Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff from acy, the right hydraulic pressure annunciator began to flicker. After a min or so the right hydraulic pressure annunciator illuminated steadily, indicating a loss of pressure at the right hydraulic pump. At this time I requested that the first officer check the hydraulic pressure gauge. The system pressure indicated normal. Approximately 1 min later the left hydraulic pressure annunciator illuminated and the system pressure dropped to 0. At this time I, as PNF, informed ATC of our problem and requested to return to acy and land. Emergency equipment was requested as a precaution. After the aircraft had been turned back toward the airport, we consulted the emergency checklist only to find that it contained no procedure for a hydraulic system failure. It should be pointed out here that the hydraulic pressure annunciators are red, indicating an emergency situation. The system was secured and a manual extension of the landing gear was accomplished from memory. Landing at acy was uneventful. The problem was discovered to be a broken hydraulic line that had allowed all of the hydraulic fluid to be pumped overboard. I had flown this particular type of aircraft, an light transport, for another company prior to coming to my present company 3 months ago. Both companies have approved procedures and checklists, but they are very different. It seems to me that, for a given aircraft type, there should be only one set of correct procedures. When I consulted the emergency checklist on this occasion, I expected to find a hydraulic failure procedure because my former airline had one. The need for standardization is well recognized in the aviation safety community. It does not, however, seem to extend very far afield. The obvious solution to a problem such as described above is to require, as a part of certification, a set of checklists that would be used by all operators without modification. My company has only been operating light transport's for 5 months. I do not feel that they are qualified to develop checklists for an aircraft with which they have little experience. Also, FAA designated poi for this airline has no light transport experience. He reviewed and approved the checklist I attempted to use. It should be left to the people who know the airplane, the manufacturers, to develop the checklists that will be used in its operation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROBLEM AND RESULTING ATTEMPTS AT CHKLIST USE REVEALS PUBLICATION DEFICIENCY.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM ACY, THE R HYD PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR BEGAN TO FLICKER. AFTER A MIN OR SO THE R HYD PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED STEADILY, INDICATING A LOSS OF PRESSURE AT THE R HYD PUMP. AT THIS TIME I REQUESTED THAT THE FO CHK THE HYD PRESSURE GAUGE. THE SYS PRESSURE INDICATED NORMAL. APPROX 1 MIN LATER THE L HYD PRESSURE ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED AND THE SYS PRESSURE DROPPED TO 0. AT THIS TIME I, AS PNF, INFORMED ATC OF OUR PROBLEM AND REQUESTED TO RETURN TO ACY AND LAND. EMER EQUIP WAS REQUESTED AS A PRECAUTION. AFTER THE ACFT HAD BEEN TURNED BACK TOWARD THE ARPT, WE CONSULTED THE EMER CHKLIST ONLY TO FIND THAT IT CONTAINED NO PROC FOR A HYD SYS FAILURE. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT HERE THAT THE HYD PRESSURE ANNUNCIATORS ARE RED, INDICATING AN EMER SITUATION. THE SYS WAS SECURED AND A MANUAL EXTENSION OF THE LNDG GEAR WAS ACCOMPLISHED FROM MEMORY. LNDG AT ACY WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED TO BE A BROKEN HYD LINE THAT HAD ALLOWED ALL OF THE HYD FLUID TO BE PUMPED OVERBOARD. I HAD FLOWN THIS PARTICULAR TYPE OF ACFT, AN LTT, FOR ANOTHER COMPANY PRIOR TO COMING TO MY PRESENT COMPANY 3 MONTHS AGO. BOTH COMPANIES HAVE APPROVED PROCS AND CHKLISTS, BUT THEY ARE VERY DIFFERENT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, FOR A GIVEN ACFT TYPE, THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE SET OF CORRECT PROCS. WHEN I CONSULTED THE EMER CHKLIST ON THIS OCCASION, I EXPECTED TO FIND A HYD FAILURE PROC BECAUSE MY FORMER AIRLINE HAD ONE. THE NEED FOR STANDARDIZATION IS WELL RECOGNIZED IN THE AVIATION SAFETY COMMUNITY. IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, SEEM TO EXTEND VERY FAR AFIELD. THE OBVIOUS SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM SUCH AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS TO REQUIRE, AS A PART OF CERTIFICATION, A SET OF CHKLISTS THAT WOULD BE USED BY ALL OPERATORS WITHOUT MODIFICATION. MY COMPANY HAS ONLY BEEN OPERATING LTT'S FOR 5 MONTHS. I DO NOT FEEL THAT THEY ARE QUALIFIED TO DEVELOP CHKLISTS FOR AN ACFT WITH WHICH THEY HAVE LITTLE EXPERIENCE. ALSO, FAA DESIGNATED POI FOR THIS AIRLINE HAS NO LTT EXPERIENCE. HE REVIEWED AND APPROVED THE CHKLIST I ATTEMPTED TO USE. IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE AIRPLANE, THE MANUFACTURERS, TO DEVELOP THE CHKLISTS THAT WILL BE USED IN ITS OP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.