Narrative:

We were being vectored for a parallel ILS IFR approach at a hub airport with the wind from the east landing west. ATC was 'flying' the airplane and had us on a base leg about 12- 15 mi from the airport at 250 KTS and 7000 ft. We did not know our sequence but as we approached the localizer high and fast we expected a turn downwind. Instead we were given an intercept heading, speed reduction and approach clearance. We were late due to bad WX with an airplane full of people with close connections. I decided to try to land. At 1000 ft we were still above the GS with power at idle (mandatory go around according to company policy). At 500 ft we simultaneously acquired the runway, intercepted the GS and triggered 1 warning from the GPWS (another mandatory go around according to company policy). We landed in the touchdown zone smoothly and turned off the runway without incident. I consider myself to be a conservative pilot who goes by the book. Why did I ignore company SOP and land? Why did I exhibit such poor judgement? The desire to see my company succeed (a go around with missed connections is costly) was a factor. Overconfidence (I can handle anything they throw at me) was a factor. I have agonized over these questions and I am determined never to have a repeat occurrence. There are other questions though: 1) why is the 'slam-dunk' procedure such a common occurrence? The approach and landing phase of flight is no time for ATC induced aerobatics. I don't think the controllers know what they're putting us through. They clear us for an approach and if we land it was a success as far as they're concerned. 2) does the 'slam-dunk' maneuver really facilitate traffic flow and at what cost to safety margins? 3) why can't ATC tell us our sequence at some meaningful point during the vectoring process at every busy airport? A short transmission like 'you're #2' would eliminate a lot of guess work. 4) why land downwind? This airport was configured for tail wind approachs with surface tail winds approaching 10 KTS for most of the day. There is a high level of incidents/accidents during the approach and landing phase of flight. To the greatest degree possible we need to keep the approach and landing maneuver as simple and standardized as possible. The 'slam-dunk' maneuver requires maximum performance dscnts close to the ground with high rates of change in altitude and airspeed. Pilot attention is diverted from other very important areas. I believe the stabilized approach concept needs to be extended beyond the current 1000 ft level in IFR conditions and should include ATC procedures since ATC currently has control of aircraft heading, speed and altitude to the OM at all busy hub airports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR CITES 1 CAUSE OF UNSTABILIZED APCH AS THE KEEP 'EM HIGH DOCTRINE AS PRACTICED AS AN ATC FACILITY OPERATIONAL PROC.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A PARALLEL ILS IFR APCH AT A HUB ARPT WITH THE WIND FROM THE E LNDG W. ATC WAS 'FLYING' THE AIRPLANE AND HAD US ON A BASE LEG ABOUT 12- 15 MI FROM THE ARPT AT 250 KTS AND 7000 FT. WE DID NOT KNOW OUR SEQUENCE BUT AS WE APCHED THE LOC HIGH AND FAST WE EXPECTED A TURN DOWNWIND. INSTEAD WE WERE GIVEN AN INTERCEPT HDG, SPD REDUCTION AND APCH CLRNC. WE WERE LATE DUE TO BAD WX WITH AN AIRPLANE FULL OF PEOPLE WITH CLOSE CONNECTIONS. I DECIDED TO TRY TO LAND. AT 1000 FT WE WERE STILL ABOVE THE GS WITH PWR AT IDLE (MANDATORY GAR ACCORDING TO COMPANY POLICY). AT 500 FT WE SIMULTANEOUSLY ACQUIRED THE RWY, INTERCEPTED THE GS AND TRIGGERED 1 WARNING FROM THE GPWS (ANOTHER MANDATORY GAR ACCORDING TO COMPANY POLICY). WE LANDED IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE SMOOTHLY AND TURNED OFF THE RWY WITHOUT INCIDENT. I CONSIDER MYSELF TO BE A CONSERVATIVE PLT WHO GOES BY THE BOOK. WHY DID I IGNORE COMPANY SOP AND LAND? WHY DID I EXHIBIT SUCH POOR JUDGEMENT? THE DESIRE TO SEE MY COMPANY SUCCEED (A GAR WITH MISSED CONNECTIONS IS COSTLY) WAS A FACTOR. OVERCONFIDENCE (I CAN HANDLE ANYTHING THEY THROW AT ME) WAS A FACTOR. I HAVE AGONIZED OVER THESE QUESTIONS AND I AM DETERMINED NEVER TO HAVE A REPEAT OCCURRENCE. THERE ARE OTHER QUESTIONS THOUGH: 1) WHY IS THE 'SLAM-DUNK' PROC SUCH A COMMON OCCURRENCE? THE APCH AND LNDG PHASE OF FLT IS NO TIME FOR ATC INDUCED AEROBATICS. I DON'T THINK THE CTLRS KNOW WHAT THEY'RE PUTTING US THROUGH. THEY CLR US FOR AN APCH AND IF WE LAND IT WAS A SUCCESS AS FAR AS THEY'RE CONCERNED. 2) DOES THE 'SLAM-DUNK' MANEUVER REALLY FACILITATE TFC FLOW AND AT WHAT COST TO SAFETY MARGINS? 3) WHY CAN'T ATC TELL US OUR SEQUENCE AT SOME MEANINGFUL POINT DURING THE VECTORING PROCESS AT EVERY BUSY ARPT? A SHORT XMISSION LIKE 'YOU'RE #2' WOULD ELIMINATE A LOT OF GUESS WORK. 4) WHY LAND DOWNWIND? THIS ARPT WAS CONFIGURED FOR TAIL WIND APCHS WITH SURFACE TAIL WINDS APCHING 10 KTS FOR MOST OF THE DAY. THERE IS A HIGH LEVEL OF INCIDENTS/ACCIDENTS DURING THE APCH AND LNDG PHASE OF FLT. TO THE GREATEST DEG POSSIBLE WE NEED TO KEEP THE APCH AND LNDG MANEUVER AS SIMPLE AND STANDARDIZED AS POSSIBLE. THE 'SLAM-DUNK' MANEUVER REQUIRES MAX PERFORMANCE DSCNTS CLOSE TO THE GND WITH HIGH RATES OF CHANGE IN ALT AND AIRSPD. PLT ATTN IS DIVERTED FROM OTHER VERY IMPORTANT AREAS. I BELIEVE THE STABILIZED APCH CONCEPT NEEDS TO BE EXTENDED BEYOND THE CURRENT 1000 FT LEVEL IN IFR CONDITIONS AND SHOULD INCLUDE ATC PROCS SINCE ATC CURRENTLY HAS CTL OF ACFT HDG, SPD AND ALT TO THE OM AT ALL BUSY HUB ARPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.