Narrative:

Air carrier X en route from new orleans to los angeles. After switching to ZLA we experienced the most serious example of overctling by ATC that I've witnessed in 27 yrs of professional flying. I realize that with runway 25R closed in lax, it places a tremendous burden on the controllers to use min spacing on arriving and departing aircraft. However, when this begins to be disruptive in the normal cockpit procedures it becomes a serious safety hazard. My only suggestion for corrective action is to give controllers greater spacing between aircraft in congested airspace. The following is a brief narrative of the events as my memory can best recall. 1) cleared by ZLA to lax via direct drk J-10 civet direct lax. 2) given radar vector 30 degrees left of course past drk for spacing. 3) cleared direct civet. 4) cleared 40 degrees right of course for spacing. 5) cleared direct to tnp J-10 civet, at FL350 maintain 250 KTS. 6) cleared to descend to FL280, pilot's discretion to FL240. Then later cleared for civet 2 profile descent. 7) past tnp cleared 20 degrees left of course. 8) cleared turn right heading 275 degrees and intercept lax 25L localizer course. This was given 85 mi out where the localizer is very erratic and so we requested direct to civet. This request was denied. 9) directed to maintain 270 KTS in descent and later changed to 280 KTS. 10) changed to lax approach control and given clearance direct to civet also maintain 300 KTS. 11) just outside arnes and closing rapidly (visual and TCASII on widebody transport ahead). We were given clearance to slow to 250 KTS. I reacted quickly because of the closure rate with throttles idle and maximum speed brake. 12) cleared after fuelr for ILS approach to 25L lax and speed 210 KTS. 13) after fuelr we were asked if able to maintain visual contact on the widebody transport ahead (4 mi) on approach to 24R. When we responded that we were in clouds, ATC directed us to stop descent at 6500 ft. Then later cleared to descend to 6000 ft. After 2 radio transmissions by approach were blocked by other aircraft and at approximately 13 mi from runway, we requested descent clearance, and were given clearance for ILS approach to lax 25L. At this point it required an excessive rate of descent (2500 FPM) and landing gear, full speed brake and maximum flap settings to recapture the GS from full scale deflection above. A safe and uneventful landing was made from this very unorthodox approach and no violations were encountered but this excessive intrusion into a normal cockpit operation creates an environment for confusion and possible compromise of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EXCESSIVE RADAR VECTORS AND SPD CTL BY ZLA AND APCH CTL.

Narrative: ACR X ENRTE FROM NEW ORLEANS TO LOS ANGELES. AFTER SWITCHING TO ZLA WE EXPERIENCED THE MOST SERIOUS EXAMPLE OF OVERCTLING BY ATC THAT I'VE WITNESSED IN 27 YRS OF PROFESSIONAL FLYING. I REALIZE THAT WITH RWY 25R CLOSED IN LAX, IT PLACES A TREMENDOUS BURDEN ON THE CTLRS TO USE MIN SPACING ON ARRIVING AND DEPARTING ACFT. HOWEVER, WHEN THIS BEGINS TO BE DISRUPTIVE IN THE NORMAL COCKPIT PROCS IT BECOMES A SERIOUS SAFETY HAZARD. MY ONLY SUGGESTION FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO GIVE CTLRS GREATER SPACING BTWN ACFT IN CONGESTED AIRSPACE. THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS AS MY MEMORY CAN BEST RECALL. 1) CLRED BY ZLA TO LAX VIA DIRECT DRK J-10 CIVET DIRECT LAX. 2) GIVEN RADAR VECTOR 30 DEGS L OF COURSE PAST DRK FOR SPACING. 3) CLRED DIRECT CIVET. 4) CLRED 40 DEGS R OF COURSE FOR SPACING. 5) CLRED DIRECT TO TNP J-10 CIVET, AT FL350 MAINTAIN 250 KTS. 6) CLRED TO DSND TO FL280, PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL240. THEN LATER CLRED FOR CIVET 2 PROFILE DSCNT. 7) PAST TNP CLRED 20 DEGS L OF COURSE. 8) CLRED TURN R HDG 275 DEGS AND INTERCEPT LAX 25L LOC COURSE. THIS WAS GIVEN 85 MI OUT WHERE THE LOC IS VERY ERRATIC AND SO WE REQUESTED DIRECT TO CIVET. THIS REQUEST WAS DENIED. 9) DIRECTED TO MAINTAIN 270 KTS IN DSCNT AND LATER CHANGED TO 280 KTS. 10) CHANGED TO LAX APCH CTL AND GIVEN CLRNC DIRECT TO CIVET ALSO MAINTAIN 300 KTS. 11) JUST OUTSIDE ARNES AND CLOSING RAPIDLY (VISUAL AND TCASII ON WDB AHEAD). WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO SLOW TO 250 KTS. I REACTED QUICKLY BECAUSE OF THE CLOSURE RATE WITH THROTTLES IDLE AND MAX SPD BRAKE. 12) CLRED AFTER FUELR FOR ILS APCH TO 25L LAX AND SPD 210 KTS. 13) AFTER FUELR WE WERE ASKED IF ABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT ON THE WDB AHEAD (4 MI) ON APCH TO 24R. WHEN WE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE IN CLOUDS, ATC DIRECTED US TO STOP DSCNT AT 6500 FT. THEN LATER CLRED TO DSND TO 6000 FT. AFTER 2 RADIO TRANSMISSIONS BY APCH WERE BLOCKED BY OTHER ACFT AND AT APPROX 13 MI FROM RWY, WE REQUESTED DSCNT CLRNC, AND WERE GIVEN CLRNC FOR ILS APCH TO LAX 25L. AT THIS POINT IT REQUIRED AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF DSCNT (2500 FPM) AND LNDG GEAR, FULL SPD BRAKE AND MAX FLAP SETTINGS TO RECAPTURE THE GS FROM FULL SCALE DEFLECTION ABOVE. A SAFE AND UNEVENTFUL LNDG WAS MADE FROM THIS VERY UNORTHODOX APCH AND NO VIOLATIONS WERE ENCOUNTERED BUT THIS EXCESSIVE INTRUSION INTO A NORMAL COCKPIT OP CREATES AN ENVIRONMENT FOR CONFUSION AND POSSIBLE COMPROMISE OF SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.