Narrative:

From about 15 mi south of the airport we requested radar vectors to deviate around heavy rain showers appearing on our radar. We were vectored to a point about 5 mi west of hoons and descended to 2600 ft MSL. Our radar showed heavy precipitation on final approach from hoons inbound for about 3 mi. The controller asked when we could turn inbound toward final approach and we accepted a heading which would put us on an intercept heading to begin the approach at hoons and 2600 ft MSL. While on a heading of about 090 degrees for hoons the captain turned to parallel final approach and began a descent with full scale CDI deflection to the right. This was done to avoid the WX. Shortly thereafter, I suggested a far due to the fact we had not intercepted the final approach course. The captain continued the approach and at about 1000 ft AGL I suggested in a firmer tone to 'go around.' the captain continued and responded that he had the ground contact. At this point I began to ponder when I would take control of the aircraft and just prior to doing so I called the runway at 1 O'clock about 1 1/2 mi out and 500 ft afl. (Still with full scale defection on the CDI.) the captain landed uneventfully and while in the checks after engine shutdown I told him he should have gone around. I feel the cause of this incident was the captain's disregard of far approach criteria. The aircraft should not have descended on GS with full scale CDI deflection inside the FAF. I also feel the captain's disregard of his first officer's advice to go around allowed the situation to deteriorate. Contributing to the above was the heavy rain on final approach which made the approach very difficult at best. To prevent this type of incident in the future we need continued emphasis on the cockpit resource management concept. We probably should brief these types of incidents during the course of training to reenforce the need for good communications and respect for advice from your crew. The flight engine and I will meet with the captain to discuss this incident in hopes of preventing any recurrence in the future. Supplemental information from acn 202536: after the fact, I feel that had I, the so, also suggested a go around, maybe the captain would have done so. However, at the time, I felt that the first officer was sufficiently expressing his dissatisfaction with the approach as well as mine. If an incident such as this happens in the future, I know I will also suggest a go around if the first officer doesn't speak up, or the captain ignores his suggestions. Captain disregard far approach criteria for the sake of trying to make our scheduled block-in time, and also disregarded crew input when crew felt the situation was becoming dangerous.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT CONTINUES ILS APCH WITH FULL R DEFLECTION OF CDI NEEDLE DURING WX AVOIDANCE. WHEN VISUAL, MAKES EXCEEDINGLY STEEP BANK INSTEAD OF GAR.

Narrative: FROM ABOUT 15 MI S OF THE ARPT WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS TO DEVIATE AROUND HVY RAIN SHOWERS APPEARING ON OUR RADAR. WE WERE VECTORED TO A POINT ABOUT 5 MI W OF HOONS AND DSNDED TO 2600 FT MSL. OUR RADAR SHOWED HVY PRECIPITATION ON FINAL APCH FROM HOONS INBOUND FOR ABOUT 3 MI. THE CTLR ASKED WHEN WE COULD TURN INBOUND TOWARD FINAL APCH AND WE ACCEPTED A HDG WHICH WOULD PUT US ON AN INTERCEPT HDG TO BEGIN THE APCH AT HOONS AND 2600 FT MSL. WHILE ON A HDG OF ABOUT 090 DEGS FOR HOONS THE CAPT TURNED TO PARALLEL FINAL APCH AND BEGAN A DSCNT WITH FULL SCALE CDI DEFLECTION TO THE R. THIS WAS DONE TO AVOID THE WX. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I SUGGESTED A FAR DUE TO THE FACT WE HAD NOT INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE CAPT CONTINUED THE APCH AND AT ABOUT 1000 FT AGL I SUGGESTED IN A FIRMER TONE TO 'GAR.' THE CAPT CONTINUED AND RESPONDED THAT HE HAD THE GND CONTACT. AT THIS POINT I BEGAN TO PONDER WHEN I WOULD TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT AND JUST PRIOR TO DOING SO I CALLED THE RWY AT 1 O'CLOCK ABOUT 1 1/2 MI OUT AND 500 FT AFL. (STILL WITH FULL SCALE DEFECTION ON THE CDI.) THE CAPT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND WHILE IN THE CHKS AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN I TOLD HIM HE SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND. I FEEL THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS THE CAPT'S DISREGARD OF FAR APCH CRITERIA. THE ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE DSNDED ON GS WITH FULL SCALE CDI DEFLECTION INSIDE THE FAF. I ALSO FEEL THE CAPT'S DISREGARD OF HIS FO'S ADVICE TO GAR ALLOWED THE SITUATION TO DETERIORATE. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ABOVE WAS THE HVY RAIN ON FINAL APCH WHICH MADE THE APCH VERY DIFFICULT AT BEST. TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT IN THE FUTURE WE NEED CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON THE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT CONCEPT. WE PROBABLY SHOULD BRIEF THESE TYPES OF INCIDENTS DURING THE COURSE OF TRAINING TO REENFORCE THE NEED FOR GOOD COMS AND RESPECT FOR ADVICE FROM YOUR CREW. THE FLT ENG AND I WILL MEET WITH THE CAPT TO DISCUSS THIS INCIDENT IN HOPES OF PREVENTING ANY RECURRENCE IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 202536: AFTER THE FACT, I FEEL THAT HAD I, THE SO, ALSO SUGGESTED A GAR, MAYBE THE CAPT WOULD HAVE DONE SO. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME, I FELT THAT THE FO WAS SUFFICIENTLY EXPRESSING HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE APCH AS WELL AS MINE. IF AN INCIDENT SUCH AS THIS HAPPENS IN THE FUTURE, I KNOW I WILL ALSO SUGGEST A GAR IF THE FO DOESN'T SPEAK UP, OR THE CAPT IGNORES HIS SUGGESTIONS. CAPT DISREGARD FAR APCH CRITERIA FOR THE SAKE OF TRYING TO MAKE OUR SCHEDULED BLOCK-IN TIME, AND ALSO DISREGARDED CREW INPUT WHEN CREW FELT THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING DANGEROUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.