Narrative:

I was PNF (pilot not flying) on an IFR flight in aircraft X; a corporate owned aircraft on a company flight originating in ZZZ and scheduled to arrive at ded at xa:46. As PNF; my preflight duties were shared with the PF (pilot flying) and my flight duties were handling communications with ATC; and calling out checklists to the PF. The flight departed on time with one passenger aboard and was uneventful until the final critical phase of flight in the airport environment of ded in which we came within what I would estimate would be approximately 200 ft. Of a skydiver who was under canopy and proceeding to land at the ded airport.during the descent phase of flight I had made multiple attempts to secure the field conditions and weather information via the AWOS which is published to be available on frequency. There was no NOTAM on record indicating that the AWOS was out of service. However; it was in fact; out of service. I also made multiple attempts to call [the FBO] on the unicom frequency to advise of our arriving passenger. There was no response to any of my radio calls on unicom. While still talking with center - I don't remember the frequency - I advised that I could not pick up the AWOS and requested a weather report. The controller advised me that he did not have weather for ded available and that I could make my request with the next controller; which would be approach.once handed off to approach; which I would estimate to have occurred about 20 miles from ded; I noted and commented to the PF that the approach controller seemed very busy on the radio. Despite the frequency congestion; the controller managed to give me the weather at ZZZ1; which was VFR. Based on this report; the PF and I agreed that we would likely set up for a left downwind to runway 30 which was the longest runway available. Almost immediately after making that decision an unidentified aircraft commented to approach that 'ded is using runway 23.' the controller then inquired; 'aircraft X did you copy that aircraft?' I replied in the affirmative and we then made plans to overfly the airport for a left downwind to runway 23.as we were continuing our descent; approximately 7 miles from the airport; the controller advised; 'aircraft X the airport is at your 12 o'clock at __ miles; advise when you have it in sight.' I advised the controller that we still had a few clouds between us and the field; and that I would be making that call shortly. There was a scattered - broken layer at around 2;200 which was just barely keeping us from making the airport. Then as we descended and were within approximately 5 miles; I called ZZZ1 and advised that the airport was in sight and we would cancel IFR. She advised us that our cancellation was received and to squawk VFR. I then announced our intention of overflying the field for the left downwind entry to runway 23 on the CTAF. While I do recall hearing other aircraft on the frequency; I do not recall hearing any other person on the radio advising us to call off our pattern entry. When we crossed over the field at about 1;700 ft. MSL; that was when I saw the parachutist under canopy at our 10 o'clock high position at what I would estimate to be about 200 ft.I could tell that the parachutist had us in sight and he appeared to be in control of his rig. We quickly entered a tight left downwind; and began configuring the aircraft for landing. I made the usual base and final leg calls on the CTAF while simultaneously observing outside and our TCAS screen for reference to other traffic. Once we had established about a 1 mile final; which is a very critical phase of flight I might add; someone unidentified called us on the CTAF and stated 'aircraft on final; runway 23; ded; did you check your NOTAMS?' I replied in the affirmative. He then stated 'well you guys just flew directly under one of our parachutes and you should check your NOTAMS.' I replied 'roger.' he then said 'and just for the record whether you checked your NOTAMS or not there are always parachute operations here at ded and you should not overfly the field to runway 23.' at this point; we were about ready to flare onto a 4;300 ft. Runway and I was frankly done with the radio discussion. My last radio reply to this individual before touchdown was 'standby.' then we landed; waved friendly to the parachutists who were in the grass around centerfield; and announced our clearing the runway into the FBO.as a pilot whether PNF or PF; it is part of my duty to consider all relevant information during preflight planning on an IFR flight. The following is a direct quote from the relevant airport remarks from the AFD (airport facility directory) at ded pertaining to skydiving: 'parachute jumping. Extv parachute and flt trng ops. Avoid over flying arpt dur parachute ops. Touch and go ops prohibited if there are 3 or more acft in the tfc pat.' etc. Apparently; the individual who was so interested in talking to me on the radio during a critical phase of our flight; believes that this remark in the AFD constitutes that a NOTAM has been issued that skydiving is in effect at ded. In fact; as I stated on the radio; we did check NOTAMS and there was no NOTAM advising pilots that any skydiving operations were being conducted at ded at our ETA. In fact; there were no new NOTAMS reported at ded at all. The only NOTAMS in my flight log were for unlit towers in the area of ded. While the airport remarks in the AFD are advisory in nature; there is no published requirement that pilots arriving from the north should fly right hand traffic on runway 23. In fact; other than the note listed above there is no guidance whatsoever as to exactly how an aircraft is to proceed into the traffic pattern for runway 23. It only states what you are advised not to do; and it simply states that these advisory requirements are in effect during parachute operations which I believe has to be published in a NOTAM or at least in the AWOS if it were working.I believe that parachute operators at ded should publish NOTAMS when parachute operations are in effect to include dates and times of operations. I feel that the NOTAM should mirror the airport remarks in the AFD and that those same remarks should be made available on an operating AWOS. The AWOS should also have an 'oos' NOTAM issued when the facility is out of service. In the approach controller's defense; I believe that she was doing the best job she could do considering the frequency congestion that she was dealing with; and I certainly didn't want to have to add to her workload by requesting an IFR approach into an airport that was VFR at the time. Therefore; I believe that our IFR cancellation was a prudent thing to do under the circumstances. In fact; I believe that all of our actions were prudent. While I can recognize the frustration of the skydiver operator; and I understand the relevance of the published advisories in the AFD; if there is not a notification made that skydiving operations are in effect at my ETA; then I believe that normal airport pattern procedures are prudent and safe. My passenger; aircraft; and crew were jeopardized by this incident just as much as the skydivers who were out having a good time. But as is the case in many aviation incidents; there are many links in the chain of factors that lead to aviation incidents/accidents. Usually; if any one link in the chain is broken; then the incident/accident does not occur. In this case; the links of the chain are NOTAMS; ATC; AWOS; and CTAF communications. If we had been properly notified by one of these links in the chain; then this incident would not have occurred. I believe that all [of] us were very fortunate in this case and I hope that this report will help resolve any issues in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Pilot Not Flying reported encountering a NMAC with a skydiver.

Narrative: I was PNF (Pilot Not Flying) on an IFR flight in Aircraft X; a corporate owned aircraft on a company flight originating in ZZZ and scheduled to arrive at DED at XA:46. As PNF; my preflight duties were shared with the PF (Pilot Flying) and my flight duties were handling communications with ATC; and calling out checklists to the PF. The flight departed on time with one passenger aboard and was uneventful until the final critical phase of flight in the airport environment of DED in which we came within what I would estimate would be approximately 200 ft. of a skydiver who was under canopy and proceeding to land at the DED airport.During the descent phase of flight I had made multiple attempts to secure the field conditions and weather information via the AWOS which is published to be available on frequency. There was no NOTAM on record indicating that the AWOS was out of service. However; it was in fact; out of service. I also made multiple attempts to call [the FBO] on the UNICOM frequency to advise of our arriving passenger. There was no response to any of my radio calls on UNICOM. While still talking with Center - I don't remember the frequency - I advised that I could not pick up the AWOS and requested a weather report. The Controller advised me that he did not have weather for DED available and that I could make my request with the next Controller; which would be Approach.Once handed off to Approach; which I would estimate to have occurred about 20 miles from DED; I noted and commented to the PF that the Approach Controller seemed very busy on the radio. Despite the frequency congestion; the Controller managed to give me the weather at ZZZ1; which was VFR. Based on this report; the PF and I agreed that we would likely set up for a left downwind to Runway 30 which was the longest runway available. Almost immediately after making that decision an unidentified aircraft commented to Approach that 'DED is using Runway 23.' The Controller then inquired; 'Aircraft X did you copy that aircraft?' I replied in the affirmative and we then made plans to overfly the airport for a left downwind to Runway 23.As we were continuing our descent; approximately 7 miles from the airport; the Controller advised; 'Aircraft X the airport is at your 12 o'clock at __ miles; advise when you have it in sight.' I advised the Controller that we still had a few clouds between us and the field; and that I would be making that call shortly. There was a scattered - broken layer at around 2;200 which was just barely keeping us from making the airport. Then as we descended and were within approximately 5 miles; I called ZZZ1 and advised that the airport was in sight and we would cancel IFR. She advised us that our cancellation was received and to squawk VFR. I then announced our intention of overflying the field for the left downwind entry to Runway 23 on the CTAF. While I do recall hearing other aircraft on the frequency; I do not recall hearing any other person on the radio advising us to call off our pattern entry. When we crossed over the field at about 1;700 ft. MSL; that was when I saw the parachutist under canopy at our 10 o'clock high position at what I would estimate to be about 200 ft.I could tell that the parachutist had us in sight and he appeared to be in control of his rig. We quickly entered a tight left downwind; and began configuring the aircraft for landing. I made the usual base and final leg calls on the CTAF while simultaneously observing outside and our TCAS screen for reference to other traffic. Once we had established about a 1 mile final; which is a very critical phase of flight I might add; someone unidentified called us on the CTAF and stated 'Aircraft on final; Runway 23; DED; did you check your NOTAMS?' I replied in the affirmative. He then stated 'Well you guys just flew directly under one of our parachutes and you should check your NOTAMS.' I replied 'Roger.' He then said 'And just for the record whether you checked your NOTAMS or not there are ALWAYS parachute operations here at DED and you should NOT overfly the field to Runway 23.' At this point; we were about ready to flare onto a 4;300 ft. runway and I was frankly done with the radio discussion. My last radio reply to this individual before touchdown was 'Standby.' Then we landed; waved friendly to the parachutists who were in the grass around centerfield; and announced our clearing the runway into the FBO.As a pilot whether PNF or PF; it is part of my duty to consider ALL relevant information during preflight planning on an IFR flight. The following is a direct quote from the relevant Airport Remarks from the AFD (Airport Facility Directory) at DED pertaining to skydiving: 'Parachute Jumping. Extv parachute and flt trng ops. Avoid over flying arpt dur parachute ops. Touch and go ops prohibited if there are 3 or more acft in the tfc pat.' etc. Apparently; the individual who was so interested in talking to me on the radio during a critical phase of our flight; believes that this remark in the AFD constitutes that a NOTAM has been issued that skydiving is in effect at DED. In fact; as I stated on the radio; we DID check NOTAMS and there was NO NOTAM advising pilots that ANY skydiving operations were being conducted at DED at our ETA. In fact; there were no new NOTAMS reported at DED at all. The only NOTAMS in my flight log were for unlit towers in the area of DED. While the Airport Remarks in the AFD are ADVISORY in nature; there is no published requirement that pilots arriving from the North should fly right hand traffic on Runway 23. In fact; other than the note listed above there is NO GUIDANCE WHATSOEVER as to exactly how an aircraft is to proceed into the traffic pattern for Runway 23. It only states what you are advised NOT to do; and it simply states that these advisory requirements are in effect DURING parachute operations which I believe has to be published in a NOTAM or at least in the AWOS if it were working.I believe that parachute operators at DED should publish NOTAMS when parachute operations are in effect to include dates and times of operations. I feel that the NOTAM should mirror the airport remarks in the AFD and that those same remarks should be made available on an operating AWOS. The AWOS should also have an 'OOS' NOTAM issued when the facility is out of service. In the Approach Controller's defense; I believe that she was doing the best job she could do considering the frequency congestion that she was dealing with; and I certainly didn't want to have to add to her workload by requesting an IFR approach into an airport that was VFR at the time. Therefore; I believe that our IFR cancellation was a prudent thing to do under the circumstances. In fact; I believe that ALL of our actions were prudent. While I can recognize the frustration of the skydiver operator; and I understand the relevance of the published advisories in the AFD; if there is not a notification made that skydiving operations are IN EFFECT at my ETA; then I believe that normal airport pattern procedures are prudent and safe. My passenger; aircraft; and crew were jeopardized by this incident just as much as the skydivers who were out having a good time. But as is the case in many aviation incidents; there are many links in the chain of factors that lead to aviation incidents/accidents. Usually; if any one link in the chain is broken; then the incident/accident does not occur. In this case; the links of the chain are NOTAMS; ATC; AWOS; and CTAF communications. If we had been properly notified by one of these links in the chain; then this incident would not have occurred. I believe that all [of] us were very fortunate in this case and I hope that this report will help resolve any issues in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.