Narrative:

A 3 day trip began on apr/xx/92, with a show-time of PA35. After commencing my duties as the captain, I learned that my first officer had to show late because he had to meet a regulatory requirement. The first officer was a new hire and had just finished his training. He had to have 24 hours off to be legal for his trip. The remainder of this day's trip was uneventful and we dutied-off in lbl at PB10. This day's trip was scheduled for 4:27 of flying time and a duty-off time of XX15. After driving to a place to get a bite to eat, my first officer and I went to the motel room for rest. This overnight was scheduled for an 8 hour reduced rest, with day 2 having a report time of AA20 and scheduled flying time of 3:58 (lbl-laa-den-laa-lbl-ict). The first leg was uneventful. After arriving in laa at AB24, we noticed that the ramp area was a little congested (see diagram). The taxi lines on the air carrier ramp were badly weathered, but, visible in ideal conditions. Following the station agent's hand signals, we were parked at the appropriate spot and shut down. After the passenger were loaded and the paperwork completed, we began doing business as usual. With the engines running the station agent waved us off and returned inside the terminal. The time was AB32. I began to taxi with my attention directed to the areas I could visibly see. Not seeing the parked aircraft, my mind perceived that it had moved during the time my attention was on filling out the paperwork. This was reinforced by several elements: I did not visually see the aircraft, I did not hear any mention of the aircraft, the aircraft should not have been parked in that location, the casual wave by the agent. With the first officer being new and overwhelmed with the workload placed on him by the company and myself, his attention was diverted. He later stated that he was so overwhelmed that he was unaware that our aircraft was even under movement. Shortly after our aircraft began to roll, we hit the left trailing wing of a smaller single engine aircraft. I then shut down both engines and had the first officer visually inspect the area for possible fuel leaks, fires, or any other potential hazards. After being reassured that an emergency evacuate/evacuation was not necessary, we completed the shutdown and deplaned the passenger to the terminal. I then notified the company. Shortly thereafter we were returned to ict for drug-testing and reevaluation. There were, to this date, no discrepancies found in neither I nor my first officer. We were then returned to full flight status. In closing, one of many factors that contributed to this accident was the failure to make enough adjustments in the normal routine to compensate for a new first officer. There were several contributing factors which led to this accident. The following list is elements I find to be contributing factors: inadequate crew rest. Inattn of both crew members to outside of aircraft while it was in motion. Inadequate training (both ground and flight personnel). Lack of training covering cockpit management resources. Ramp congestion and no well-defined air carrier operations. Inadequate visibility from a normal sitting position (aircraft design).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TAXIING TFC, AN LTT, HITS A PARKED SMA DURING RAMP OP RAMP DEP PROC.

Narrative: A 3 DAY TRIP BEGAN ON APR/XX/92, WITH A SHOW-TIME OF PA35. AFTER COMMENCING MY DUTIES AS THE CAPT, I LEARNED THAT MY FO HAD TO SHOW LATE BECAUSE HE HAD TO MEET A REGULATORY REQUIREMENT. THE FO WAS A NEW HIRE AND HAD JUST FINISHED HIS TRAINING. HE HAD TO HAVE 24 HRS OFF TO BE LEGAL FOR HIS TRIP. THE REMAINDER OF THIS DAY'S TRIP WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE DUTIED-OFF IN LBL AT PB10. THIS DAY'S TRIP WAS SCHEDULED FOR 4:27 OF FLYING TIME AND A DUTY-OFF TIME OF XX15. AFTER DRIVING TO A PLACE TO GET A BITE TO EAT, MY FO AND I WENT TO THE MOTEL ROOM FOR REST. THIS OVERNIGHT WAS SCHEDULED FOR AN 8 HR REDUCED REST, WITH DAY 2 HAVING A RPT TIME OF AA20 AND SCHEDULED FLYING TIME OF 3:58 (LBL-LAA-DEN-LAA-LBL-ICT). THE FIRST LEG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER ARRIVING IN LAA AT AB24, WE NOTICED THAT THE RAMP AREA WAS A LITTLE CONGESTED (SEE DIAGRAM). THE TAXI LINES ON THE ACR RAMP WERE BADLY WEATHERED, BUT, VISIBLE IN IDEAL CONDITIONS. FOLLOWING THE STATION AGENT'S HAND SIGNALS, WE WERE PARKED AT THE APPROPRIATE SPOT AND SHUT DOWN. AFTER THE PAX WERE LOADED AND THE PAPERWORK COMPLETED, WE BEGAN DOING BUSINESS AS USUAL. WITH THE ENGS RUNNING THE STATION AGENT WAVED US OFF AND RETURNED INSIDE THE TERMINAL. THE TIME WAS AB32. I BEGAN TO TAXI WITH MY ATTN DIRECTED TO THE AREAS I COULD VISIBLY SEE. NOT SEEING THE PARKED ACFT, MY MIND PERCEIVED THAT IT HAD MOVED DURING THE TIME MY ATTN WAS ON FILLING OUT THE PAPERWORK. THIS WAS REINFORCED BY SEVERAL ELEMENTS: I DID NOT VISUALLY SEE THE ACFT, I DID NOT HEAR ANY MENTION OF THE ACFT, THE ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PARKED IN THAT LOCATION, THE CASUAL WAVE BY THE AGENT. WITH THE FO BEING NEW AND OVERWHELMED WITH THE WORKLOAD PLACED ON HIM BY THE COMPANY AND MYSELF, HIS ATTN WAS DIVERTED. HE LATER STATED THAT HE WAS SO OVERWHELMED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE THAT OUR ACFT WAS EVEN UNDER MOVEMENT. SHORTLY AFTER OUR ACFT BEGAN TO ROLL, WE HIT THE L TRAILING WING OF A SMALLER SINGLE ENG ACFT. I THEN SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS AND HAD THE FO VISUALLY INSPECT THE AREA FOR POSSIBLE FUEL LEAKS, FIRES, OR ANY OTHER POTENTIAL HAZARDS. AFTER BEING REASSURED THAT AN EMER EVAC WAS NOT NECESSARY, WE COMPLETED THE SHUTDOWN AND DEPLANED THE PAX TO THE TERMINAL. I THEN NOTIFIED THE COMPANY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE RETURNED TO ICT FOR DRUG-TESTING AND REEVALUATION. THERE WERE, TO THIS DATE, NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND IN NEITHER I NOR MY FO. WE WERE THEN RETURNED TO FULL FLT STATUS. IN CLOSING, ONE OF MANY FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE TO MAKE ENOUGH ADJUSTMENTS IN THE NORMAL ROUTINE TO COMPENSATE FOR A NEW FO. THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH LED TO THIS ACCIDENT. THE FOLLOWING LIST IS ELEMENTS I FIND TO BE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: INADEQUATE CREW REST. INATTN OF BOTH CREW MEMBERS TO OUTSIDE OF ACFT WHILE IT WAS IN MOTION. INADEQUATE TRAINING (BOTH GND AND FLT PERSONNEL). LACK OF TRAINING COVERING COCKPIT MGMNT RESOURCES. RAMP CONGESTION AND NO WELL-DEFINED ACR OPS. INADEQUATE VISIBILITY FROM A NORMAL SITTING POS (ACFT DESIGN).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.