Narrative:

First officer flying pilot on mfg. Routing to destination included mountain 2 departure (vector) out of sea. During 'before takeoff' checklist, I briefed the published SID during 'takeoff briefing' item. Takeoff was on runway 16L. SID instructions: intercept and proceed via seattle R-158, cross seattle 5 DME fix at or above 3000 ft, turn left to a 070 degree heading for radar vectors to assigned route. Takeoff and climb out was uneventful except for the effect of gusting winds which required additional effort to intercept and maintain the 158 degree radial. Just after reaching the 3000 ft SID restriction and feeling/believing that all restrictions had been met, I began a standard route left turn to the 070 degree heading. The turn was slightly early and as I rolled out on the 070 degree heading, seattle DME was 5.3 mi. Controller requested that on subsequent departures to initiate runs no earlier than 5 DME. Cockpit factors: FAA safety inspector was on the jump seat and concentration level was high in order to execute the takeoff/climb out to perfection. I was distracted by gusting winds at altitude which complicated my effort to intercept the 158 degree radial. This was my first trip ever into/out of seattle. After reaching 3000 ft, the captain announced, '3000 ft restriction is met'. My thought process led us to believe that all restrictions were met, and I initiated the early left turn to 070 degrees. During the pre-departure phase at the terminal gate. The captain advised the FAA inspector to bring to our attention anything which made him (the inspector) uncomfortable or which affected safety of flight anytime it was observed. He acknowledged that he would comply with this request. However, he made no comment whatsoever throughout the entire departure process. Supplemental information from acn 200746: the FAA safety inspector who was on the jump seat said nothing prior to the completion of the turn and failed to notice it until the controller called our attention to it. When the airplane rolled out on the 070 degree heading the DME was 5.3. The inspector then informed me that he was filing notice of a violation for an early turn and ATC deviation. At no time was there a traffic conflict or was separation lost. I think that our concern with our altitude awareness program (making the 3000 ft 5 DME) overshadowed the 5 DME turn restriction. I may have contributed by announcing 'restriction met'. This may have given him the idea that restrictions were met when actually we had not quite reached the turn point. The presence of the inspector set both of us up for a case of 'chkitis'. The inspector showed no concern what so ever for the cause factors or any interest in how a similar situation could be prevented. He stated he was there simply in an enforcement capacity. So much for the kinder gentler FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WITH ACI ON JUMP SEAT TURNS EARLY WHILE FLYING SID. ATC REQUESTS NO EARLY TURN NEXT TIME. ACI SYS HE WILL FILE A VIOLATION.

Narrative: FO FLYING PLT ON MFG. ROUTING TO DEST INCLUDED MOUNTAIN 2 DEP (VECTOR) OUT OF SEA. DURING 'BEFORE TKOF' CHKLIST, I BRIEFED THE PUBLISHED SID DURING 'TKOF BRIEFING' ITEM. TKOF WAS ON RWY 16L. SID INSTRUCTIONS: INTERCEPT AND PROCEED VIA SEATTLE R-158, CROSS SEATTLE 5 DME FIX AT OR ABOVE 3000 FT, TURN L TO A 070 DEG HDG FOR RADAR VECTORS TO ASSIGNED RTE. TKOF AND CLBOUT WAS UNEVENTFUL EXCEPT FOR THE EFFECT OF GUSTING WINDS WHICH REQUIRED ADDITIONAL EFFORT TO INTERCEPT AND MAINTAIN THE 158 DEG RADIAL. JUST AFTER REACHING THE 3000 FT SID RESTRICTION AND FEELING/BELIEVING THAT ALL RESTRICTIONS HAD BEEN MET, I BEGAN A STANDARD RTE L TURN TO THE 070 DEG HDG. THE TURN WAS SLIGHTLY EARLY AND AS I ROLLED OUT ON THE 070 DEG HDG, SEATTLE DME WAS 5.3 MI. CTLR REQUESTED THAT ON SUBSEQUENT DEPS TO INITIATE RUNS NO EARLIER THAN 5 DME. COCKPIT FACTORS: FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR WAS ON THE JUMP SEAT AND CONCENTRATION LEVEL WAS HIGH IN ORDER TO EXECUTE THE TKOF/CLBOUT TO PERFECTION. I WAS DISTRACTED BY GUSTING WINDS AT ALT WHICH COMPLICATED MY EFFORT TO INTERCEPT THE 158 DEG RADIAL. THIS WAS MY FIRST TRIP EVER INTO/OUT OF SEATTLE. AFTER REACHING 3000 FT, THE CAPT ANNOUNCED, '3000 FT RESTRICTION IS MET'. MY THOUGHT PROCESS LED US TO BELIEVE THAT ALL RESTRICTIONS WERE MET, AND I INITIATED THE EARLY L TURN TO 070 DEGS. DURING THE PRE-DEP PHASE AT THE TERMINAL GATE. THE CAPT ADVISED THE FAA INSPECTOR TO BRING TO OUR ATTN ANYTHING WHICH MADE HIM (THE INSPECTOR) UNCOMFORTABLE OR WHICH AFFECTED SAFETY OF FLT ANYTIME IT WAS OBSERVED. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WOULD COMPLY WITH THIS REQUEST. HOWEVER, HE MADE NO COMMENT WHATSOEVER THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE DEP PROCESS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 200746: THE FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR WHO WAS ON THE JUMP SEAT SAID NOTHING PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE TURN AND FAILED TO NOTICE IT UNTIL THE CTLR CALLED OUR ATTN TO IT. WHEN THE AIRPLANE ROLLED OUT ON THE 070 DEG HDG THE DME WAS 5.3. THE INSPECTOR THEN INFORMED ME THAT HE WAS FILING NOTICE OF A VIOLATION FOR AN EARLY TURN AND ATC DEV. AT NO TIME WAS THERE A TFC CONFLICT OR WAS SEPARATION LOST. I THINK THAT OUR CONCERN WITH OUR ALT AWARENESS PROGRAM (MAKING THE 3000 FT 5 DME) OVERSHADOWED THE 5 DME TURN RESTRICTION. I MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED BY ANNOUNCING 'RESTRICTION MET'. THIS MAY HAVE GIVEN HIM THE IDEA THAT RESTRICTIONS WERE MET WHEN ACTUALLY WE HAD NOT QUITE REACHED THE TURN POINT. THE PRESENCE OF THE INSPECTOR SET BOTH OF US UP FOR A CASE OF 'CHKITIS'. THE INSPECTOR SHOWED NO CONCERN WHAT SO EVER FOR THE CAUSE FACTORS OR ANY INTEREST IN HOW A SIMILAR SITUATION COULD BE PREVENTED. HE STATED HE WAS THERE SIMPLY IN AN ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY. SO MUCH FOR THE KINDER GENTLER FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.