Narrative:

Told to follow 2 air carrier Y lgts for takeoff. Long taxi, elected to taxi on 1 engine. As we neared departure runway, started second engine. Shortly after start, both lgts directed to run up block. We were told to pass up and cleared for immediate takeoff. We entered runway and started rolling takeoff. After power set, I looked down at V speed chart to verify speeds. Realized speeds had not been set, then realized before takeoff checklist not completed. Looked at ACARS for weight. Not there, not ever received. Having rough idea of weight, used speed 10 KTS faster and continued takeoff. Do not allow yourself to be rushed, ever! Should not have pushed back without weight and balance data. Supplemental information from acn 188951: as I switched to the tower frequency the master caution illuminated with the 'overhead' on the recall annunciator. Looking to the overhead I first noticed the B system electric hydraulic pump caution illuminated with the switch in the on position. B system quantity and pressure were full and steady. Looking back to the overhead I found that the left generator had fallen off the line, and brought it to the captain's attention. The captain advanced the power levers and engaged the automatic throttles. The engine power went to full takeoff thrust, and the captain commented that no reduction had been entered in the FMS. The captain again commented, as we both realized, 'we don't have the weight and balance numbers'. The captain and I are both adamant about checklist use. Having a familiar cockpit and checklist flow as well as a working routine allowed a safely configured takeoff. It is the nonstandard, the last min distraction, the last leg of the trip, get home on time, the allowing ourselves to be rushed that put us into a potentially dangerous position of takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TKOF WITHOUT COMPLETING BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. FLC HAD NOT RECEIVED WT AND BAL SO ACFT WAS NOT CORRECTLY CONFIGURED.

Narrative: TOLD TO FOLLOW 2 ACR Y LGTS FOR TKOF. LONG TAXI, ELECTED TO TAXI ON 1 ENG. AS WE NEARED DEP RWY, STARTED SECOND ENG. SHORTLY AFTER START, BOTH LGTS DIRECTED TO RUN UP BLOCK. WE WERE TOLD TO PASS UP AND CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. WE ENTERED RWY AND STARTED ROLLING TKOF. AFTER PWR SET, I LOOKED DOWN AT V SPD CHART TO VERIFY SPDS. REALIZED SPDS HAD NOT BEEN SET, THEN REALIZED BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST NOT COMPLETED. LOOKED AT ACARS FOR WT. NOT THERE, NOT EVER RECEIVED. HAVING ROUGH IDEA OF WT, USED SPD 10 KTS FASTER AND CONTINUED TKOF. DO NOT ALLOW YOURSELF TO BE RUSHED, EVER! SHOULD NOT HAVE PUSHED BACK WITHOUT WT AND BAL DATA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 188951: AS I SWITCHED TO THE TWR FREQ THE MASTER CAUTION ILLUMINATED WITH THE 'OVERHEAD' ON THE RECALL ANNUNCIATOR. LOOKING TO THE OVERHEAD I FIRST NOTICED THE B SYS ELECTRIC HYD PUMP CAUTION ILLUMINATED WITH THE SWITCH IN THE ON POS. B SYS QUANTITY AND PRESSURE WERE FULL AND STEADY. LOOKING BACK TO THE OVERHEAD I FOUND THAT THE L GENERATOR HAD FALLEN OFF THE LINE, AND BROUGHT IT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. THE CAPT ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS AND ENGAGED THE AUTO THROTTLES. THE ENG PWR WENT TO FULL TKOF THRUST, AND THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT NO REDUCTION HAD BEEN ENTERED IN THE FMS. THE CAPT AGAIN COMMENTED, AS WE BOTH REALIZED, 'WE DON'T HAVE THE WT AND BAL NUMBERS'. THE CAPT AND I ARE BOTH ADAMANT ABOUT CHKLIST USE. HAVING A FAMILIAR COCKPIT AND CHKLIST FLOW AS WELL AS A WORKING ROUTINE ALLOWED A SAFELY CONFIGURED TKOF. IT IS THE NONSTANDARD, THE LAST MIN DISTR, THE LAST LEG OF THE TRIP, GET HOME ON TIME, THE ALLOWING OURSELVES TO BE RUSHED THAT PUT US INTO A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS POS OF TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.