Narrative:

Situation seems to be one of human factors with several parties involves. When in in flight operations checking flight plan papers, it was noted that although the WX, NOTAMS, etc for the flight were appropriate, the actual flight plan itself was for another flight. A new flight plan was pulled up on the computer. After returning to the cockpit and completing the preflight, the checklist was called for. We began the challenge and response and got down to portion for fuel which I responded 20200 pounds release min (this fuel was the required fuel for the first incorrect flight plan I remembered that number for some reason). The correct fuel should have been 29100 pounds. The supporting fuel papers from the fueler as it turns out also were from the first flight and supported the 20200 pound response. The first officer made his response and then we were interrupted by the lead flight attendant and a boarding agent about a passenger who had boarded the aircraft with a set of golf clubs. We then continued on with the remainder of the checklist beginning with the next challenge after fuel. After engine start and during taxi, we inserted the zero fuel weight into the performance page of the FMC and at that point an insufficient fuel message showed on the FMC. We then returned to the gate for additional fuel. This situation resulted in the breakdown of communications in several areas. The fueler who put the wrong fuel in the aircraft, the agent who put the wrong papers together and possibly gave the wrong numbers to the fueler. The captain who after computing the fuel numbers for the correct flight plan read back the wrong numbers on the checklist. The problem was mitigated by the passenger disturbance. The final check with the FMC saved an incident from occurring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT LEFT THE BLOCKS WITH INSUFFICIENT FUEL. AN FMC CAUSED THE FLC TO RETURN TO THE BLOCKS FOR MORE FUEL.

Narrative: SITUATION SEEMS TO BE ONE OF HUMAN FACTORS WITH SEVERAL PARTIES INVOLVES. WHEN IN IN FLT OPS CHKING FLT PLAN PAPERS, IT WAS NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE WX, NOTAMS, ETC FOR THE FLT WERE APPROPRIATE, THE ACTUAL FLT PLAN ITSELF WAS FOR ANOTHER FLT. A NEW FLT PLAN WAS PULLED UP ON THE COMPUTER. AFTER RETURNING TO THE COCKPIT AND COMPLETING THE PREFLT, THE CHKLIST WAS CALLED FOR. WE BEGAN THE CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE AND GOT DOWN TO PORTION FOR FUEL WHICH I RESPONDED 20200 POUNDS RELEASE MIN (THIS FUEL WAS THE REQUIRED FUEL FOR THE FIRST INCORRECT FLT PLAN I REMEMBERED THAT NUMBER FOR SOME REASON). THE CORRECT FUEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN 29100 POUNDS. THE SUPPORTING FUEL PAPERS FROM THE FUELER AS IT TURNS OUT ALSO WERE FROM THE FIRST FLT AND SUPPORTED THE 20200 POUND RESPONSE. THE FO MADE HIS RESPONSE AND THEN WE WERE INTERRUPTED BY THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT AND A BOARDING AGENT ABOUT A PAX WHO HAD BOARDED THE ACFT WITH A SET OF GOLF CLUBS. WE THEN CONTINUED ON WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE CHKLIST BEGINNING WITH THE NEXT CHALLENGE AFTER FUEL. AFTER ENG START AND DURING TAXI, WE INSERTED THE ZERO FUEL WT INTO THE PERFORMANCE PAGE OF THE FMC AND AT THAT POINT AN INSUFFICIENT FUEL MESSAGE SHOWED ON THE FMC. WE THEN RETURNED TO THE GATE FOR ADDITIONAL FUEL. THIS SITUATION RESULTED IN THE BREAKDOWN OF COMS IN SEVERAL AREAS. THE FUELER WHO PUT THE WRONG FUEL IN THE ACFT, THE AGENT WHO PUT THE WRONG PAPERS TOGETHER AND POSSIBLY GAVE THE WRONG NUMBERS TO THE FUELER. THE CAPT WHO AFTER COMPUTING THE FUEL NUMBERS FOR THE CORRECT FLT PLAN READ BACK THE WRONG NUMBERS ON THE CHKLIST. THE PROBLEM WAS MITIGATED BY THE PAX DISTURBANCE. THE FINAL CHK WITH THE FMC SAVED AN INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.