Narrative:

Descending on a clearance to 1600 ft, cleared ILS 6R, first officer announced 'ground contact' simultaneously the controller issued an altitude alert as the ground proximity warning system warned of terrain 'pull up'. This actually happened approximately 900 ft AGL. Both captain and first officer had thought they were just reaching 1600 ft. The primary altimeters had been set to an erroneous barometric pressure. Although the correct altimeter setting had been set in the standby altimeter 28.89, both primary altimeters were set to 29.89 as per the call by myself, the first officer descending through FL180, '29.89 set right, crosschecked.' the captain repeated the call out, however both had crosschecked against each other and omitted to xchk the standby altimeter. At the first indication of low altitude the captain applied power and climbed to 1600 ft from which a normal ILS approach to a landing was made. Company was immediately notified, nothing was requested from ATC. Contributing factors: both of us had just recently been checked out in this aircraft and had very little experience in it. As per our company standards we were using higher than published mins. WX at the airport at the time was suitable for the approach, however not suitable for our high min requirement. This greatly concerned the captain and he asked me to check WX at destination and alternates. Then, he would assign radios to first officer and rechk the WX himself. This went back and forth several times, there was often a gray area as to who was actually monitoring the autoplt, and who was working the radios. As a result, cockpit tasks were sometimes not delegated clearly, degrading good cockpit resource management practices, adding to an already high workload. Somewhere an erroneous altimeter setting was copied on a piece of paper with the rest of ATIS by first officer, someone had placed the correct altimeter in the standby, yet we both missed that on our xchk. The problem could have been caught descending through FL180 if all 3 altimeters had been crosschecked, not just the 2 primary. Our radar altimeter also gave accurate readout, but no one used it. Relative inexperience in the aircraft, high cockpit workload, 'gray' areas in designating cockpit tasks all contributed. Xchk means that, not just 1 instrument or altimeter, but every single one aboard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF SUPPLEMENTAL CARRIER ON APCH TO ANC HAD GND PROX WARNING SYS, WRONG ALTIMETER SETTING.

Narrative: DSNDING ON A CLRNC TO 1600 FT, CLRED ILS 6R, FO ANNOUNCED 'GND CONTACT' SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CTLR ISSUED AN ALT ALERT AS THE GND PROX WARNING SYS WARNED OF TERRAIN 'PULL UP'. THIS ACTUALLY HAPPENED APPROX 900 FT AGL. BOTH CAPT AND FO HAD THOUGHT THEY WERE JUST REACHING 1600 FT. THE PRIMARY ALTIMETERS HAD BEEN SET TO AN ERRONEOUS BAROMETRIC PRESSURE. ALTHOUGH THE CORRECT ALTIMETER SETTING HAD BEEN SET IN THE STANDBY ALTIMETER 28.89, BOTH PRIMARY ALTIMETERS WERE SET TO 29.89 AS PER THE CALL BY MYSELF, THE FO DSNDING THROUGH FL180, '29.89 SET RIGHT, XCHKED.' THE CAPT REPEATED THE CALL OUT, HOWEVER BOTH HAD XCHKED AGAINST EACH OTHER AND OMITTED TO XCHK THE STANDBY ALTIMETER. AT THE FIRST INDICATION OF LOW ALT THE CAPT APPLIED PWR AND CLBED TO 1600 FT FROM WHICH A NORMAL ILS APCH TO A LNDG WAS MADE. COMPANY WAS IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED, NOTHING WAS REQUESTED FROM ATC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: BOTH OF US HAD JUST RECENTLY BEEN CHKED OUT IN THIS ACFT AND HAD VERY LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN IT. AS PER OUR COMPANY STANDARDS WE WERE USING HIGHER THAN PUBLISHED MINS. WX AT THE ARPT AT THE TIME WAS SUITABLE FOR THE APCH, HOWEVER NOT SUITABLE FOR OUR HIGH MIN REQUIREMENT. THIS GREATLY CONCERNED THE CAPT AND HE ASKED ME TO CHK WX AT DEST AND ALTERNATES. THEN, HE WOULD ASSIGN RADIOS TO FO AND RECHK THE WX HIMSELF. THIS WENT BACK AND FORTH SEVERAL TIMES, THERE WAS OFTEN A GRAY AREA AS TO WHO WAS ACTUALLY MONITORING THE AUTOPLT, AND WHO WAS WORKING THE RADIOS. AS A RESULT, COCKPIT TASKS WERE SOMETIMES NOT DELEGATED CLRLY, DEGRADING GOOD COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT PRACTICES, ADDING TO AN ALREADY HIGH WORKLOAD. SOMEWHERE AN ERRONEOUS ALTIMETER SETTING WAS COPIED ON A PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE REST OF ATIS BY FO, SOMEONE HAD PLACED THE CORRECT ALTIMETER IN THE STANDBY, YET WE BOTH MISSED THAT ON OUR XCHK. THE PROBLEM COULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT DSNDING THROUGH FL180 IF ALL 3 ALTIMETERS HAD BEEN XCHKED, NOT JUST THE 2 PRIMARY. OUR RADAR ALTIMETER ALSO GAVE ACCURATE READOUT, BUT NO ONE USED IT. RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT, HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOAD, 'GRAY' AREAS IN DESIGNATING COCKPIT TASKS ALL CONTRIBUTED. XCHK MEANS THAT, NOT JUST 1 INST OR ALTIMETER, BUT EVERY SINGLE ONE ABOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.