and differential braking was applied. The aircraft responded to the control input and swerved back to approximate alignment with the runway; but by then had deviated far enough left that the left main tire was off the hard surface and into the grass. The aircraft again yawed slightly to the left and the nose tire left the hard surface. Once the main and nose tires left the runway; additional control inputs to correct to the right were ineffective and the aircraft came to a stop in approximately 75 feet. Attempts to return to the pavement from the resting position were ineffective and the aircraft was shut down. Upon exiting the aircraft; the nose wheel was determined to be buried nearly to the top of the tire in a muddy rut which was 30-40 feet long. With the assistance of airport personnel and maintenance personnel from the flight school the aircraft was tipped back toward the tail far enough to raise the nose wheel out of the mud and put a 3x5 foot board under it to support its weight. The aircraft was pulled back onto the runway and towed to the flight school using a standard tow bar.as for a root cause analysis of the events leading up to the incident; I think there are several:1. Relative inexperience of flying pilot: I had 5.9 hours in the aircraft and this was my third flight with this instructor. Two previous flights occurred with a different instructor at a different school; the most recent being 35 days prior to this incident. I had to switch schools as the aircraft at the original training site became unavailable due to long-term maintenance issues. This was my second-ever engine failure on takeoff practice. The maneuver was not briefed by the instructor; though I assumed it was likely to occur.2. Slow reaction time: I noticed the change in engine noise just prior to the onset of adverse yaw. I believe I hesitated for a second or less prior to pulling the throttles to idle. This exacerbated the yaw which ultimately led to the runway departure.3. Misunderstanding of the written emergency procedure: I applied significant braking as I attempted to control the aircraft and prevent it from exiting the runway; to include differentially applying heavier braking to the right main. During a debrief with the instructor and flight school owner; they explained that the heavy braking may have reduced directional control of the aircraft. I saw no evidence of locked brakes; but I am not an expert in such matters. As a low time multi-engine pilot; I suppose I have to defer to the instructors' experience. Given the discussion surrounding the potential negative impact of applying maximum braking during this procedure it seems that the phrase 'braking-as required' or similar might be better than 'braking-maximum' as written in the flight school's current checklist.4. Failure of the instructor to back me up on the controls on only my second exposure to this maneuver. As mentioned; I may have hesitated briefly before retarding the throttles to idle. It was suggested that this may have allowed the situation to develop into and unrecoverable maneuver; but at no point did the instructor physically touch either throttle or verbally indicate I needed to take different actions.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Instructor and student pilot reported a planned engine out exercise resulted in a runway excursion.

Narrative: During the initial take-off of a multi-engine training flight; the instructor retarded the mixture of the left engine to simulate an engine failure on takeoff. As the flying pilot; I executed the first two steps of the published emergency procedure (1. Throttles to IDLE; 2. Apply maximum braking) upon aural recognition of the loss of power along with a significant (45-60 degree) yaw to the left. To counteract the left yaw; full right rudder and differential braking was applied. The aircraft responded to the control input and swerved back to approximate alignment with the runway; but by then had deviated far enough left that the left main tire was off the hard surface and into the grass. The aircraft again yawed slightly to the left and the nose tire left the hard surface. Once the main and nose tires left the runway; additional control inputs to correct to the right were ineffective and the aircraft came to a stop in approximately 75 feet. Attempts to return to the pavement from the resting position were ineffective and the aircraft was shut down. Upon exiting the aircraft; the nose wheel was determined to be buried nearly to the top of the tire in a muddy rut which was 30-40 feet long. With the assistance of airport personnel and maintenance personnel from the flight school the aircraft was tipped back toward the tail far enough to raise the nose wheel out of the mud and put a 3X5 foot board under it to support its weight. The aircraft was pulled back onto the runway and towed to the flight school using a standard tow bar.As for a root cause analysis of the events leading up to the incident; I think there are several:1. Relative inexperience of flying pilot: I had 5.9 hours in the aircraft and this was my third flight with this instructor. Two previous flights occurred with a different instructor at a different school; the most recent being 35 days prior to this incident. I had to switch schools as the aircraft at the original training site became unavailable due to long-term maintenance issues. This was my second-ever engine failure on takeoff practice. The maneuver was not briefed by the instructor; though I assumed it was likely to occur.2. Slow reaction time: I noticed the change in engine noise just prior to the onset of adverse yaw. I believe I hesitated for a second or less prior to pulling the throttles to idle. This exacerbated the yaw which ultimately led to the runway departure.3. Misunderstanding of the written emergency procedure: I applied significant braking as I attempted to control the aircraft and prevent it from exiting the runway; to include differentially applying heavier braking to the right main. During a debrief with the instructor and flight school owner; they explained that the heavy braking may have reduced directional control of the aircraft. I saw no evidence of locked brakes; but I am not an expert in such matters. As a low time multi-engine pilot; I suppose I have to defer to the instructors' experience. Given the discussion surrounding the potential negative impact of applying maximum braking during this procedure it seems that the phrase 'Braking-As Required' or similar might be better than 'Braking-Maximum' as written in the flight school's current checklist.4. Failure of the instructor to back me up on the controls on only my second exposure to this maneuver. As mentioned; I may have hesitated briefly before retarding the throttles to idle. It was suggested that this may have allowed the situation to develop into and unrecoverable maneuver; but at no point did the instructor physically touch either throttle or verbally indicate I needed to take different actions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.