Narrative:

The incident described below occurred during the recent period of stormy WX that effected southern california. As a result of a series of poor decisions, I ended up landing as a low fuel emergency at night in IMC at a military airfield. My lack of experience in the particular aircraft and type of operation leading up to the incident was a contributory factor. I had flown the burbank - grand canyon run a number of times within recent weeks in mostly VMC and had become used to the fact that a one way leg could be flown using significantly less than the 106 gallons of fuel contained in full inboard tanks on the aircraft I was using. Although I am type rated in this aircraft, my experience in type prior to the date of the incident had included little actual IFR and no encounters with airframe icing. My assignment on the day of the incident was to carry 9 passengers from burbank to the grand canyon in the morning and to return them to burbank in the afternoon. The morning flight from burbank to grand canyon on the date of the incident was uneventful and mostly VMC. I had started at burbank with a company standard ramp load of fuel which included full inboards (106 gal) and about 1/4 tank in each of the outboards (approximately 20 gal). I burned about 1/2 of the outboards en route to gcn plus a significant fraction of the fuel in the inboards. My gross weight calculations at burbank, I have since realized, were high. This was due to a 200 pound clerical error in computing passenger weight. I thought I was about 120 pounds over maximum gross weight as I left the chocks for the burbank takeoff, but was not concerned because I knew I would burn some fuel during taxi. Additionally, I have come to realize that it's impossible to know exactly how much usable fuel one has in fuel tanks that are less than full (as in the case of my outboards) just by looking at gauges. The gross weight calculations in general aviation aircraft, required to operate daily at less than full fuel are estimates with a tolerance of plus or minus 60-70 pounds at best. The flight from the grand canyon to burbank was mostly IMC which included significant headwinds and icing. The storm that I had been expecting to affect my approach and landing at burbank was already having effect between the california coast and the colorado river. I had not made enough allowance for the headwinds and the adverse effects of airframe ice buildup in my planning for the grand canyon to burbank leg. I determined, 45 mins short of my destination, that the fuel I had remaining was only the min required for continuing the flight to burbank. Since I knew the WX at burbank was bad, I realized I would be best advised to divert for fuel. When I realized that I needed to stop for fuel, the most obvious choice was at west.J. Fox field at lancaster. The WX sequence at fox seemed to indicate that I could complete the VOR approach and land with no problems. At the missed approach point it was dark. I could easily see the field below me and was aware of light rain and limited visibility. As I circled to the downwind, I flew back into low clouds and realized that I would have to go around. In view of my low fuel state, I elected to declare an emergency with approach control and request the ILS approach at palmdale. After a few mins of vectors I had runway 25 in sight and completed the landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIN FUEL EMER DECLARED AFTER GAR DURING APCH IN MIN VFR CONDITIONS.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT DESCRIBED BELOW OCCURRED DURING THE RECENT PERIOD OF STORMY WX THAT EFFECTED SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. AS A RESULT OF A SERIES OF POOR DECISIONS, I ENDED UP LNDG AS A LOW FUEL EMER AT NIGHT IN IMC AT A MIL AIRFIELD. MY LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE PARTICULAR ACFT AND TYPE OF OP LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT WAS A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR. I HAD FLOWN THE BURBANK - GRAND CANYON RUN A NUMBER OF TIMES WITHIN RECENT WEEKS IN MOSTLY VMC AND HAD BECOME USED TO THE FACT THAT A ONE WAY LEG COULD BE FLOWN USING SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE 106 GALLONS OF FUEL CONTAINED IN FULL INBOARD TANKS ON THE ACFT I WAS USING. ALTHOUGH I AM TYPE RATED IN THIS ACFT, MY EXPERIENCE IN TYPE PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE INCIDENT HAD INCLUDED LITTLE ACTUAL IFR AND NO ENCOUNTERS WITH AIRFRAME ICING. MY ASSIGNMENT ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT WAS TO CARRY 9 PAXS FROM BURBANK TO THE GRAND CANYON IN THE MORNING AND TO RETURN THEM TO BURBANK IN THE AFTERNOON. THE MORNING FLT FROM BURBANK TO GRAND CANYON ON THE DATE OF THE INCIDENT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND MOSTLY VMC. I HAD STARTED AT BURBANK WITH A COMPANY STANDARD RAMP LOAD OF FUEL WHICH INCLUDED FULL INBOARDS (106 GAL) AND ABOUT 1/4 TANK IN EACH OF THE OUTBOARDS (APPROX 20 GAL). I BURNED ABOUT 1/2 OF THE OUTBOARDS ENRTE TO GCN PLUS A SIGNIFICANT FRACTION OF THE FUEL IN THE INBOARDS. MY GROSS WT CALCULATIONS AT BURBANK, I HAVE SINCE REALIZED, WERE HIGH. THIS WAS DUE TO A 200 POUND CLERICAL ERROR IN COMPUTING PAX WT. I THOUGHT I WAS ABOUT 120 POUNDS OVER MAX GROSS WT AS I LEFT THE CHOCKS FOR THE BURBANK TKOF, BUT WAS NOT CONCERNED BECAUSE I KNEW I WOULD BURN SOME FUEL DURING TAXI. ADDITIONALLY, I HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW EXACTLY HOW MUCH USABLE FUEL ONE HAS IN FUEL TANKS THAT ARE LESS THAN FULL (AS IN THE CASE OF MY OUTBOARDS) JUST BY LOOKING AT GAUGES. THE GROSS WT CALCULATIONS IN GENERAL AVIATION ACFT, REQUIRED TO OPERATE DAILY AT LESS THAN FULL FUEL ARE ESTIMATES WITH A TOLERANCE OF PLUS OR MINUS 60-70 POUNDS AT BEST. THE FLT FROM THE GRAND CANYON TO BURBANK WAS MOSTLY IMC WHICH INCLUDED SIGNIFICANT HEADWINDS AND ICING. THE STORM THAT I HAD BEEN EXPECTING TO AFFECT MY APCH AND LNDG AT BURBANK WAS ALREADY HAVING EFFECT BTWN THE CALIFORNIA COAST AND THE COLORADO RIVER. I HAD NOT MADE ENOUGH ALLOWANCE FOR THE HEADWINDS AND THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF AIRFRAME ICE BUILDUP IN MY PLANNING FOR THE GRAND CANYON TO BURBANK LEG. I DETERMINED, 45 MINS SHORT OF MY DEST, THAT THE FUEL I HAD REMAINING WAS ONLY THE MIN REQUIRED FOR CONTINUING THE FLT TO BURBANK. SINCE I KNEW THE WX AT BURBANK WAS BAD, I REALIZED I WOULD BE BEST ADVISED TO DIVERT FOR FUEL. WHEN I REALIZED THAT I NEEDED TO STOP FOR FUEL, THE MOST OBVIOUS CHOICE WAS AT W.J. FOX FIELD AT LANCASTER. THE WX SEQUENCE AT FOX SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT I COULD COMPLETE THE VOR APCH AND LAND WITH NO PROBLEMS. AT THE MISSED APCH POINT IT WAS DARK. I COULD EASILY SEE THE FIELD BELOW ME AND WAS AWARE OF LIGHT RAIN AND LIMITED VISIBILITY. AS I CIRCLED TO THE DOWNWIND, I FLEW BACK INTO LOW CLOUDS AND REALIZED THAT I WOULD HAVE TO GAR. IN VIEW OF MY LOW FUEL STATE, I ELECTED TO DECLARE AN EMER WITH APCH CTL AND REQUEST THE ILS APCH AT PALMDALE. AFTER A FEW MINS OF VECTORS I HAD RWY 25 IN SIGHT AND COMPLETED THE LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.