Narrative:

This report is being filed due to an unsafe condition existing at the erie international airport on taxiway delta directly adjacent to the approach end of runway 24 to taxiway echo. This area is of course movement area and the tower is responsible for all operations. The problem is this area is not visible from the tower due to trees on off airport property. This area is routinely used by aircraft for pretkof engine runups and other checks. Any unusual situation that could develop, such as aircraft engine fire or any number of emergencys, would not be visible from tower for immediate action (ie: crash fire rescue equipment notification, rerte other aircraft, etc). This problem has been addressed on a local level for some time with no action resulting. I feel this is a threat to air safety and an injustice to the controllers responsible for this area on the field. This area on taxiway delta is routinely used by aircraft (air carrier, air taxi, military and GA) for pretkof checks, engine runups, etc. The staging of departure traffic for takeoff sequence and the decision of whether there is ample spacing to 'squeeze out' a departure reference an arrival is based on seeing the position of the aircraft in question. On taxiway delta the only time tower is able to see the departure traffic after passing taxiway echo is when the aircraft is a the 'hold bars' (holding position markings) just short of runway 24, inadequate to perform the needed position check of aircraft prior to initiating a departure versus arrival decision. The aircraft could be up to 500 ft short of the runway and tower could not be aware of this for a competent decision to make which will affect air safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TREES OBSTRUCT VIEW OF CTLED TAXIWAY.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS BEING FILED DUE TO AN UNSAFE CONDITION EXISTING AT THE ERIE INTL ARPT ON TAXIWAY DELTA DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE APCH END OF RWY 24 TO TAXIWAY ECHO. THIS AREA IS OF COURSE MOVEMENT AREA AND THE TWR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OPS. THE PROBLEM IS THIS AREA IS NOT VISIBLE FROM THE TWR DUE TO TREES ON OFF ARPT PROPERTY. THIS AREA IS ROUTINELY USED BY ACFT FOR PRETKOF ENG RUNUPS AND OTHER CHKS. ANY UNUSUAL SITUATION THAT COULD DEVELOP, SUCH AS ACFT ENG FIRE OR ANY NUMBER OF EMERS, WOULD NOT BE VISIBLE FROM TWR FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION (IE: CFR NOTIFICATION, RERTE OTHER ACFT, ETC). THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN ADDRESSED ON A LCL LEVEL FOR SOME TIME WITH NO ACTION RESULTING. I FEEL THIS IS A THREAT TO AIR SAFETY AND AN INJUSTICE TO THE CTLRS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS AREA ON THE FIELD. THIS AREA ON TAXIWAY DELTA IS ROUTINELY USED BY ACFT (AIR CARRIER, AIR TAXI, MIL AND GA) FOR PRETKOF CHKS, ENG RUNUPS, ETC. THE STAGING OF DEP TFC FOR TKOF SEQUENCE AND THE DECISION OF WHETHER THERE IS AMPLE SPACING TO 'SQUEEZE OUT' A DEP REF AN ARR IS BASED ON SEEING THE POS OF THE ACFT IN QUESTION. ON TAXIWAY DELTA THE ONLY TIME TWR IS ABLE TO SEE THE DEP TFC AFTER PASSING TAXIWAY ECHO IS WHEN THE ACFT IS A THE 'HOLD BARS' (HOLDING POS MARKINGS) JUST SHORT OF RWY 24, INADEQUATE TO PERFORM THE NEEDED POS CHK OF ACFT PRIOR TO INITIATING A DEP VERSUS ARR DECISION. THE ACFT COULD BE UP TO 500 FT SHORT OF THE RWY AND TWR COULD NOT BE AWARE OF THIS FOR A COMPETENT DECISION TO MAKE WHICH WILL AFFECT AIR SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.