Narrative:

I was the first officer on a scheduled air carrier operation. Due to a late departure from the hotel (1 flight attendant was late), a longer than allocated travel time to airport and a long walk to the gate, we arrived at the gate with less than the needed 45 mins preparation time for a first flight preflight. Since additional time was needed to sign in on a computer to determine the correct aircraft number for departure (a practice I normally adhere to) when I was already behind and the captain had indicated to me that the marquis showed our aircraft to be departing from gate xy, I simply opted to follow his direction and headed for the plane. After thorough yet expedient completion of my duties (all except reviewing the paperwork) the captain called for the before starting engines checklist. With only a min to go to engine start I hastily reviewed the papers catching the items that I've found to be most important but not doublechking the aircraft number. After all, I assumed the captain had checked it, and the fueler, the baggage handlers, the flight attendants, the caterer and the station agents. Well, I was wrong. The only clue was that catering had to switch carts between 2 aircraft, but catering often makes mistakes. After departure, when we tried to get our flight plan time and fuel figures from ACARS, things just didn't match. Then we realized it and the captain called dispatch to inform them and make the necessary corrections. My suggestions are as follows: 1) better crew resource management in this phase of the operation. On a 2 pilot aircraft the first officer often does the work of the flight engineer and first officer both without captain's (some) offering to help. (They read the newspaper instead.) 2) a greater awareness on the part of capts that they need to encourage and support the practice of first officer's reviewing all essential documents before departure. If extra time is needed, most won't take, some will say it isn't necessary and I hate to say it but a few won't even allow it (reviewing the papers)! 3) increased support from the first officer toward capts who are changed with crew delays. The corporate philosophy is to find someone to blame for errors and apply discipline rather than trusting the good intentions of the employee and solicit positive suggestions on how to improve performance. Many capts would rather avoid this scrutiny. 4) reducing the emphasis on, or possible elimination of, the on time performance program. Everyone means well, but in the heat of the battle, priorities sometimes get mixed up. 5) most importantly for me personally, is to be more insistent on being involved and more thorough with all aspects of our combined duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR IMPLIES THAT FLC TOOK THE CORRECT ACFT AT THE GATE FOR FLT ASSIGNMENT BUT THAT THE DISPATCH RELEASE PAPERS DID NOT REFLECT THE PROPER ACFT NUMBER. ATTEMPTED CALLBACK TO DETERMINE IF THAT WAS THE CASE OR IF FLC TOOK THE WRONG ACFT.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON A SCHEDULED ACR OP. DUE TO A LATE DEP FROM THE HOTEL (1 FLT ATTENDANT WAS LATE), A LONGER THAN ALLOCATED TRAVEL TIME TO ARPT AND A LONG WALK TO THE GATE, WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE WITH LESS THAN THE NEEDED 45 MINS PREPARATION TIME FOR A FIRST FLT PREFLT. SINCE ADDITIONAL TIME WAS NEEDED TO SIGN IN ON A COMPUTER TO DETERMINE THE CORRECT ACFT NUMBER FOR DEP (A PRACTICE I NORMALLY ADHERE TO) WHEN I WAS ALREADY BEHIND AND THE CAPT HAD INDICATED TO ME THAT THE MARQUIS SHOWED OUR ACFT TO BE DEPARTING FROM GATE XY, I SIMPLY OPTED TO FOLLOW HIS DIRECTION AND HEADED FOR THE PLANE. AFTER THOROUGH YET EXPEDIENT COMPLETION OF MY DUTIES (ALL EXCEPT REVIEWING THE PAPERWORK) THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE BEFORE STARTING ENGS CHKLIST. WITH ONLY A MIN TO GO TO ENG START I HASTILY REVIEWED THE PAPERS CATCHING THE ITEMS THAT I'VE FOUND TO BE MOST IMPORTANT BUT NOT DOUBLECHKING THE ACFT NUMBER. AFTER ALL, I ASSUMED THE CAPT HAD CHKED IT, AND THE FUELER, THE BAGGAGE HANDLERS, THE FLT ATTENDANTS, THE CATERER AND THE STATION AGENTS. WELL, I WAS WRONG. THE ONLY CLUE WAS THAT CATERING HAD TO SWITCH CARTS BTWN 2 ACFT, BUT CATERING OFTEN MAKES MISTAKES. AFTER DEP, WHEN WE TRIED TO GET OUR FLT PLAN TIME AND FUEL FIGURES FROM ACARS, THINGS JUST DIDN'T MATCH. THEN WE REALIZED IT AND THE CAPT CALLED DISPATCH TO INFORM THEM AND MAKE THE NECESSARY CORRECTIONS. MY SUGGESTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) BETTER CREW RESOURCE MGMNT IN THIS PHASE OF THE OP. ON A 2 PLT ACFT THE FO OFTEN DOES THE WORK OF THE FE AND FO BOTH WITHOUT CAPT'S (SOME) OFFERING TO HELP. (THEY READ THE NEWSPAPER INSTEAD.) 2) A GREATER AWARENESS ON THE PART OF CAPTS THAT THEY NEED TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT THE PRACTICE OF FO'S REVIEWING ALL ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS BEFORE DEP. IF EXTRA TIME IS NEEDED, MOST WON'T TAKE, SOME WILL SAY IT ISN'T NECESSARY AND I HATE TO SAY IT BUT A FEW WON'T EVEN ALLOW IT (REVIEWING THE PAPERS)! 3) INCREASED SUPPORT FROM THE FO TOWARD CAPTS WHO ARE CHANGED WITH CREW DELAYS. THE CORPORATE PHILOSOPHY IS TO FIND SOMEONE TO BLAME FOR ERRORS AND APPLY DISCIPLINE RATHER THAN TRUSTING THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE EMPLOYEE AND SOLICIT POSITIVE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE. MANY CAPTS WOULD RATHER AVOID THIS SCRUTINY. 4) REDUCING THE EMPHASIS ON, OR POSSIBLE ELIMINATION OF, THE ON TIME PERFORMANCE PROGRAM. EVERYONE MEANS WELL, BUT IN THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE, PRIORITIES SOMETIMES GET MIXED UP. 5) MOST IMPORTANTLY FOR ME PERSONALLY, IS TO BE MORE INSISTENT ON BEING INVOLVED AND MORE THOROUGH WITH ALL ASPECTS OF OUR COMBINED DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.