Narrative:

After landing at philadelphia on runway 9R, we cleared on a parallel taxiway and taxied to a hold point at taxiway C. It was not clear if the tower controller had indicated to stay on his frequency or switch to ground control, so I stayed on tower frequency and the first officer switched to ground control on radio 2. Both radio frequencys were congested and it was difficult to get any calls in without stepping on someone else's transmission. So we waited for either ground control or tower to contact us. After approximately 2 mins ground control issued us further taxi instructions that were heard by the first officer on radio 2. He informed me that we were to cross 9L on taxiway C and hold short of a taxiway on the other side. Runway 9L was closed (by NOTAM and ATIS), so I taxied across and attempted to call ground control to clear up the ambiguity on the remainder of the taxi instruction. Ground control then informed me that their instruction had been to hold short of 9L on taxiway C. 2 factors affected this situation: extreme frequency congestion making it nearly impossible to initiate a call to either ground or tower. First officer passing incorrect information to the captain about the ground controller's instructions. The problem could be eliminated by requiring readback of hold short instructions verbatim. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states the problem was definitely crew coordination. First officer was firm that cleared to cross 9L but did not get hold short position. Captain requested confirm from first officer that they were cleared to cross. First officer assured captain they were. As usual it was a number of things leading to the infraction. The single runway operation created major impact. Reporter is training officer and this was a training flight. First officer has a problem truly exemplified by this incident. He is unable to admit he does not know something. Captain did not hear instruction to taxi and obviously first officer did not hear correctly. First officer has been recommended for cockpit resource management training. Captain assures that if the runway had been active he never would have crossed without confirmation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CROSSES CLOSED RWY WHEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG AT PHILADELPHIA ON RWY 9R, WE CLRED ON A PARALLEL TAXIWAY AND TAXIED TO A HOLD POINT AT TAXIWAY C. IT WAS NOT CLR IF THE TWR CTLR HAD INDICATED TO STAY ON HIS FREQ OR SWITCH TO GND CTL, SO I STAYED ON TWR FREQ AND THE FO SWITCHED TO GND CTL ON RADIO 2. BOTH RADIO FREQS WERE CONGESTED AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET ANY CALLS IN WITHOUT STEPPING ON SOMEONE ELSE'S XMISSION. SO WE WAITED FOR EITHER GND CTL OR TWR TO CONTACT US. AFTER APPROX 2 MINS GND CTL ISSUED US FURTHER TAXI INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE HEARD BY THE FO ON RADIO 2. HE INFORMED ME THAT WE WERE TO CROSS 9L ON TAXIWAY C AND HOLD SHORT OF A TAXIWAY ON THE OTHER SIDE. RWY 9L WAS CLOSED (BY NOTAM AND ATIS), SO I TAXIED ACROSS AND ATTEMPTED TO CALL GND CTL TO CLR UP THE AMBIGUITY ON THE REMAINDER OF THE TAXI INSTRUCTION. GND CTL THEN INFORMED ME THAT THEIR INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN TO HOLD SHORT OF 9L ON TAXIWAY C. 2 FACTORS AFFECTED THIS SITUATION: EXTREME FREQ CONGESTION MAKING IT NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO INITIATE A CALL TO EITHER GND OR TWR. FO PASSING INCORRECT INFO TO THE CAPT ABOUT THE GND CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. THE PROBLEM COULD BE ELIMINATED BY REQUIRING READBACK OF HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS VERBATIM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THE PROBLEM WAS DEFINITELY CREW COORD. FO WAS FIRM THAT CLRED TO CROSS 9L BUT DID NOT GET HOLD SHORT POS. CAPT REQUESTED CONFIRM FROM FO THAT THEY WERE CLRED TO CROSS. FO ASSURED CAPT THEY WERE. AS USUAL IT WAS A NUMBER OF THINGS LEADING TO THE INFRACTION. THE SINGLE RWY OP CREATED MAJOR IMPACT. RPTR IS TRAINING OFFICER AND THIS WAS A TRAINING FLT. FO HAS A PROBLEM TRULY EXEMPLIFIED BY THIS INCIDENT. HE IS UNABLE TO ADMIT HE DOES NOT KNOW SOMETHING. CAPT DID NOT HEAR INSTRUCTION TO TAXI AND OBVIOUSLY FO DID NOT HEAR CORRECTLY. FO HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING. CAPT ASSURES THAT IF THE RWY HAD BEEN ACTIVE HE NEVER WOULD HAVE CROSSED WITHOUT CONFIRMATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.