Narrative:

Passenger jet lndgs were taking place on 18R. The lndgs were spaced very closely with 1 jet just being able to clear the active before the following aircraft touched down. They were clearly spaced incorrectly and became out of sequence with the lndgs on runway 9R, so that the aircraft were converging and not landing alternately. The small transport landed short and rolled out slowly. During its rollout, a passenger jet crossed its path on runway 18R. By the time it got to the intersection with 18R the next jet was on short final for 18R. The controller held the small transport and the jet landed and subsequently passed 9R. Just before the jet passed 9R, I called the controller and asked him if he wanted me to go around and he said no, go ahead and land on 9R, there is 3000 ft between you and the small transport, hold short of 18R. He then cleared the small transport to cross 18R. In retrospect, I do not believe that the controller realized how high and close I was when he made the statement. I knew that I was high, but enticed by the controller's statement, commenced to land. I was slightly fast over the #'south and on flare could tell that the wind was not helping me. I noted air carrier X landing on 18R at the same moment and could perceive that, based on our relative speed at that moment, we were sequenced to arrive at the intersection at the same time. Upon touchdown I commenced hard braking and noted that air carrier X must have had the same perception as it commenced hard braking also. I estimated that I could stop in time, but felt uncomfortable with the margin of safety that appeared to exist. Being on centerline, as a precaution, I angled towards the right side of the runway and scanned the grass area to the right as a safety valve to be used if necessary. I continued to feel uneasy about the margin of safety, particularly when I noted that the jet was continuing to break hard and estimated that it would stop about in the intersection. If it hadn't been doing so, it would have passed the intersection well before I would have gotten there. I then made the decision, and committed to the course of action, to turn to the right off the hard surface into the grass and do a 360 degree turn. I felt this would be the safe thing to do and preserve a margin of safety for all. I commenced my turn to the right to leave the runway and then the controller said 'put it in the grass' before I left the hard surface. I exited 9R well before the intersection with 18R and at no time did I encroach on runway 18R space. I left the runway approximately 250 ft from the intersection. As I prepared to exit the runway I adjusted my exit path to go between the runway lights, ceased hard braking to maintain speed, exited the hard surface runway and applied power to maintain momentum and not bog down in the grass. I quickly completed the 360 degree turn and was back on the runway and was told to 'park it right there'. Air carrier X had stopped in the middle of the intersection and was told to turn left and to contact ground. Before leaving the frequency air carrier X radioed that I did a good job. In retrospect, it is apparent now that I could have stopped on 9R prior to the intersection with 18R. However, there would not have been an acceptable margin of safety had a brake failure occurred or some other unforeseeable thing. Once I made my decision, I was committed to the action and carried it out. When runway 18R was clear, I was first asked if there was any damage to the runway lights and my aircraft, I said no, then was cleared to cross 18R, exit the runway and go to ground. I proceeded to taxi to cvg FBO, shut down, unload passenger and baggage, and then inspect the aircraft for any damage. There was no damage. On calling ground for taxi instructions for departure, I was asked for my name and telephone #. I complied with the request.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA X EXCURSION FROM RWY TO AVOID NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC. HOLD SHORT OF RWY INTXN.

Narrative: PAX JET LNDGS WERE TAKING PLACE ON 18R. THE LNDGS WERE SPACED VERY CLOSELY WITH 1 JET JUST BEING ABLE TO CLR THE ACTIVE BEFORE THE FOLLOWING ACFT TOUCHED DOWN. THEY WERE CLEARLY SPACED INCORRECTLY AND BECAME OUT OF SEQUENCE WITH THE LNDGS ON RWY 9R, SO THAT THE ACFT WERE CONVERGING AND NOT LNDG ALTERNATELY. THE SMT LANDED SHORT AND ROLLED OUT SLOWLY. DURING ITS ROLLOUT, A PAX JET CROSSED ITS PATH ON RWY 18R. BY THE TIME IT GOT TO THE INTXN WITH 18R THE NEXT JET WAS ON SHORT FINAL FOR 18R. THE CTLR HELD THE SMT AND THE JET LANDED AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED 9R. JUST BEFORE THE JET PASSED 9R, I CALLED THE CTLR AND ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED ME TO GAR AND HE SAID NO, GO AHEAD AND LAND ON 9R, THERE IS 3000 FT BTWN YOU AND THE SMT, HOLD SHORT OF 18R. HE THEN CLRED THE SMT TO CROSS 18R. IN RETROSPECT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR REALIZED HOW HIGH AND CLOSE I WAS WHEN HE MADE THE STATEMENT. I KNEW THAT I WAS HIGH, BUT ENTICED BY THE CTLR'S STATEMENT, COMMENCED TO LAND. I WAS SLIGHTLY FAST OVER THE #'S AND ON FLARE COULD TELL THAT THE WIND WAS NOT HELPING ME. I NOTED ACR X LNDG ON 18R AT THE SAME MOMENT AND COULD PERCEIVE THAT, BASED ON OUR RELATIVE SPD AT THAT MOMENT, WE WERE SEQUENCED TO ARRIVE AT THE INTXN AT THE SAME TIME. UPON TOUCHDOWN I COMMENCED HARD BRAKING AND NOTED THAT ACR X MUST HAVE HAD THE SAME PERCEPTION AS IT COMMENCED HARD BRAKING ALSO. I ESTIMATED THAT I COULD STOP IN TIME, BUT FELT UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE MARGIN OF SAFETY THAT APPEARED TO EXIST. BEING ON CENTERLINE, AS A PRECAUTION, I ANGLED TOWARDS THE R SIDE OF THE RWY AND SCANNED THE GRASS AREA TO THE R AS A SAFETY VALVE TO BE USED IF NECESSARY. I CONTINUED TO FEEL UNEASY ABOUT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY, PARTICULARLY WHEN I NOTED THAT THE JET WAS CONTINUING TO BREAK HARD AND ESTIMATED THAT IT WOULD STOP ABOUT IN THE INTXN. IF IT HADN'T BEEN DOING SO, IT WOULD HAVE PASSED THE INTXN WELL BEFORE I WOULD HAVE GOTTEN THERE. I THEN MADE THE DECISION, AND COMMITTED TO THE COURSE OF ACTION, TO TURN TO THE R OFF THE HARD SURFACE INTO THE GRASS AND DO A 360 DEG TURN. I FELT THIS WOULD BE THE SAFE THING TO DO AND PRESERVE A MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR ALL. I COMMENCED MY TURN TO THE R TO LEAVE THE RWY AND THEN THE CTLR SAID 'PUT IT IN THE GRASS' BEFORE I LEFT THE HARD SURFACE. I EXITED 9R WELL BEFORE THE INTXN WITH 18R AND AT NO TIME DID I ENCROACH ON RWY 18R SPACE. I LEFT THE RWY APPROX 250 FT FROM THE INTXN. AS I PREPARED TO EXIT THE RWY I ADJUSTED MY EXIT PATH TO GO BTWN THE RWY LIGHTS, CEASED HARD BRAKING TO MAINTAIN SPD, EXITED THE HARD SURFACE RWY AND APPLIED PWR TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND NOT BOG DOWN IN THE GRASS. I QUICKLY COMPLETED THE 360 DEG TURN AND WAS BACK ON THE RWY AND WAS TOLD TO 'PARK IT RIGHT THERE'. ACR X HAD STOPPED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE INTXN AND WAS TOLD TO TURN L AND TO CONTACT GND. BEFORE LEAVING THE FREQ ACR X RADIOED THAT I DID A GOOD JOB. IN RETROSPECT, IT IS APPARENT NOW THAT I COULD HAVE STOPPED ON 9R PRIOR TO THE INTXN WITH 18R. HOWEVER, THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ACCEPTABLE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAD A BRAKE FAILURE OCCURRED OR SOME OTHER UNFORESEEABLE THING. ONCE I MADE MY DECISION, I WAS COMMITTED TO THE ACTION AND CARRIED IT OUT. WHEN RWY 18R WAS CLR, I WAS FIRST ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY DAMAGE TO THE RWY LIGHTS AND MY ACFT, I SAID NO, THEN WAS CLRED TO CROSS 18R, EXIT THE RWY AND GO TO GND. I PROCEEDED TO TAXI TO CVG FBO, SHUT DOWN, UNLOAD PAX AND BAGGAGE, AND THEN INSPECT THE ACFT FOR ANY DAMAGE. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE. ON CALLING GND FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEP, I WAS ASKED FOR MY NAME AND TELEPHONE #. I COMPLIED WITH THE REQUEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.