Narrative:

The problem is multi-faceted so please bear with me. On the 4TH day of 5 in a row, the atmosphere around air carrier operations had become one of suspicion and distrust. During the previous 3 days as many as 10 line pilots (captain and first officer's) had been taken 'off line' by management personnel, specifically by the duty officer and chief pilot for reasons ranging from aborted takeoff on ord 22L for EFIS computer problems to cookie crumbs found in critical document envelopes. A line captain was taken 'off line' after stumbling across 2 management pilots X and Y in the tower cabin attendant of ord ATC facility while on a time killing tour of the facility. Allegedly, the 2 management pilots were plugged in to ATC telephone jacks, monitoring aircraft movements and writing down names and flight numbers of company aircraft which they felt were taxiing at speeds not found to be acceptable to the company, etc. At present, a union and air carrier operator are locked into a serious contact battle. That sets the stage. While taxiing out of the left concourse at ord, during the performance of our taxi checklist, I discovered that the captain's directional gyroscope and my RMI (which are slave to each other) had frozen at a heading better than 120 degrees from that of our magnetic compass, my directional gyroscope, and our known heading reference our taxiway position. I asked the captain if he wished to return to the gate or call company maintenance. He replied 'no...they wouldn't like that...let me try this.' at that point he furiously began pulling and resetting circuit breakers. Just prior to takeoff, after making several distracted taxi maneuvers and repeatedly letting go of the tiller, the problem corrected itself. However, only temporarily. His directional gyroscope was inoperative more than it was not over the next day and a half. Clear WX with unrestricted visibility was all we experienced so I felt less of a sense of urgency to pressure him, however, each time I asked him to call maintenance his response was one of fear. He was afraid that if he reported a discrepancy he would be taken 'off line' also or even lose his job. Over the course of this period of time out flight attendant also asked him to call maintenance over a few things such as emergency lights which were burned out and a few cosmetic items. In this case, I called maintenance without his knowledge and all items were repaired. Even though maintenance personnel appeared at the aircraft and repaired obviously legitimate items, the captain refused to put anything in writing in the maintenance log expressing the same fear. On the second to the last leg, I was at the controls. As we climbed out of chicago. I slowly, periodically advanced the throttles in order to maintain optimum climb power. Through 7000 I realized that the right throttle had reached maximum forward travel yet the engine was still 400 pounds below its rated power development under those conditions. We had a power control problem on the right engine. The captain again fiddled with the lever furiously but to no avail. He hesitated to call the company for some 15 mins trying to justify the conditions. At this point, I told him that I would not fly the airplane out if we continued to our destination, dec. Only after this did he call dispatch via our onboard 'bat' telephone. After another 5 mins of waiting while the dispatcher worked another flight in far less of a serious condition, the halfhearted choice was made to return to ord. The flight went without serious incident. The atmosphere here is, at least for now, one of survival over safety. I fail to understand why the administrators of the ord ATC facility would jeopardize the sterile environment of the world's tower cabin attendant for such subversive activities. The result of these actions has effectively shattered part or all of the sense of shelter each pilot feels with its relationship to the FAA. We need to know that the FAA and NTSB are there to help promote safety regardless of pressure from management or any other corporate source. Please contact me if you would like assistance in documenting these incidents. Please feel free to call me at home. I'm not worried about my employment status as much as iam worried about an accident!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REGIONAL ACR PLT RPTS OF FLC GNDINGS AND SUBSEQUENT PLT RESPONSE IN NOT RPTING ACFT EQUIP PROBLEMS ACCOUNT FEAR OF BEING GNDED. LABOR DISPUTE OVER UNION AFFILIATION.

Narrative: THE PROBLEM IS MULTI-FACETED SO PLEASE BEAR WITH ME. ON THE 4TH DAY OF 5 IN A ROW, THE ATMOSPHERE AROUND ACR OPS HAD BECOME ONE OF SUSPICION AND DISTRUST. DURING THE PREVIOUS 3 DAYS AS MANY AS 10 LINE PLTS (CAPT AND FO'S) HAD BEEN TAKEN 'OFF LINE' BY MGMNT PERSONNEL, SPECIFICALLY BY THE DUTY OFFICER AND CHIEF PLT FOR REASONS RANGING FROM ABORTED TKOF ON ORD 22L FOR EFIS COMPUTER PROBLEMS TO COOKIE CRUMBS FOUND IN CRITICAL DOCUMENT ENVELOPES. A LINE CAPT WAS TAKEN 'OFF LINE' AFTER STUMBLING ACROSS 2 MGMNT PLTS X AND Y IN THE TWR CAB OF ORD ATC FACILITY WHILE ON A TIME KILLING TOUR OF THE FACILITY. ALLEGEDLY, THE 2 MGMNT PLTS WERE PLUGGED IN TO ATC TELEPHONE JACKS, MONITORING ACFT MOVEMENTS AND WRITING DOWN NAMES AND FLT NUMBERS OF COMPANY ACFT WHICH THEY FELT WERE TAXIING AT SPDS NOT FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMPANY, ETC. AT PRESENT, A UNION AND ACR OPERATOR ARE LOCKED INTO A SERIOUS CONTACT BATTLE. THAT SETS THE STAGE. WHILE TAXIING OUT OF THE L CONCOURSE AT ORD, DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR TAXI CHKLIST, I DISCOVERED THAT THE CAPT'S DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE AND MY RMI (WHICH ARE SLAVE TO EACH OTHER) HAD FROZEN AT A HDG BETTER THAN 120 DEGS FROM THAT OF OUR MAGNETIC COMPASS, MY DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE, AND OUR KNOWN HDG REF OUR TAXIWAY POS. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WISHED TO RETURN TO THE GATE OR CALL COMPANY MAINT. HE REPLIED 'NO...THEY WOULDN'T LIKE THAT...LET ME TRY THIS.' AT THAT POINT HE FURIOUSLY BEGAN PULLING AND RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS. JUST PRIOR TO TKOF, AFTER MAKING SEVERAL DISTRACTED TAXI MANEUVERS AND REPEATEDLY LETTING GO OF THE TILLER, THE PROBLEM CORRECTED ITSELF. HOWEVER, ONLY TEMPORARILY. HIS DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE WAS INOP MORE THAN IT WAS NOT OVER THE NEXT DAY AND A HALF. CLR WX WITH UNRESTRICTED VISIBILITY WAS ALL WE EXPERIENCED SO I FELT LESS OF A SENSE OF URGENCY TO PRESSURE HIM, HOWEVER, EACH TIME I ASKED HIM TO CALL MAINT HIS RESPONSE WAS ONE OF FEAR. HE WAS AFRAID THAT IF HE RPTED A DISCREPANCY HE WOULD BE TAKEN 'OFF LINE' ALSO OR EVEN LOSE HIS JOB. OVER THE COURSE OF THIS PERIOD OF TIME OUT FLT ATTENDANT ALSO ASKED HIM TO CALL MAINT OVER A FEW THINGS SUCH AS EMER LIGHTS WHICH WERE BURNED OUT AND A FEW COSMETIC ITEMS. IN THIS CASE, I CALLED MAINT WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND ALL ITEMS WERE REPAIRED. EVEN THOUGH MAINT PERSONNEL APPEARED AT THE ACFT AND REPAIRED OBVIOUSLY LEGITIMATE ITEMS, THE CAPT REFUSED TO PUT ANYTHING IN WRITING IN THE MAINT LOG EXPRESSING THE SAME FEAR. ON THE SECOND TO THE LAST LEG, I WAS AT THE CTLS. AS WE CLBED OUT OF CHICAGO. I SLOWLY, PERIODICALLY ADVANCED THE THROTTLES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OPTIMUM CLB PWR. THROUGH 7000 I REALIZED THAT THE R THROTTLE HAD REACHED MAX FORWARD TRAVEL YET THE ENG WAS STILL 400 POUNDS BELOW ITS RATED PWR DEVELOPMENT UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS. WE HAD A PWR CTL PROBLEM ON THE R ENG. THE CAPT AGAIN FIDDLED WITH THE LEVER FURIOUSLY BUT TO NO AVAIL. HE HESITATED TO CALL THE COMPANY FOR SOME 15 MINS TRYING TO JUSTIFY THE CONDITIONS. AT THIS POINT, I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD NOT FLY THE AIRPLANE OUT IF WE CONTINUED TO OUR DEST, DEC. ONLY AFTER THIS DID HE CALL DISPATCH VIA OUR ONBOARD 'BAT' TELEPHONE. AFTER ANOTHER 5 MINS OF WAITING WHILE THE DISPATCHER WORKED ANOTHER FLT IN FAR LESS OF A SERIOUS CONDITION, THE HALFHEARTED CHOICE WAS MADE TO RETURN TO ORD. THE FLT WENT WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT. THE ATMOSPHERE HERE IS, AT LEAST FOR NOW, ONE OF SURVIVAL OVER SAFETY. I FAIL TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ORD ATC FACILITY WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE STERILE ENVIRONMENT OF THE WORLD'S TWR CAB FOR SUCH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. THE RESULT OF THESE ACTIONS HAS EFFECTIVELY SHATTERED PART OR ALL OF THE SENSE OF SHELTER EACH PLT FEELS WITH ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE FAA. WE NEED TO KNOW THAT THE FAA AND NTSB ARE THERE TO HELP PROMOTE SAFETY REGARDLESS OF PRESSURE FROM MGMNT OR ANY OTHER CORPORATE SOURCE. PLEASE CONTACT ME IF YOU WOULD LIKE ASSISTANCE IN DOCUMENTING THESE INCIDENTS. PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CALL ME AT HOME. I'M NOT WORRIED ABOUT MY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS MUCH AS IAM WORRIED ABOUT AN ACCIDENT!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.