Narrative:

I am a check airman with abc airline and at the time I was giving mr east the balance of his operating experience and line check to finish his upgrade to captain on medium large transport type aircraft. Aircraft was full (142 passenger) plus a crew of 7. Mr east was flying as captain in the left seat and was doing a good job. This leg was the first that I had flown with him. He had about 7.5 hours other IOE from a previous trip and also flew this type aircraft several yrs before as a copilot. We were descending in VFR conditions to land on 29L at msp with the autoplt on in vertical speed descent mode. At about 1000 ft msp tower cleared us to land and hold short of the crossing runway. I accepted the clearance and acknowledged the hold short. From previous experience at msp, I knew about the crossing runway but thought that it was about 8000 ft down 29L. I didn't have time to check runway available and tower didn't offer that information and I didn't ask. After accepting the clearance, I noticed that we were getting low on the GS. I became distraction with trying to figure out why we were low and then getting back on GS. Our landing weight was about 126000 pounds which resulted in a high approach speed with 28 degree flaps. Our touchdown point was about 1500 ft down the runway. After touchdown and prior to the intersection, the tower controller cleared us for the full length of the runway for the rollout. On the phone with the tower supervisor, he said that an alert tower controller determined that we weren't going to make the stop at the intersection and promptly held the departure traffic that was in position for takeoff on the crossing runway. The tower controller in his alertness probably prevented an accident and I commend him for it. As for myself, I made a major mistake in accepting that clearance without the information that I needed. This situation will surely never be allowed to happen again. I definitely won't be so hasty as to accept such a clearance without knowing all the specifics such as runway available, especially on such short notice. Our 'mind set' at the time, was to land on a long runway with 28 degree flaps and we needed to shift gears to a 40 degree flap short runway situation which is what we failed to do. Added to this was the fact that we used up valuable seconds on short final disconnecting the autoplt and getting the aircraft back to where it belonged on the proper GS. The tower controller had a legal right giving us the 'hold short' landing clearance, but it would have helped immensely if he had reminded us of how much runway was available under those conditions. The tower supervisor on the phone acknowledged that the tower controller assumed that we were familiar with the airport. This is true to the extent that mr east and I have been into msp before but not very often. In the future, I will be more alert in my analysis of airport diagrams to the possibility of getting a 'hold short' clearance and determine before hand what changes to the approach and landing configns have to be made and also whether or not I can comply with a clearance. I have the utmost respect for controllers and tower operators for the outstanding job that they perform on a daily basis and I try to help them as much as I can. I get chills when I think of what the outcome could have been if that other airplane had been cleared for takeoff. I'll be kicking myself rather hard for a long time for allowing this situation to degenerate as bad as it did. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter clarified types of aircraft involved. His time in type. Changed report to reflect correct altitude at time landing and hold short clearance was received. Says he should have asked what runway remaining was. Other aircraft, in position runway 22, was not cleared for takeoff because controller noted the potential runway incursion and conflict. The 2 aircraft were on different tower frequencys.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG ACR FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF XING RWY AS INSTRUCTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED.

Narrative: I AM A CHK AIRMAN WITH ABC AIRLINE AND AT THE TIME I WAS GIVING MR E THE BAL OF HIS OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND LINE CHK TO FINISH HIS UPGRADE TO CAPT ON MLG TYPE ACFT. ACFT WAS FULL (142 PAX) PLUS A CREW OF 7. MR E WAS FLYING AS CAPT IN THE L SEAT AND WAS DOING A GOOD JOB. THIS LEG WAS THE FIRST THAT I HAD FLOWN WITH HIM. HE HAD ABOUT 7.5 HRS OTHER IOE FROM A PREVIOUS TRIP AND ALSO FLEW THIS TYPE ACFT SEVERAL YRS BEFORE AS A COPLT. WE WERE DSNDING IN VFR CONDITIONS TO LAND ON 29L AT MSP WITH THE AUTOPLT ON IN VERT SPD DSCNT MODE. AT ABOUT 1000 FT MSP TWR CLRED US TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT OF THE XING RWY. I ACCEPTED THE CLRNC AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE HOLD SHORT. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AT MSP, I KNEW ABOUT THE XING RWY BUT THOUGHT THAT IT WAS ABOUT 8000 FT DOWN 29L. I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO CHK RWY AVAILABLE AND TWR DIDN'T OFFER THAT INFO AND I DIDN'T ASK. AFTER ACCEPTING THE CLRNC, I NOTICED THAT WE WERE GETTING LOW ON THE GS. I BECAME DISTR WITH TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY WE WERE LOW AND THEN GETTING BACK ON GS. OUR LNDG WT WAS ABOUT 126000 POUNDS WHICH RESULTED IN A HIGH APCH SPD WITH 28 DEG FLAPS. OUR TOUCHDOWN POINT WAS ABOUT 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY. AFTER TOUCHDOWN AND PRIOR TO THE INTXN, THE TWR CTLR CLRED US FOR THE FULL LENGTH OF THE RWY FOR THE ROLLOUT. ON THE PHONE WITH THE TWR SUPVR, HE SAID THAT AN ALERT TWR CTLR DETERMINED THAT WE WEREN'T GOING TO MAKE THE STOP AT THE INTXN AND PROMPTLY HELD THE DEP TFC THAT WAS IN POS FOR TKOF ON THE XING RWY. THE TWR CTLR IN HIS ALERTNESS PROBABLY PREVENTED AN ACCIDENT AND I COMMEND HIM FOR IT. AS FOR MYSELF, I MADE A MAJOR MISTAKE IN ACCEPTING THAT CLRNC WITHOUT THE INFO THAT I NEEDED. THIS SITUATION WILL SURELY NEVER BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN AGAIN. I DEFINITELY WON'T BE SO HASTY AS TO ACCEPT SUCH A CLRNC WITHOUT KNOWING ALL THE SPECIFICS SUCH AS RWY AVAILABLE, ESPECIALLY ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. OUR 'MIND SET' AT THE TIME, WAS TO LAND ON A LONG RWY WITH 28 DEG FLAPS AND WE NEEDED TO SHIFT GEARS TO A 40 DEG FLAP SHORT RWY SITUATION WHICH IS WHAT WE FAILED TO DO. ADDED TO THIS WAS THE FACT THAT WE USED UP VALUABLE SECONDS ON SHORT FINAL DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AND GETTING THE ACFT BACK TO WHERE IT BELONGED ON THE PROPER GS. THE TWR CTLR HAD A LEGAL RIGHT GIVING US THE 'HOLD SHORT' LNDG CLRNC, BUT IT WOULD HAVE HELPED IMMENSELY IF HE HAD REMINDED US OF HOW MUCH RWY WAS AVAILABLE UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS. THE TWR SUPVR ON THE PHONE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TWR CTLR ASSUMED THAT WE WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. THIS IS TRUE TO THE EXTENT THAT MR E AND I HAVE BEEN INTO MSP BEFORE BUT NOT VERY OFTEN. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BE MORE ALERT IN MY ANALYSIS OF ARPT DIAGRAMS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING A 'HOLD SHORT' CLRNC AND DETERMINE BEFORE HAND WHAT CHANGES TO THE APCH AND LNDG CONFIGNS HAVE TO BE MADE AND ALSO WHETHER OR NOT I CAN COMPLY WITH A CLRNC. I HAVE THE UTMOST RESPECT FOR CTLRS AND TWR OPERATORS FOR THE OUTSTANDING JOB THAT THEY PERFORM ON A DAILY BASIS AND I TRY TO HELP THEM AS MUCH AS I CAN. I GET CHILLS WHEN I THINK OF WHAT THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN IF THAT OTHER AIRPLANE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I'LL BE KICKING MYSELF RATHER HARD FOR A LONG TIME FOR ALLOWING THIS SITUATION TO DEGENERATE AS BAD AS IT DID. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR CLARIFIED TYPES OF ACFT INVOLVED. HIS TIME IN TYPE. CHANGED RPT TO REFLECT CORRECT ALT AT TIME LNDG AND HOLD SHORT CLRNC WAS RECEIVED. SAYS HE SHOULD HAVE ASKED WHAT RWY REMAINING WAS. OTHER ACFT, IN POS RWY 22, WAS NOT CLRED FOR TKOF BECAUSE CTLR NOTED THE POTENTIAL RWY INCURSION AND CONFLICT. THE 2 ACFT WERE ON DIFFERENT TWR FREQS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.