Narrative:

*Reporter was the pilot of an military fgt/bmb on an IFR flight from andrews back to bradley field. IFR filed and after takeoff many delay and orbits given by dca departure controller. Appears that full route clearance not available so delay vectors and orbits given with altitudes from 3000-9000 ft. After 1 attempt to cancel IFR was refused by controller due traffic proximity, reporter did, in an apparent move to hasten his flight, cancel after receiving a TA and noting aircraft insight. He then instituted a VFR climb and proceeded to destination. At the home field he was told that he had come close enough to an air carrier large transport that the captain had to take evasive action. Once airborne, contributing factors became those of: communicating due to frequency congestion, lack of communication by the controller to the pilot in explaining reasons for the delay, controller failure to give specific holding instructions and an expect further clearance time, and lack of TA's. Pilot perceived controller to be totally overloaded with his IFR traffic and made a judgement that by cancelling IFR and proceeding VFR he would lessen controllers burden by reducing IFR traffic separation requirements which the controller would otherwise have to comply with, thereby allowing the controller to issue more advisories as to other traffic. Other human performance considerations include pilot task saturation and prioritization. These specifically involve maintaining aircraft control and situational awareness while doing in place 360's at the same time you are copying and deciphering an unexpected route clearance which involved numerous navaids and intxns, deciding on flying this IFR clearance in a high density traffic area in VMC requiring substantially all the pilot's attention be directed inside the cockpit or cancelling IFR and proceeding VFR in VMC with TA's in controled airspace and concentrating on looking outside for other traffic. System factors contributing to the event include the division in control of the airspace above 10000 MSL from that below 10000 MSL between 2 different controllers. With numerous aircraft at or around this 10000 MSL altitude being controled by 2 agencies or sectors and the aircraft on different frequencys it not only complicates the controller's job of coordinating handoffs, routing and maintaining traffic separation but makes it impossible for a pilot who is on only 1 frequency to use the radio to maintain situational awareness with regard to other aircraft around him unless the controller gives the pilot TA's on all other aircraft that are a factor, whether under that controller's control or not. A physical/design factor could have contributed in that an aircraft approaching an fgt from the fgt's 10-11 O'clock position at the same or slightly higher altitude, while the fgt's pilot is visually clearing reported traffic at his 2 O'clock position, would be hidden in a blind spot caused by the fgt's canopy bow.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN A MIL FGT AND AN ACR LGT.

Narrative: *RPTR WAS THE PLT OF AN MIL FGT/BMB ON AN IFR FLT FROM ANDREWS BACK TO BRADLEY FIELD. IFR FILED AND AFTER TKOF MANY DELAY AND ORBITS GIVEN BY DCA DEP CTLR. APPEARS THAT FULL RTE CLRNC NOT AVAILABLE SO DELAY VECTORS AND ORBITS GIVEN WITH ALTS FROM 3000-9000 FT. AFTER 1 ATTEMPT TO CANCEL IFR WAS REFUSED BY CTLR DUE TFC PROX, RPTR DID, IN AN APPARENT MOVE TO HASTEN HIS FLT, CANCEL AFTER RECEIVING A TA AND NOTING ACFT INSIGHT. HE THEN INSTITUTED A VFR CLB AND PROCEEDED TO DEST. AT THE HOME FIELD HE WAS TOLD THAT HE HAD COME CLOSE ENOUGH TO AN ACR LGT THAT THE CAPT HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. ONCE AIRBORNE, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS BECAME THOSE OF: COMMUNICATING DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION, LACK OF COM BY THE CTLR TO THE PLT IN EXPLAINING REASONS FOR THE DELAY, CTLR FAILURE TO GIVE SPECIFIC HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AND AN EXPECT FURTHER CLRNC TIME, AND LACK OF TA'S. PLT PERCEIVED CTLR TO BE TOTALLY OVERLOADED WITH HIS IFR TFC AND MADE A JUDGEMENT THAT BY CANCELLING IFR AND PROCEEDING VFR HE WOULD LESSEN CTLRS BURDEN BY REDUCING IFR TFC SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS WHICH THE CTLR WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO COMPLY WITH, THEREBY ALLOWING THE CTLR TO ISSUE MORE ADVISORIES AS TO OTHER TFC. OTHER HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE PLT TASK SATURATION AND PRIORITIZATION. THESE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVE MAINTAINING ACFT CTL AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHILE DOING IN PLACE 360'S AT THE SAME TIME YOU ARE COPYING AND DECIPHERING AN UNEXPECTED RTE CLRNC WHICH INVOLVED NUMEROUS NAVAIDS AND INTXNS, DECIDING ON FLYING THIS IFR CLRNC IN A HIGH DENSITY TFC AREA IN VMC REQUIRING SUBSTANTIALLY ALL THE PLT'S ATTN BE DIRECTED INSIDE THE COCKPIT OR CANCELLING IFR AND PROCEEDING VFR IN VMC WITH TA'S IN CTLED AIRSPACE AND CONCENTRATING ON LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR OTHER TFC. SYS FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE EVENT INCLUDE THE DIVISION IN CTL OF THE AIRSPACE ABOVE 10000 MSL FROM THAT BELOW 10000 MSL BTWN 2 DIFFERENT CTLRS. WITH NUMEROUS ACFT AT OR AROUND THIS 10000 MSL ALT BEING CTLED BY 2 AGENCIES OR SECTORS AND THE ACFT ON DIFFERENT FREQS IT NOT ONLY COMPLICATES THE CTLR'S JOB OF COORDINATING HDOFS, RTING AND MAINTAINING TFC SEPARATION BUT MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A PLT WHO IS ON ONLY 1 FREQ TO USE THE RADIO TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WITH REGARD TO OTHER ACFT AROUND HIM UNLESS THE CTLR GIVES THE PLT TA'S ON ALL OTHER ACFT THAT ARE A FACTOR, WHETHER UNDER THAT CTLR'S CTL OR NOT. A PHYSICAL/DESIGN FACTOR COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN THAT AN ACFT APCHING AN FGT FROM THE FGT'S 10-11 O'CLOCK POS AT THE SAME OR SLIGHTLY HIGHER ALT, WHILE THE FGT'S PLT IS VISUALLY CLRING RPTED TFC AT HIS 2 O'CLOCK POS, WOULD BE HIDDEN IN A BLIND SPOT CAUSED BY THE FGT'S CANOPY BOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.