Narrative:

I was conducting 'initial operating experience' training for a copilot, and this was the fourth day of the rotation. The first officer was doing well in most phases but was still getting behind during the landing phase due to being high and fast. Instead of leading him through the entire evolution, I decided to let him go farther into the visual approach (being high and fast) than I should have. At 3 mi and approximately 2000 ft AGL, I took control of the aircraft and made an uneventful landing, on speed, touching down approximately 1/3 of the way down the runway. We made the second high speed turn off (2000-3000 ft remaining) and didn't use much reversing or braking. The 'sink rate' warning had gone off on the GPWS system for a good part of the last 3 mi, however, and it made the approach uncomfortable, as well as the first officer and the jump seat occupant (an ATC controller). In retrospect, my margin of 'when-to-intercede' during IOE training will be moved in the direction of conservatism as the comfort and well being of the passenger must remain paramount. No one even mentioned the approach during deplaning (several said 'nice flight') but in my mind, there was little gained by not going around and doing it again, and a good lesson could still have been accomplished for this new first officer. In fact, the act of going around in this situation, would have been the 'best' lesson for all concerned!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CHK AIRMAN GIVING IOE TO NEW FO WHO WAS FLYING A VISUAL APCH TO CVG, REMAINED TOO HIGH TOO CLOSE IN. CHK AIRMAN TOOK OVER AND MADE LNDG BUT APCH WAS UNCOMFORTABLE FROM SAFETY STANDPOINT WITH FAA ACI OBSERVING.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING 'INITIAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE' TRAINING FOR A COPLT, AND THIS WAS THE FOURTH DAY OF THE ROTATION. THE FO WAS DOING WELL IN MOST PHASES BUT WAS STILL GETTING BEHIND DURING THE LNDG PHASE DUE TO BEING HIGH AND FAST. INSTEAD OF LEADING HIM THROUGH THE ENTIRE EVOLUTION, I DECIDED TO LET HIM GO FARTHER INTO THE VISUAL APCH (BEING HIGH AND FAST) THAN I SHOULD HAVE. AT 3 MI AND APPROX 2000 FT AGL, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG, ON SPD, TOUCHING DOWN APPROX 1/3 OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY. WE MADE THE SECOND HIGH SPD TURN OFF (2000-3000 FT REMAINING) AND DIDN'T USE MUCH REVERSING OR BRAKING. THE 'SINK RATE' WARNING HAD GONE OFF ON THE GPWS SYS FOR A GOOD PART OF THE LAST 3 MI, HOWEVER, AND IT MADE THE APCH UNCOMFORTABLE, AS WELL AS THE FO AND THE JUMP SEAT OCCUPANT (AN ATC CTLR). IN RETROSPECT, MY MARGIN OF 'WHEN-TO-INTERCEDE' DURING IOE TRAINING WILL BE MOVED IN THE DIRECTION OF CONSERVATISM AS THE COMFORT AND WELL BEING OF THE PAX MUST REMAIN PARAMOUNT. NO ONE EVEN MENTIONED THE APCH DURING DEPLANING (SEVERAL SAID 'NICE FLT') BUT IN MY MIND, THERE WAS LITTLE GAINED BY NOT GOING AROUND AND DOING IT AGAIN, AND A GOOD LESSON COULD STILL HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED FOR THIS NEW FO. IN FACT, THE ACT OF GOING AROUND IN THIS SITUATION, WOULD HAVE BEEN THE 'BEST' LESSON FOR ALL CONCERNED!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.