Narrative:

My student and I were practicing lndgs at a local uncontrolled airport. There were numerous aircraft operating in the airport area that afternoon, some of whom were also performing touch and goes. We entered the pattern on the 45 to the downwind following an small aircraft already on left downwind for runway 24. The small aircraft Y we were following turned base, then final, and then executed a touch and go. On final approach, approximately 1/2 mi behind the small aircraft Y, I instructed my student to set up for a short field landing with no obstacle. As we neared the threshold, it became apparent that we were well below GS and carrying alot of power to maintain altitude. At this point I instructed my student to execute a go around. The small aircraft Y in front of us continued climbing out on the upwind leg as my student performed a go around. The small aircraft Y turned crosswind nd proceeded sbound while continuing to climb several hundred ft above pattern altitude. In excess of one mi from the runway, the small aircraft Y turned east and paralleled the runway. During this time the CTAF was cluttered with radio chatter and I heard no radio calls from the small aircraft Y regarding its intentions. My student inquired what action he should take and I instructed him to turn downwind and maintain 1/2 mi from the runway, assuming that the small aircraft Y was departing the pattern. My student and I continued to fly the pattern for another touch and go. After completing the landing my student rotated and began climbing out. As he did this, I was shocked to see the Y off our right wingtip matching our course and speed and within 50 yds of our aircraft. He maintained close proximity to our aircraft as we climbed out and exclaimed over the CTAF that he had our n-number. Not certain of what action to take we continued to maintain runway alignment while climbing out. At approximately 300 ft AGL, the small aircraft Y pilot intentionally crossed our path within very close proximity of our aircraft causing a near miss situation. Fortunately, he accelerated past our airspeed and a mid air collision was averted. Both the small aircraft Y and my aircraft departed the traffic pattern after the incident. I attempted to contact the small aircraft Y on the CTAF, and advised him to switch to 122.75 MHZ (air to air) so I could apologize for the misunderstanding. However, he refused and used hostile and threatening language on the CTAF before breaking off. In retrospect, it would have been more appropriate to follow the small aircraft Y and take a wait and see attitude rather than taking an immediate course of action. A contributing factor was the density of airport operations that afternoon. Numerous radio calls made it difficult to make position reports and difficult to discern pertinent radio calls from other pilots. Another factor, was the definition of an airport traffic pattern. The dimensions of a traffic pattern are ambiguous at best. The flight training handbook recommends staying within 1/2-1 mi of the active runway at the recommended pattern altitude. This leads to a large discrepancy among pilots flying in the pattern. Also a factor was spacing among aircraft. When I instructed my student to execute a go around while following an aircraft that had just completed a touch and go, we inadvertently reduced the spacing between us. This reduced the amount of time available for decision making. In addition to all the factors I have stated one more needs to be considered, perhaps because it contributes to the other factors. A student was plting the other aircraft with his instructor. He should not have been training in such congested airspace until he was better able to cope with the additional stresses induced. As the workload on an inexperienced student increases his ability to carry out tasks such as course, altitude, and radio procedures become dangerously hampered.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT IN TFC PATTERN DURING TOUCH AND GO.

Narrative: MY STUDENT AND I WERE PRACTICING LNDGS AT A LCL UNCTLED ARPT. THERE WERE NUMEROUS ACFT OPERATING IN THE ARPT AREA THAT AFTERNOON, SOME OF WHOM WERE ALSO PERFORMING TOUCH AND GOES. WE ENTERED THE PATTERN ON THE 45 TO THE DOWNWIND FOLLOWING AN SMA ALREADY ON L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 24. THE SMA Y WE WERE FOLLOWING TURNED BASE, THEN FINAL, AND THEN EXECUTED A TOUCH AND GO. ON FINAL APCH, APPROX 1/2 MI BEHIND THE SMA Y, I INSTRUCTED MY STUDENT TO SET UP FOR A SHORT FIELD LNDG WITH NO OBSTACLE. AS WE NEARED THE THRESHOLD, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE WERE WELL BELOW GS AND CARRYING ALOT OF PWR TO MAINTAIN ALT. AT THIS POINT I INSTRUCTED MY STUDENT TO EXECUTE A GAR. THE SMA Y IN FRONT OF US CONTINUED CLBING OUT ON THE UPWIND LEG AS MY STUDENT PERFORMED A GAR. THE SMA Y TURNED XWIND ND PROCEEDED SBOUND WHILE CONTINUING TO CLB SEVERAL HUNDRED FT ABOVE PATTERN ALT. IN EXCESS OF ONE MI FROM THE RWY, THE SMA Y TURNED E AND PARALLELED THE RWY. DURING THIS TIME THE CTAF WAS CLUTTERED WITH RADIO CHATTER AND I HEARD NO RADIO CALLS FROM THE SMA Y REGARDING ITS INTENTIONS. MY STUDENT INQUIRED WHAT ACTION HE SHOULD TAKE AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO TURN DOWNWIND AND MAINTAIN 1/2 MI FROM THE RWY, ASSUMING THAT THE SMA Y WAS DEPARTING THE PATTERN. MY STUDENT AND I CONTINUED TO FLY THE PATTERN FOR ANOTHER TOUCH AND GO. AFTER COMPLETING THE LNDG MY STUDENT ROTATED AND BEGAN CLBING OUT. AS HE DID THIS, I WAS SHOCKED TO SEE THE Y OFF OUR R WINGTIP MATCHING OUR COURSE AND SPD AND WITHIN 50 YDS OF OUR ACFT. HE MAINTAINED CLOSE PROX TO OUR ACFT AS WE CLBED OUT AND EXCLAIMED OVER THE CTAF THAT HE HAD OUR N-NUMBER. NOT CERTAIN OF WHAT ACTION TO TAKE WE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN RWY ALIGNMENT WHILE CLBING OUT. AT APPROX 300 FT AGL, THE SMA Y PLT INTENTIONALLY CROSSED OUR PATH WITHIN VERY CLOSE PROX OF OUR ACFT CAUSING A NEAR MISS SITUATION. FORTUNATELY, HE ACCELERATED PAST OUR AIRSPD AND A MID AIR COLLISION WAS AVERTED. BOTH THE SMA Y AND MY ACFT DEPARTED THE TFC PATTERN AFTER THE INCIDENT. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE SMA Y ON THE CTAF, AND ADVISED HIM TO SWITCH TO 122.75 MHZ (AIR TO AIR) SO I COULD APOLOGIZE FOR THE MISUNDERSTANDING. HOWEVER, HE REFUSED AND USED HOSTILE AND THREATENING LANGUAGE ON THE CTAF BEFORE BREAKING OFF. IN RETROSPECT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE TO FOLLOW THE SMA Y AND TAKE A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE RATHER THAN TAKING AN IMMEDIATE COURSE OF ACTION. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE DENSITY OF ARPT OPS THAT AFTERNOON. NUMEROUS RADIO CALLS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE POS RPTS AND DIFFICULT TO DISCERN PERTINENT RADIO CALLS FROM OTHER PLTS. ANOTHER FACTOR, WAS THE DEFINITION OF AN ARPT TFC PATTERN. THE DIMENSIONS OF A TFC PATTERN ARE AMBIGUOUS AT BEST. THE FLT TRAINING HANDBOOK RECOMMENDS STAYING WITHIN 1/2-1 MI OF THE ACTIVE RWY AT THE RECOMMENDED PATTERN ALT. THIS LEADS TO A LARGE DISCREPANCY AMONG PLTS FLYING IN THE PATTERN. ALSO A FACTOR WAS SPACING AMONG ACFT. WHEN I INSTRUCTED MY STUDENT TO EXECUTE A GAR WHILE FOLLOWING AN ACFT THAT HAD JUST COMPLETED A TOUCH AND GO, WE INADVERTENTLY REDUCED THE SPACING BTWN US. THIS REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE FOR DECISION MAKING. IN ADDITION TO ALL THE FACTORS I HAVE STATED ONE MORE NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED, PERHAPS BECAUSE IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE OTHER FACTORS. A STUDENT WAS PLTING THE OTHER ACFT WITH HIS INSTRUCTOR. HE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRAINING IN SUCH CONGESTED AIRSPACE UNTIL HE WAS BETTER ABLE TO COPE WITH THE ADDITIONAL STRESSES INDUCED. AS THE WORKLOAD ON AN INEXPERIENCED STUDENT INCREASES HIS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT TASKS SUCH AS COURSE, ALT, AND RADIO PROCS BECOME DANGEROUSLY HAMPERED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.