Narrative:

The clearance was an unrestricted climb on course to 7000. The departure runway was runway 10 and the airway was 096 degrees, therefore the clearance was a straight ahead climb to 7000. By the time the tower had handed us off to departure control and the climb check was completed, we were at 2000 climbing at 3000 FPM. Departure control's first contact with us was to point out traffic at 12 O'clock about 5-6 mi at 4000. I informed departure that we had the traffic on TCASII at 4100 but that we would probably not get visual contact since we were about to enter a cloud layer. (WX was 2300 ft broken, tops about 3000 ft with unrestricted visibility above and below). Departure then instructed us to stop the climb at 3000. I acknowledged the instructions and at the same time I was pointing out the traffic on the TCASII screen to my first officer and I said 'departure wants us to stop at 3000 because of this 4000 traffic. My first officer moved his head as if he understood and moved, I thought, to reset the altitude alert. (Our company procedure has the PF set the altitude alert). At the time that the 3000 altitude restriction was given us, we were passing through 2500 climbing at 3000 FPM. At exactly the same time, our roc station was calling on the #2 radio asking for 'out' and 'off' times. (These are required calls per our company operations manual and are not considered a violation of sterile cockpit procedures). I told my first officer that he had #1 radio and I would be off with the station I reported our times to the station. This call took 4-5 seconds and my attention was on the logbook which I was holding in my lap. At this time I heard a TCASII RA saying 'climb, climb now.' I looked up and saw us passing through about 3300 and increasing our climb. I got off the #2 radio and asked my first officer if ATC had cancelled our 3000 altitude while I was gone. The altitude alert was set at 7000. My first officer responded that our original clearance had been to 7000 and that he was responding to a TCASII RA and that he had never heard that our altitude had been amended to 3000. At the same time as the RA, ATC asked if we were at 4000. Also at the same time we had visual contact with the traffic. TCASII showed the traffic at 3 O'clock and 2.5 mi at 4000 and we visually confirmed this. The traffic also reported that he had us in visual contact. Within 4-5 seconds after ATC's altitude question the controller told us to climb to 5000 and then to 7000. Although a narrative description of the events seem long, the entire sequence from start to finish was perhaps 20-30 seconds. ATC should not have issued a climb through the altitude of known oncoming traffic. We could have been issued a turn off the airway for the climb or given the 3000 altitude in the initial clearance. ATC should not have attempted to stop our climb 500 before the new altitude. At our climb rate we had about 10 seconds to level off if everything went perfectly. Our company procedures should be changed to prohibit stations from calling for times. Our company procedures should also be changed to have the person responding to ATC set the altitude alert. With the new procedure the autoplt would automatically level off even if the PF missed the call or at least an altitude warning would be given if he were hand flying the aircraft. The TCASII worked as it should -- however, TCASII is not aware of ATC clrncs, therefore the TCASII ordered a climb rather than a descent to our assigned altitude because of our existing climb rate the quickest way to resolve the RA was to increase climb. However, this did add some confusion to the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF LTT IN CLB ENCOUNTERED TFC. LATE CLRNC FROM TRACON TO LEVEL. TCASII RA WAS COMMANDING CLB. TFC SIGHTED. CLRED TO NEW ALT.

Narrative: THE CLRNC WAS AN UNRESTRICTED CLB ON COURSE TO 7000. THE DEP RWY WAS RWY 10 AND THE AIRWAY WAS 096 DEGS, THEREFORE THE CLRNC WAS A STRAIGHT AHEAD CLB TO 7000. BY THE TIME THE TWR HAD HANDED US OFF TO DEP CTL AND THE CLB CHK WAS COMPLETED, WE WERE AT 2000 CLBING AT 3000 FPM. DEP CTL'S FIRST CONTACT WITH US WAS TO POINT OUT TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK ABOUT 5-6 MI AT 4000. I INFORMED DEP THAT WE HAD THE TFC ON TCASII AT 4100 BUT THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT GET VISUAL CONTACT SINCE WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER A CLOUD LAYER. (WX WAS 2300 FT BROKEN, TOPS ABOUT 3000 FT WITH UNRESTRICTED VISIBILITY ABOVE AND BELOW). DEP THEN INSTRUCTED US TO STOP THE CLB AT 3000. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME I WAS POINTING OUT THE TFC ON THE TCASII SCREEN TO MY FO AND I SAID 'DEP WANTS US TO STOP AT 3000 BECAUSE OF THIS 4000 TFC. MY FO MOVED HIS HEAD AS IF HE UNDERSTOOD AND MOVED, I THOUGHT, TO RESET THE ALT ALERT. (OUR COMPANY PROC HAS THE PF SET THE ALT ALERT). AT THE TIME THAT THE 3000 ALT RESTRICTION WAS GIVEN US, WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 2500 CLBING AT 3000 FPM. AT EXACTLY THE SAME TIME, OUR ROC STATION WAS CALLING ON THE #2 RADIO ASKING FOR 'OUT' AND 'OFF' TIMES. (THESE ARE REQUIRED CALLS PER OUR COMPANY OPS MANUAL AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF STERILE COCKPIT PROCS). I TOLD MY FO THAT HE HAD #1 RADIO AND I WOULD BE OFF WITH THE STATION I RPTED OUR TIMES TO THE STATION. THIS CALL TOOK 4-5 SECONDS AND MY ATTN WAS ON THE LOGBOOK WHICH I WAS HOLDING IN MY LAP. AT THIS TIME I HEARD A TCASII RA SAYING 'CLB, CLB NOW.' I LOOKED UP AND SAW US PASSING THROUGH ABOUT 3300 AND INCREASING OUR CLB. I GOT OFF THE #2 RADIO AND ASKED MY FO IF ATC HAD CANCELLED OUR 3000 ALT WHILE I WAS GONE. THE ALT ALERT WAS SET AT 7000. MY FO RESPONDED THAT OUR ORIGINAL CLRNC HAD BEEN TO 7000 AND THAT HE WAS RESPONDING TO A TCASII RA AND THAT HE HAD NEVER HEARD THAT OUR ALT HAD BEEN AMENDED TO 3000. AT THE SAME TIME AS THE RA, ATC ASKED IF WE WERE AT 4000. ALSO AT THE SAME TIME WE HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TFC. TCASII SHOWED THE TFC AT 3 O'CLOCK AND 2.5 MI AT 4000 AND WE VISUALLY CONFIRMED THIS. THE TFC ALSO RPTED THAT HE HAD US IN VISUAL CONTACT. WITHIN 4-5 SECONDS AFTER ATC'S ALT QUESTION THE CTLR TOLD US TO CLB TO 5000 AND THEN TO 7000. ALTHOUGH A NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS SEEM LONG, THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE FROM START TO FINISH WAS PERHAPS 20-30 SECONDS. ATC SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A CLB THROUGH THE ALT OF KNOWN ONCOMING TFC. WE COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED A TURN OFF THE AIRWAY FOR THE CLB OR GIVEN THE 3000 ALT IN THE INITIAL CLRNC. ATC SHOULD NOT HAVE ATTEMPTED TO STOP OUR CLB 500 BEFORE THE NEW ALT. AT OUR CLB RATE WE HAD ABOUT 10 SECONDS TO LEVEL OFF IF EVERYTHING WENT PERFECTLY. OUR COMPANY PROCS SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PROHIBIT STATIONS FROM CALLING FOR TIMES. OUR COMPANY PROCS SHOULD ALSO BE CHANGED TO HAVE THE PERSON RESPONDING TO ATC SET THE ALT ALERT. WITH THE NEW PROC THE AUTOPLT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY LEVEL OFF EVEN IF THE PF MISSED THE CALL OR AT LEAST AN ALT WARNING WOULD BE GIVEN IF HE WERE HAND FLYING THE ACFT. THE TCASII WORKED AS IT SHOULD -- HOWEVER, TCASII IS NOT AWARE OF ATC CLRNCS, THEREFORE THE TCASII ORDERED A CLB RATHER THAN A DSCNT TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT BECAUSE OF OUR EXISTING CLB RATE THE QUICKEST WAY TO RESOLVE THE RA WAS TO INCREASE CLB. HOWEVER, THIS DID ADD SOME CONFUSION TO THE SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.