Narrative:

Flight was on a normal flight between iah and lch. Crew planned and briefed arrival procedure and approach in exact accordance with company/'FAA approved' procedures and flight profiles. WX was 300' scattered, 2200' overcast, 1 mi visibility in fog/rain in area. First officer called 90 mi out to tower to verify WX due to chance of fog '0, 0' condition. ILS G/south was OTS, as was the approach light system. Tower repeated ATIS WX and said actual WX was 2 mi and scattered clouds, no ceiling lower than reported. Aircraft followed vectors to kelie LOM and localizer and was cleared. Approach handed flight to tower prior to kelie. First officer contacted tower 15 seconds after handoff after he finished landing checklist. Note: approach checklist confirmed all frequencys and identify, course apron and navigation systems. A fast descent was used by captain (the PF) on leg to descend to 420' MSL. At 500', captain leveled off in VMC. The first officer and captain both witnessed station passage of kelie LOM by RMI and electronic HSI needle course reversal. First officer started time on elec HSI clocks. This was start of the descent. After first officer frequency changed from airport to tower, heard a garbled transmission saying 500' climb to 1500'. First officer reported on frequency to tower inside of kelie. Tower said, 'we've been trying to contact you. We show you 500 altitude, should be 1500. Climb to 1500.' captain started climb upon request of ATC. Then 5 seconds later, tower said, 'inside kelie, cleared to land.' captain remained visibility and continued approach. Upon reaching missed approach point, first officer did not have runway in sight and executed the missed approach/go around in accordance with company/'FAA approved' procedure and profiles. Crew then vectored to west and executed successful localizer backcourse approach. Human performance: crew followed all procedures text book. No reason for station passage early. We can't explain this. We told tower to check LOM. Problem discovered when ATC informed us that we were outside kelie too low. Our navigation via LOM showed us inside kelie identify. Corrective action: the FAF by use of more than just the needle swing of LOM. Use marker beacon and DME. Use all available. Normal procedure is not to tune #2 VOR to cross radial unless it's the only way to identify the final approach fix or point. If something does not agree, go around! This is great, but on some approachs you can only identify the FAF one way. Then you have to trust it. Aircraft had suspected problems with VOR navigation, but captain's did not write systems up due to no confirmation, just suspected. 2 times out of 10 hours of flying. First officer had flown 10 hours in aircraft prior flts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT DESCENDED TO 500' OUTSIDE THE OUTER MARKER THE FAF. ALT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 1500' TO FAF.

Narrative: FLT WAS ON A NORMAL FLT BTWN IAH AND LCH. CREW PLANNED AND BRIEFED ARR PROC AND APCH IN EXACT ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY/'FAA APPROVED' PROCS AND FLT PROFILES. WX WAS 300' SCATTERED, 2200' OVCST, 1 MI VISIBILITY IN FOG/RAIN IN AREA. F/O CALLED 90 MI OUT TO TWR TO VERIFY WX DUE TO CHANCE OF FOG '0, 0' CONDITION. ILS G/S WAS OTS, AS WAS THE APCH LIGHT SYS. TWR REPEATED ATIS WX AND SAID ACTUAL WX WAS 2 MI AND SCATTERED CLOUDS, NO CEILING LOWER THAN RPTED. ACFT FOLLOWED VECTORS TO KELIE LOM AND LOC AND WAS CLRED. APCH HANDED FLT TO TWR PRIOR TO KELIE. F/O CONTACTED TWR 15 SECS AFTER HDOF AFTER HE FINISHED LNDG CHKLIST. NOTE: APCH CHKLIST CONFIRMED ALL FREQS AND IDENT, COURSE APRON AND NAV SYSTEMS. A FAST DSNT WAS USED BY CAPT (THE PF) ON LEG TO DSND TO 420' MSL. AT 500', CAPT LEVELED OFF IN VMC. THE F/O AND CAPT BOTH WITNESSED STATION PASSAGE OF KELIE LOM BY RMI AND ELECTRONIC HSI NEEDLE COURSE REVERSAL. F/O STARTED TIME ON ELEC HSI CLOCKS. THIS WAS START OF THE DSNT. AFTER F/O FREQ CHANGED FROM ARPT TO TWR, HEARD A GARBLED XMISSION SAYING 500' CLB TO 1500'. F/O RPTED ON FREQ TO TWR INSIDE OF KELIE. TWR SAID, 'WE'VE BEEN TRYING TO CONTACT YOU. WE SHOW YOU 500 ALT, SHOULD BE 1500. CLB TO 1500.' CAPT STARTED CLB UPON REQUEST OF ATC. THEN 5 SECS LATER, TWR SAID, 'INSIDE KELIE, CLRED TO LAND.' CAPT REMAINED VIS AND CONTINUED APCH. UPON REACHING MISSED APCH POINT, F/O DID NOT HAVE RWY IN SIGHT AND EXECUTED THE MISSED APCH/GAR IAW COMPANY/'FAA APPROVED' PROC AND PROFILES. CREW THEN VECTORED TO W AND EXECUTED SUCCESSFUL LOC BACKCOURSE APCH. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: CREW FOLLOWED ALL PROCS TEXT BOOK. NO REASON FOR STATION PASSAGE EARLY. WE CAN'T EXPLAIN THIS. WE TOLD TWR TO CHK LOM. PROB DISCOVERED WHEN ATC INFORMED US THAT WE WERE OUTSIDE KELIE TOO LOW. OUR NAV VIA LOM SHOWED US INSIDE KELIE IDENT. CORRECTIVE ACTION: THE FAF BY USE OF MORE THAN JUST THE NEEDLE SWING OF LOM. USE MARKER BEACON AND DME. USE ALL AVAILABLE. NORMAL PROC IS NOT TO TUNE #2 VOR TO CROSS RADIAL UNLESS IT'S THE ONLY WAY TO IDENT THE FINAL APCH FIX OR POINT. IF SOMETHING DOES NOT AGREE, GO AROUND! THIS IS GREAT, BUT ON SOME APCHS YOU CAN ONLY IDENT THE FAF ONE WAY. THEN YOU HAVE TO TRUST IT. ACFT HAD SUSPECTED PROBS WITH VOR NAV, BUT CAPT'S DID NOT WRITE SYSTEMS UP DUE TO NO CONFIRMATION, JUST SUSPECTED. 2 TIMES OUT OF 10 HRS OF FLYING. F/O HAD FLOWN 10 HRS IN ACFT PRIOR FLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.