Narrative:

The captain arrived at aircraft mdt prior to me, the first officer. I commenced my normal preflight duties setting up the cockpit, aligning IRS's, etc, in our EFIS equipped jet. The gate agent appeared and asked if boarding should be held up for maintenance. I told him to check with the captain as I had no knowledge of any problem at this time. I continued my internal check of the aircraft. While returning from aft, I saw the captain perform an engine start on #2. He shut it down and briefly mentioned that they were checking hydraulics. I resumed my duties to the external aircraft portion. There was a mechanic under the #2 engine and next to the hydraulic servicing panel with a hydraulic servicing unit. He appeared busy servicing the hydraulics. I noticed that there was a trickle of hydraulics coming out of the #2 engine drain and some speedy-dry on the ramp. There was another mechanic leaving the aircraft with a ladder, so I inquired to our status. He stated that the captain in conjunction with maintenance control, dispatch and operations had decided to fly the aircraft dca-pit, once the #1 system reservoir was fully svced. Having become aware that there was a potential problem, I was somewhat upset at having been omitted from the decision making. I even mentioned to the mechanic that I would be 'irritated' (word substitution), if I have to perform a manual gear and flap extension flying into pit. Upon returning to the cockpit, the aircraft was boarding for an on-time departure to pit. I asked the captain what was going on. He stated that the aircraft had a history of leaking hydraulic system #1 fluid and that the #2 engine driven #1 system hydraulic pump had been recently replaced. He said that he had looked it over and in conjunction with maintenance control, dispatch and operations he had made the decision to fly the aircraft dca-pit. I expressed my feelings on being left out of the loop on this decision. He said that he had look for me, but that I was out on the preflight. He stated that maintenance assured him that the aircraft was airworthy and that there were no open maintenance entries in the logbook. I was now convinced that the aircraft was airworthy or I would have shut down the operation by refusing to fly this fully-loaded and (captain, maintenance, operations) sanctioned flight I was also aware that both the passenger and F/a's were aware of some type of aircraft servicing prior to the dca departure. Approximately 20 mins out of pit, we commenced a noticeable decrease in hydraulic system #1 fluid. We monitored and reviewed our procedures in the event of further loss. About the time we switched to pit approach control, we got a #2 system hydraulic low quantity alert on our mfd. An emergency was declared, the emergency equipment requested, the longer runway 29R requested at pit, all procedures executed flawlessly, the company and F/a's notified. The captain flew, while I performed the checklists including manual flap and gear extension. He made a text book perfect approach and landing and we cleared the runway using our recommended procedures. The aircraft was safely towed to the gate at pit. Company has not started their CRM course, although it is being developed. I have had this training at 2 previous airlines and feel that a higher degree of comfort could have been achieved with earlier coordination of the first officer in the decision-making process. The flight crew, ATC, the emergency crews and all involved executed flawlessly in this emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR HAS HYDRAULIC PROBLEM. DECLARES EMERGENCY. SAFE LNDG.

Narrative: THE CAPT ARRIVED AT ACFT MDT PRIOR TO ME, THE F/O. I COMMENCED MY NORMAL PREFLT DUTIES SETTING UP THE COCKPIT, ALIGNING IRS'S, ETC, IN OUR EFIS EQUIPPED JET. THE GATE AGENT APPEARED AND ASKED IF BOARDING SHOULD BE HELD UP FOR MAINT. I TOLD HIM TO CHK WITH THE CAPT AS I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PROB AT THIS TIME. I CONTINUED MY INTERNAL CHK OF THE ACFT. WHILE RETURNING FROM AFT, I SAW THE CAPT PERFORM AN ENG START ON #2. HE SHUT IT DOWN AND BRIEFLY MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE CHKING HYDS. I RESUMED MY DUTIES TO THE EXTERNAL ACFT PORTION. THERE WAS A MECH UNDER THE #2 ENG AND NEXT TO THE HYD SERVICING PANEL WITH A HYD SERVICING UNIT. HE APPEARED BUSY SERVICING THE HYDRAULICS. I NOTICED THAT THERE WAS A TRICKLE OF HYDS COMING OUT OF THE #2 ENG DRAIN AND SOME SPEEDY-DRY ON THE RAMP. THERE WAS ANOTHER MECH LEAVING THE ACFT WITH A LADDER, SO I INQUIRED TO OUR STATUS. HE STATED THAT THE CAPT IN CONJUNCTION WITH MAINT CTL, DISPATCH AND OPS HAD DECIDED TO FLY THE ACFT DCA-PIT, ONCE THE #1 SYS RESERVOIR WAS FULLY SVCED. HAVING BECOME AWARE THAT THERE WAS A POTENTIAL PROB, I WAS SOMEWHAT UPSET AT HAVING BEEN OMITTED FROM THE DECISION MAKING. I EVEN MENTIONED TO THE MECH THAT I WOULD BE 'IRRITATED' (WORD SUBSTITUTION), IF I HAVE TO PERFORM A MANUAL GEAR AND FLAP EXTENSION FLYING INTO PIT. UPON RETURNING TO THE COCKPIT, THE ACFT WAS BOARDING FOR AN ON-TIME DEP TO PIT. I ASKED THE CAPT WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE STATED THAT THE ACFT HAD A HISTORY OF LEAKING HYD SYS #1 FLUID AND THAT THE #2 ENG DRIVEN #1 SYS HYD PUMP HAD BEEN RECENTLY REPLACED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD LOOKED IT OVER AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH MAINT CTL, DISPATCH AND OPS HE HAD MADE THE DECISION TO FLY THE ACFT DCA-PIT. I EXPRESSED MY FEELINGS ON BEING LEFT OUT OF THE LOOP ON THIS DECISION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD LOOK FOR ME, BUT THAT I WAS OUT ON THE PREFLT. HE STATED THAT MAINT ASSURED HIM THAT THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY AND THAT THERE WERE NO OPEN MAINT ENTRIES IN THE LOGBOOK. I WAS NOW CONVINCED THAT THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY OR I WOULD HAVE SHUT DOWN THE OPERATION BY REFUSING TO FLY THIS FULLY-LOADED AND (CAPT, MAINT, OPS) SANCTIONED FLT I WAS ALSO AWARE THAT BOTH THE PAX AND F/A'S WERE AWARE OF SOME TYPE OF ACFT SVCING PRIOR TO THE DCA DEP. APPROX 20 MINS OUT OF PIT, WE COMMENCED A NOTICEABLE DECREASE IN HYD SYS #1 FLUID. WE MONITORED AND REVIEWED OUR PROCS IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER LOSS. ABOUT THE TIME WE SWITCHED TO PIT APCH CTL, WE GOT A #2 SYS HYD LOW QUANTITY ALERT ON OUR MFD. AN EMER WAS DECLARED, THE EMER EQUIP REQUESTED, THE LONGER RWY 29R REQUESTED AT PIT, ALL PROCS EXECUTED FLAWLESSLY, THE COMPANY AND F/A'S NOTIFIED. THE CAPT FLEW, WHILE I PERFORMED THE CHKLISTS INCLUDING MANUAL FLAP AND GEAR EXTENSION. HE MADE A TEXT BOOK PERFECT APCH AND LNDG AND WE CLRED THE RWY USING OUR RECOMMENDED PROCS. THE ACFT WAS SAFELY TOWED TO THE GATE AT PIT. COMPANY HAS NOT STARTED THEIR CRM COURSE, ALTHOUGH IT IS BEING DEVELOPED. I HAVE HAD THIS TRNING AT 2 PREVIOUS AIRLINES AND FEEL THAT A HIGHER DEGREE OF COMFORT COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED WITH EARLIER COORD OF THE F/O IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. THE FLT CREW, ATC, THE EMER CREWS AND ALL INVOLVED EXECUTED FLAWLESSLY IN THIS EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.