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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 179066 |
Time | |
Date | 199105 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sdf |
State Reference | KY |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Heavy Transport, Low Wing, 4 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 110 flight time total : 7800 flight time type : 2250 |
ASRS Report | 179066 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Airport |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
We were called out on 1 hour notice to operate a ferry flight to mia. Upon arrival that flight was cancelled and we were told we were gong to cid. This was cancelled and we were going back to the original plan, ferry to mia and operate back to sdf. Then we were told to phd to mia. Right before going to the aircraft we were told we would operate the flight and that all the paperwork was on board with another crew that was involved in these changes. On arrival at the aircraft, it appeared to me that the aircraft was being downloaded for the ferry to mia. During our preflight setup we were given 2 separate weight and balance sheets by different people. Both sheets indicated a ferry flight all 0's in the weight column. There was no other paperwork on board, so flight control was notified for flight plan and WX. They told us they would send in right away, along with a corrected weight and balance. This new weight and balance also indicated a ferry flight. The doors were closed and we blocked out. The first officer performed the takeoff. At the rotation call, when he pulled back on the yoke it required excessive pull force to become airborne. We knew something was wrong. After we were under way, the second officer went back to look behind the smoke curtain and discovered that there were containers on board. After arrival in mia the cargo weight was computed to be 58264 pounds. We were all in a state of total disbelief. How could this have happened? How could load planning, flight control and our crew not realize the aircraft had been loaded? Had the aircraft been loaded aft instead of forward, we might have easily lost control after takeoff. The flight could have ended a fatal disaster. Perhaps a new procedure where someone is actually checking off container #south as they are loaded on the aircraft would prevent this type of incident from occurring again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR HVT FRT TOOK OFF ON A FERRY FLT WITH UNDOCUMENTED CARGO STILL ON BOARD.
Narrative: WE WERE CALLED OUT ON 1 HR NOTICE TO OPERATE A FERRY FLT TO MIA. UPON ARR THAT FLT WAS CANCELLED AND WE WERE TOLD WE WERE GONG TO CID. THIS WAS CANCELLED AND WE WERE GOING BACK TO THE ORIGINAL PLAN, FERRY TO MIA AND OPERATE BACK TO SDF. THEN WE WERE TOLD TO PHD TO MIA. RIGHT BEFORE GOING TO THE ACFT WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD OPERATE THE FLT AND THAT ALL THE PAPERWORK WAS ON BOARD WITH ANOTHER CREW THAT WAS INVOLVED IN THESE CHANGES. ON ARR AT THE ACFT, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE ACFT WAS BEING DOWNLOADED FOR THE FERRY TO MIA. DURING OUR PREFLT SETUP WE WERE GIVEN 2 SEPARATE WT AND BAL SHEETS BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE. BOTH SHEETS INDICATED A FERRY FLT ALL 0'S IN THE WT COLUMN. THERE WAS NO OTHER PAPERWORK ON BOARD, SO FLT CTL WAS NOTIFIED FOR FLT PLAN AND WX. THEY TOLD US THEY WOULD SEND IN RIGHT AWAY, ALONG WITH A CORRECTED WT AND BAL. THIS NEW WT AND BAL ALSO INDICATED A FERRY FLT. THE DOORS WERE CLOSED AND WE BLOCKED OUT. THE F/O PERFORMED THE TKOF. AT THE ROTATION CALL, WHEN HE PULLED BACK ON THE YOKE IT REQUIRED EXCESSIVE PULL FORCE TO BECOME AIRBORNE. WE KNEW SOMETHING WAS WRONG. AFTER WE WERE UNDER WAY, THE S/O WENT BACK TO LOOK BEHIND THE SMOKE CURTAIN AND DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE CONTAINERS ON BOARD. AFTER ARR IN MIA THE CARGO WT WAS COMPUTED TO BE 58264 LBS. WE WERE ALL IN A STATE OF TOTAL DISBELIEF. HOW COULD THIS HAVE HAPPENED? HOW COULD LOAD PLANNING, FLT CTL AND OUR CREW NOT REALIZE THE ACFT HAD BEEN LOADED? HAD THE ACFT BEEN LOADED AFT INSTEAD OF FORWARD, WE MIGHT HAVE EASILY LOST CTL AFTER TKOF. THE FLT COULD HAVE ENDED A FATAL DISASTER. PERHAPS A NEW PROC WHERE SOMEONE IS ACTUALLY CHKING OFF CONTAINER #S AS THEY ARE LOADED ON THE ACFT WOULD PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.