Narrative:

On dec/sun/91 at sometime between XA30 and XB00 I was flying as the first officer on commuter flight en route from san to lax. Accompanying me at the controls was captain ab. I was the PF. Also in the cockpit and on headset was captain dead head. The WX at that time consisted of stormy conditions with broken clouds and moderate to occasional severe turbulence. On our descent into the lax area we were given instructions by ATC to descend to 3000 MSL, we complied. We were then instructed to turn right to a heading of 340, we complied. On this heading we were positioned for a right base to runway 7. We were advised by ATC that they were painting thunderstorm cells at approximately our 12 and 10 O'clock position. We were then instructed to descend and maintain 2000 MSL. As we descended out of 3000, ATC radioed and told us that they were painting a cell at our 9-10 O'clock and asked us if we could accept a turn to 240. We looked at our radar, determined that we'd be ok and replied that we could. We were then told to turn left to a heading of 240 (180 off runway heading). During the turn ATC called and said 'company identification stop your descent now' -- we complied. We were then told to climb to 3000 MSL. We started to climb. ATC then told us to continue the turn to a heading of 220 and then ATC told us to continue to 190 -- all of which we were complying with. Passing through approximately 230-220 we broke out of the clouds briefly and saw an air carrier Y large transport at our 1-2 O'clock position that was on final for 7. The large transport was approximately 1000 ft horizontally and 500-700 ft vertically above us. While it was closer than normal I would not classify it as a near miss. At no time until the very end was there any instructions by ATC to expedite nor was there any sense of urgency in the controller's voice or instructions. Some of the contributing factors that the controller was probably not aware of were: it was very bumpy flying therefore making it a little more difficult to maintain exact bank angles in the turns. Also, I believe that the controller did not take into consideration that there was a strong left quartering tailwind therefore making the radial ground track of our left turn to 240 and eventually on to 220 and 190 greater. We were never informed by ATC that anything might have been wrong until a couple of hours after we landed. One thing that I want to make clear is that we complied with every instruction issued to us by ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLOSE PROX COMMUTER LTT ACR-LGT IN LAX TCA IN IMC.

Narrative: ON DEC/SUN/91 AT SOMETIME BTWN XA30 AND XB00 I WAS FLYING AS THE FO ON COMMUTER FLT ENRTE FROM SAN TO LAX. ACCOMPANYING ME AT THE CTLS WAS CAPT AB. I WAS THE PF. ALSO IN THE COCKPIT AND ON HEADSET WAS CAPT DEAD HEAD. THE WX AT THAT TIME CONSISTED OF STORMY CONDITIONS WITH BROKEN CLOUDS AND MODERATE TO OCCASIONAL SEVERE TURB. ON OUR DSCNT INTO THE LAX AREA WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS BY ATC TO DSND TO 3000 MSL, WE COMPLIED. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO TURN R TO A HDG OF 340, WE COMPLIED. ON THIS HDG WE WERE POSITIONED FOR A R BASE TO RWY 7. WE WERE ADVISED BY ATC THAT THEY WERE PAINTING TSTM CELLS AT APPROX OUR 12 AND 10 O'CLOCK POS. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 2000 MSL. AS WE DSNDED OUT OF 3000, ATC RADIOED AND TOLD US THAT THEY WERE PAINTING A CELL AT OUR 9-10 O'CLOCK AND ASKED US IF WE COULD ACCEPT A TURN TO 240. WE LOOKED AT OUR RADAR, DETERMINED THAT WE'D BE OK AND REPLIED THAT WE COULD. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO TURN L TO A HDG OF 240 (180 OFF RWY HDG). DURING THE TURN ATC CALLED AND SAID 'COMPANY ID STOP YOUR DSCNT NOW' -- WE COMPLIED. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO CLB TO 3000 MSL. WE STARTED TO CLB. ATC THEN TOLD US TO CONTINUE THE TURN TO A HDG OF 220 AND THEN ATC TOLD US TO CONTINUE TO 190 -- ALL OF WHICH WE WERE COMPLYING WITH. PASSING THROUGH APPROX 230-220 WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS BRIEFLY AND SAW AN ACR Y LGT AT OUR 1-2 O'CLOCK POS THAT WAS ON FINAL FOR 7. THE LGT WAS APPROX 1000 FT HORIZLY AND 500-700 FT VERTICALLY ABOVE US. WHILE IT WAS CLOSER THAN NORMAL I WOULD NOT CLASSIFY IT AS A NEAR MISS. AT NO TIME UNTIL THE VERY END WAS THERE ANY INSTRUCTIONS BY ATC TO EXPEDITE NOR WAS THERE ANY SENSE OF URGENCY IN THE CTLR'S VOICE OR INSTRUCTIONS. SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THAT THE CTLR WAS PROBABLY NOT AWARE OF WERE: IT WAS VERY BUMPY FLYING THEREFORE MAKING IT A LITTLE MORE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN EXACT BANK ANGLES IN THE TURNS. ALSO, I BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THERE WAS A STRONG L QUARTERING TAILWIND THEREFORE MAKING THE RADIAL GND TRACK OF OUR L TURN TO 240 AND EVENTUALLY ON TO 220 AND 190 GREATER. WE WERE NEVER INFORMED BY ATC THAT ANYTHING MIGHT HAVE BEEN WRONG UNTIL A COUPLE OF HRS AFTER WE LANDED. ONE THING THAT I WANT TO MAKE CLR IS THAT WE COMPLIED WITH EVERY INSTRUCTION ISSUED TO US BY ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.