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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 201109 |
Time | |
Date | 199202 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bfl |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 600 msl bound upper : 1400 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : bfl |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Route In Use | approach : straight in enroute other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 5450 flight time type : 800 |
ASRS Report | 201109 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Captain would not discontinue the approach after bfl approach told us that another air carrier had turned around, that the RVV was 1/4, and after I told him we should not fly the approach. He said that tower visibility takes precedence over RVV. I told him that I didn't think so and he said that he had just covered it at last recurrent training. I got out operations manual but decided it wasn't time to be reading. I knew about legal prevailing visibility and legal RVR values bur RVV had me confused. (I looked it up in the manuals after flight and chart glossary clearly states RVV takes precedence). I again told captain that I didn't think we were legal but that if he was certain we were legal we should continue. At this point I realized that it had turned into a bad situation. Before joining 30R localizer I told him we should go back to lax. At the FAF he called for gear down, before landing check. I told him we should go to lax. He pushed the nose over. I decided that it wasn't the time to argue with him, so I put the gear down and did landing checklist. I started to review in my mind what I needed to do to take over controls and fly the aircraft. DH is 690 ft, I decided to take control at 800 ft. I saw altitude at 1000 ft and called it. Captain went heads up. I monitored ILS and runway lights. I called 'slightly low' at 1/2 DOT low on GS and 'GS' at 2 dots low, but captain was correcting by now. We had drifted over right side runway lights and I called 'go around, go around.' captain said 'it's alright' and then turned slightly and pulled off a smooth landing. We rolled into a fog bank where we could see 2 runway lights ahead. We made it to parking ok. When I got to the hotel I called chief pilot at home and told him what happened. He agreed that it was a big problem and we set a time to discuss it by phone in the morning. The chief pilot asked me if I wanted to finish shift with this captain. (It's a 2 day trip), or if I wanted to be pulled off the line with him. (Chief pilot didn't mean this as a threat, those are the 2 options. Both he and the company are to be commended on how they are handling this matter). I told the chief pilot I didn't want to fly trips with this guy so they pulled us off shift. We had a meeting the same day. (Chief pilot, captain and myself). The captain admitted to shooting the approach even though I said no. We didn't discuss how bad the rest of the flight went because the chief pilot and company are shielding me by saying the competition turned us in. Captain has been pulled off the line for retraining, chkrides and probation. I think that CRM programs could be enhanced if they contained a checklist or procedure for first officer's to run through in their minds so that as bad situations develop, the first officer reacts with an appropriate response. At what point do you question the captain, when do you start telling him, when do you take the aircraft away from him?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMMUTER FLC FLYS APCH AT BFL WHEN RVV (RWY VISUAL VALUE) IS BELOW REQUIRED MINS.
Narrative: CAPT WOULD NOT DISCONTINUE THE APCH AFTER BFL APCH TOLD US THAT ANOTHER AIR CARRIER HAD TURNED AROUND, THAT THE RVV WAS 1/4, AND AFTER I TOLD HIM WE SHOULD NOT FLY THE APCH. HE SAID THAT TWR VISIBILITY TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER RVV. I TOLD HIM THAT I DIDN'T THINK SO AND HE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST COVERED IT AT LAST RECURRENT TRAINING. I GOT OUT OPS MANUAL BUT DECIDED IT WASN'T TIME TO BE READING. I KNEW ABOUT LEGAL PREVAILING VISIBILITY AND LEGAL RVR VALUES BUR RVV HAD ME CONFUSED. (I LOOKED IT UP IN THE MANUALS AFTER FLT AND CHART GLOSSARY CLRLY STATES RVV TAKES PRECEDENCE). I AGAIN TOLD CAPT THAT I DIDN'T THINK WE WERE LEGAL BUT THAT IF HE WAS CERTAIN WE WERE LEGAL WE SHOULD CONTINUE. AT THIS POINT I REALIZED THAT IT HAD TURNED INTO A BAD SITUATION. BEFORE JOINING 30R LOC I TOLD HIM WE SHOULD GO BACK TO LAX. AT THE FAF HE CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, BEFORE LNDG CHK. I TOLD HIM WE SHOULD GO TO LAX. HE PUSHED THE NOSE OVER. I DECIDED THAT IT WASN'T THE TIME TO ARGUE WITH HIM, SO I PUT THE GEAR DOWN AND DID LNDG CHKLIST. I STARTED TO REVIEW IN MY MIND WHAT I NEEDED TO DO TO TAKE OVER CTLS AND FLY THE ACFT. DH IS 690 FT, I DECIDED TO TAKE CTL AT 800 FT. I SAW ALT AT 1000 FT AND CALLED IT. CAPT WENT HEADS UP. I MONITORED ILS AND RWY LIGHTS. I CALLED 'SLIGHTLY LOW' AT 1/2 DOT LOW ON GS AND 'GS' AT 2 DOTS LOW, BUT CAPT WAS CORRECTING BY NOW. WE HAD DRIFTED OVER R SIDE RWY LIGHTS AND I CALLED 'GAR, GAR.' CAPT SAID 'IT'S ALRIGHT' AND THEN TURNED SLIGHTLY AND PULLED OFF A SMOOTH LNDG. WE ROLLED INTO A FOG BANK WHERE WE COULD SEE 2 RWY LIGHTS AHEAD. WE MADE IT TO PARKING OK. WHEN I GOT TO THE HOTEL I CALLED CHIEF PLT AT HOME AND TOLD HIM WHAT HAPPENED. HE AGREED THAT IT WAS A BIG PROBLEM AND WE SET A TIME TO DISCUSS IT BY PHONE IN THE MORNING. THE CHIEF PLT ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO FINISH SHIFT WITH THIS CAPT. (IT'S A 2 DAY TRIP), OR IF I WANTED TO BE PULLED OFF THE LINE WITH HIM. (CHIEF PLT DIDN'T MEAN THIS AS A THREAT, THOSE ARE THE 2 OPTIONS. BOTH HE AND THE COMPANY ARE TO BE COMMENDED ON HOW THEY ARE HANDLING THIS MATTER). I TOLD THE CHIEF PLT I DIDN'T WANT TO FLY TRIPS WITH THIS GUY SO THEY PULLED US OFF SHIFT. WE HAD A MEETING THE SAME DAY. (CHIEF PLT, CAPT AND MYSELF). THE CAPT ADMITTED TO SHOOTING THE APCH EVEN THOUGH I SAID NO. WE DIDN'T DISCUSS HOW BAD THE REST OF THE FLT WENT BECAUSE THE CHIEF PLT AND COMPANY ARE SHIELDING ME BY SAYING THE COMPETITION TURNED US IN. CAPT HAS BEEN PULLED OFF THE LINE FOR RETRAINING, CHKRIDES AND PROBATION. I THINK THAT CRM PROGRAMS COULD BE ENHANCED IF THEY CONTAINED A CHKLIST OR PROC FOR FO'S TO RUN THROUGH IN THEIR MINDS SO THAT AS BAD SITUATIONS DEVELOP, THE FO REACTS WITH AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. AT WHAT POINT DO YOU QUESTION THE CAPT, WHEN DO YOU START TELLING HIM, WHEN DO YOU TAKE THE ACFT AWAY FROM HIM?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.