Narrative:

Flight deck crew plus 8 flight attendants departed layover hotel in west palm beach, florida after 29 1/2 hour layover. While traveling to airport in limo, crew was notified of a 1 hour delay in departure time due to hydraulic problems with the aircraft. Crew continued to airport to await departure. Flight deck crew conferred with maintenance concerning the maintenance problems of the aircraft. It was discovered the aircraft had returned to the gate the night previous, due to flight control indicator problems. During the repair process a hydraulic leak was discovered by maintenance in a left gear brake line. This hydraulic leak was being repaired as the crew spoke with maintenance. After repairs were effected, aircraft was released by maintenance. Upon request of, and in conjunction with maintenance, crew started engines 1 and 2 at gate to verify that no hydraulic leaks were present. None were noticed. The flight number was changed from (revenue flight) to (ferry flight) by flight control and we were dispatched. In addition to normal push back, start and taxi procedure, the crew monitored hydraulic and flight control systems for any abnormal indications. A final review and check of these systems was accomplished before taxiing onto the runway and just prior to the takeoff roll. Everything was normal with no flags or warnings in view. The normal takeoff checklist was accomplished. The copilot initiated takeoff. The captain and so were monitoring instruments and, as briefed, were paying particular attention to hydraulics and flight control indications. The captain looked at airspeed indicators and noticed airspeed indicators appeared to be moving off the 60 KT stop. His attention then was to make final power adjustments and check engine parameters and annunciator panel indications. It had been anticipated that a reoccurring hydraulic or flight control problem might necessitate an abort. As the captain was redirecting his attention to primary flight instruments, the copilot called 'no airspeed indication.' the captain confirmed his airspeed was at or near the 60 KT stop. The captain determined runway available to abort and looked at the 'standby airspeed indicator.' airspeed on that indicator was between 140 and 150 KTS. The captain elected to continue the takeoff and called 'rotate' to the copilot. The WX was clear with 8 mi visibility and realizing a rather short runway along with normal indications on standby flight instruments, it is definitely believed the decision was correct. Acceleration during the takeoff roll was more rapidly than normal due to light gross weight which offered very little time for decision. A normal takeoff was performed with normal gear and flap retraction using standby airspeed indicator and altimeter. The so was commanded to initiate company checklists and procedures to attempt to regain primary airspeed, altitude and rate of climb instruments. A normal 'after takeoff' checklist was accomplished. Departure control was orlando international airport due to longer and wider runways and favorable WX conditions. The captain requested an altitude of 5000 ft due to lower scattered clouds en route. ATC requested we continue with transponder on and it was discussed over radio that this would give an erroneous altitude readout to ATC. It was confirmed several times off the standby altimeter readout which appears to have been accurate. The crew continued to attempt to correct the problem by discussions with maintenance control and reviewing company manuals. The crew was unable to regain the primary airspeed, altitude and vertical speed indicators systems. The descent, approach and before landing checklists were accomplished. A normal landing on runway 36L was accomplished with crash equipment standing by. The captain elected to fly the approach and landing. Odm manuals were followed. Maintenance repaired the systems, tested the systems to ensure normal operation and released the aircraft. The flight attendants were rerted to another flight and the original flight deck crew continued to ferry the aircraft to atl. The aircraft performed normally from orlando to atlanta.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT FLT INST MALFUNCTION DURING TKOF FOR A FLT TO TEST A MAINT REPAIR.

Narrative: FLT DECK CREW PLUS 8 FLT ATTENDANTS DEPARTED LAYOVER HOTEL IN W PALM BEACH, FLORIDA AFTER 29 1/2 HR LAYOVER. WHILE TRAVELING TO ARPT IN LIMO, CREW WAS NOTIFIED OF A 1 HR DELAY IN DEP TIME DUE TO HYD PROBLEMS WITH THE ACFT. CREW CONTINUED TO ARPT TO AWAIT DEP. FLT DECK CREW CONFERRED WITH MAINT CONCERNING THE MAINT PROBLEMS OF THE ACFT. IT WAS DISCOVERED THE ACFT HAD RETURNED TO THE GATE THE NIGHT PREVIOUS, DUE TO FLT CTL INDICATOR PROBLEMS. DURING THE REPAIR PROCESS A HYD LEAK WAS DISCOVERED BY MAINT IN A L GEAR BRAKE LINE. THIS HYD LEAK WAS BEING REPAIRED AS THE CREW SPOKE WITH MAINT. AFTER REPAIRS WERE EFFECTED, ACFT WAS RELEASED BY MAINT. UPON REQUEST OF, AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH MAINT, CREW STARTED ENGS 1 AND 2 AT GATE TO VERIFY THAT NO HYD LEAKS WERE PRESENT. NONE WERE NOTICED. THE FLT NUMBER WAS CHANGED FROM (REVENUE FLT) TO (FERRY FLT) BY FLT CTL AND WE WERE DISPATCHED. IN ADDITION TO NORMAL PUSH BACK, START AND TAXI PROC, THE CREW MONITORED HYD AND FLIGHT CTL SYSTEMS FOR ANY ABNORMAL INDICATIONS. A FINAL REVIEW AND CHK OF THESE SYSTEMS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE TAXIING ONTO THE RWY AND JUST PRIOR TO THE TKOF ROLL. EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL WITH NO FLAGS OR WARNINGS IN VIEW. THE NORMAL TKOF CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE COPLT INITIATED TKOF. THE CAPT AND SO WERE MONITORING INSTS AND, AS BRIEFED, WERE PAYING PARTICULAR ATTN TO HYDS AND FLT CTL INDICATIONS. THE CAPT LOOKED AT AIRSPD INDICATORS AND NOTICED AIRSPD INDICATORS APPEARED TO BE MOVING OFF THE 60 KT STOP. HIS ATTN THEN WAS TO MAKE FINAL PWR ADJUSTMENTS AND CHK ENG PARAMETERS AND ANNUNCIATOR PANEL INDICATIONS. IT HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED THAT A REOCCURRING HYD OR FLT CTL PROBLEM MIGHT NECESSITATE AN ABORT. AS THE CAPT WAS REDIRECTING HIS ATTN TO PRIMARY FLT INSTS, THE COPLT CALLED 'NO AIRSPD INDICATION.' THE CAPT CONFIRMED HIS AIRSPD WAS AT OR NEAR THE 60 KT STOP. THE CAPT DETERMINED RWY AVAILABLE TO ABORT AND LOOKED AT THE 'STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATOR.' AIRSPD ON THAT INDICATOR WAS BTWN 140 AND 150 KTS. THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF AND CALLED 'ROTATE' TO THE COPLT. THE WX WAS CLR WITH 8 MI VISIBILITY AND REALIZING A RATHER SHORT RWY ALONG WITH NORMAL INDICATIONS ON STANDBY FLT INSTS, IT IS DEFINITELY BELIEVED THE DECISION WAS CORRECT. ACCELERATION DURING THE TKOF ROLL WAS MORE RAPIDLY THAN NORMAL DUE TO LIGHT GROSS WT WHICH OFFERED VERY LITTLE TIME FOR DECISION. A NORMAL TKOF WAS PERFORMED WITH NORMAL GEAR AND FLAP RETRACTION USING STANDBY AIRSPD INDICATOR AND ALTIMETER. THE SO WAS COMMANDED TO INITIATE COMPANY CHKLISTS AND PROCS TO ATTEMPT TO REGAIN PRIMARY AIRSPD, ALT AND RATE OF CLB INSTS. A NORMAL 'AFTER TKOF' CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. DEP CTL WAS ORLANDO INTL ARPT DUE TO LONGER AND WIDER RWYS AND FAVORABLE WX CONDITIONS. THE CAPT REQUESTED AN ALT OF 5000 FT DUE TO LOWER SCATTERED CLOUDS ENRTE. ATC REQUESTED WE CONTINUE WITH TRANSPONDER ON AND IT WAS DISCUSSED OVER RADIO THAT THIS WOULD GIVE AN ERRONEOUS ALT READOUT TO ATC. IT WAS CONFIRMED SEVERAL TIMES OFF THE STANDBY ALTIMETER READOUT WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ACCURATE. THE CREW CONTINUED TO ATTEMPT TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM BY DISCUSSIONS WITH MAINT CTL AND REVIEWING COMPANY MANUALS. THE CREW WAS UNABLE TO REGAIN THE PRIMARY AIRSPD, ALT AND VERTICAL SPEED INDICATORS SYSTEMS. THE DSCNT, APCH AND BEFORE LNDG CHKLISTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED. A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 36L WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH CRASH EQUIP STANDING BY. THE CAPT ELECTED TO FLY THE APCH AND LNDG. ODM MANUALS WERE FOLLOWED. MAINT REPAIRED THE SYSTEMS, TESTED THE SYSTEMS TO ENSURE NORMAL OP AND RELEASED THE ACFT. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE RERTED TO ANOTHER FLT AND THE ORIGINAL FLT DECK CREW CONTINUED TO FERRY THE ACFT TO ATL. THE ACFT PERFORMED NORMALLY FROM ORLANDO TO ATLANTA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.