Narrative:

On taxi for takeoff, 100 yards before taking the runway, I made a PA for the flight attendants to take their seats for takeoff. I used my hand-held microphone and the PA position on my radio jack box. Immediately after finishing the announcement, the captain called for the before takeoff checklist. I started the checklist without switching my jack box back to the #1 communication radio (used for ATC communication). As we approached the end of the runway, we finished the checklist and were cleared for takeoff to maintain visual separation on an large transport which was just lifting off. Both the captain and I looked to make sure we had the large transport in sight. I acknowledged the takeoff clearance over the PA. The captain reached down and switched my jack box back to the #1 communication. I reacknowledged the clearance. At the same time, the captain reached up and turned on the landing lights (his responsibility) and the wing lights (my responsibility). He then moved his hand to arm the automatic throttles. Inadvertently, he engaged the autoplt. The switches are similar, approximately 6 inches apart. This was done while we were both watching the large transport. He then added power to stabilize the engine before engaging the automatic throttles. (The automatic throttles are armed by a switch on the glare shield are engaged by the switches on the throttles.) as the aircraft accelerated he said the controls were very stiff. Within approximately 3-5 seconds of adding power, he said we were aborting. I told the tower. They said to turn off the runway at the next exit, and asked us if we needed assistance. I said it was not necessary. We taxied clear. This ended the incident. The workload of a 2 person crew immediately prior to takeoff needs to be examined carefully. Any time the workload can be reduced, i.e., ringing the flight attendant call button to signal takeoff instead of making a PA, the possibility of making an error will be minimized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRE TKOF. CAPT ARMED AUTOPLT THINKING HE HAD ARMED THE AUTO THROTTLES -- ON TKOF -- CTLS WERE STIFF. CAPT ABORTED TKOF.

Narrative: ON TAXI FOR TKOF, 100 YARDS BEFORE TAKING THE RWY, I MADE A PA FOR THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO TAKE THEIR SEATS FOR TKOF. I USED MY HAND-HELD MICROPHONE AND THE PA POS ON MY RADIO JACK BOX. IMMEDIATELY AFTER FINISHING THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. I STARTED THE CHKLIST WITHOUT SWITCHING MY JACK BOX BACK TO THE #1 COM RADIO (USED FOR ATC COM). AS WE APCHED THE END OF THE RWY, WE FINISHED THE CHKLIST AND WERE CLRED FOR TKOF TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION ON AN LGT WHICH WAS JUST LIFTING OFF. BOTH THE CAPT AND I LOOKED TO MAKE SURE WE HAD THE LGT IN SIGHT. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE TKOF CLRNC OVER THE PA. THE CAPT REACHED DOWN AND SWITCHED MY JACK BOX BACK TO THE #1 COM. I REACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT REACHED UP AND TURNED ON THE LNDG LIGHTS (HIS RESPONSIBILITY) AND THE WING LIGHTS (MY RESPONSIBILITY). HE THEN MOVED HIS HAND TO ARM THE AUTO THROTTLES. INADVERTENTLY, HE ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. THE SWITCHES ARE SIMILAR, APPROX 6 INCHES APART. THIS WAS DONE WHILE WE WERE BOTH WATCHING THE LGT. HE THEN ADDED PWR TO STABILIZE THE ENG BEFORE ENGAGING THE AUTO THROTTLES. (THE AUTO THROTTLES ARE ARMED BY A SWITCH ON THE GLARE SHIELD ARE ENGAGED BY THE SWITCHES ON THE THROTTLES.) AS THE ACFT ACCELERATED HE SAID THE CTLS WERE VERY STIFF. WITHIN APPROX 3-5 SECONDS OF ADDING PWR, HE SAID WE WERE ABORTING. I TOLD THE TWR. THEY SAID TO TURN OFF THE RWY AT THE NEXT EXIT, AND ASKED US IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. I SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY. WE TAXIED CLR. THIS ENDED THE INCIDENT. THE WORKLOAD OF A 2 PERSON CREW IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO TKOF NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY. ANY TIME THE WORKLOAD CAN BE REDUCED, I.E., RINGING THE FLT ATTENDANT CALL BUTTON TO SIGNAL TKOF INSTEAD OF MAKING A PA, THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING AN ERROR WILL BE MINIMIZED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.