Narrative:

During the stall recoveries the CFI candidate flew the aircraft and verbalized his actions. The procedure used and verbalized during the stall recovery was 'pitch down, full power, level your wings, carburetor heat cold, flaps up, gear up, climb to your original altitude.' I discussed with the CFI candidate after this demonstration that flaps he should initially retract flaps halfway, then increase pitch to the climb attitude, check for a positive rate of climb as indicated by the vsi, then retract the landing gear and the remaining flaps. Otherwise, the maneuver was executed well, so we proceeded to the airport to practice touch-and- go's. In retrospect, we should have repeated the maneuver at that time to correct the error in the recovery procedure before moving on. Approach was normal in all respects. On downwind the CFI candidate talked through the pre-landing checklist and performed each task as required. We made a normal approach using full flaps. On final approach a final gump check was performed. The landing was exceptionally good. Prior to this landing the CFI candidate was landing to the right of the centerline. He was putting a lot of effort into making a good landing because this flight was probably the last one in the complex aircraft before his check ride. The landing was so good, I suspect the CFI candidate mentally congratulated himself on the landing, which could have taken his attention away from the after landing duties. After touchdown the CFI candidate called out 'carburetor heat cold, flaps up, gear up' while simultaneously pushing the carburetor heat handle in, pushing the flap switch up, and moving the landing gear handle up. The landing gear retracted immediately without sufficient time to take corrective action. I suspect the CFI candidate became complacent and inattentive after making such a good landing. He may have been thinking about how well the landing was rather than the tasks at hand. He then called out 'carburetor heat cold, flaps up,' which began a mental checklist which was rehearsed over-and-over in preparation for stall recoveries, and which was practiced just prior to the landing. After beginning this mental checklist he proceeded through to the end of the checklist without thinking of his specific situation. If he rehearsed the proper recovery from stalls, which includes a check for a positive rate of climb, the incident may have been averted. One method of operating a complex aircraft is to always do full stop lndgs and not to touch anything until after exiting the runway. Alternatively, if a flight instructor is in the aircraft then touch-and-go's can be done, but the instructor handles the flaps. This method minimizes the inadvertent retraction of the landing gear on the ground during instruction in complex aircraft, but does not train the student to be able to handle a go around after touchdown. For safety reasons, when initially training a pilot in the operation of retractable landing gear I always do full-stop lndgs and do not allow touch-and-go's. This is the policy of the flight school and a decision I agree with. But, I have not been able to reconcile the fact that this training does not completely prepare the pilot for the situation when he has to do a go around after touchdown. For this training, I rely on procedures established for and practice of gars while airborne. Additionally, because the pilot was a CFI candidate who was current and competent in the operation of complex aircraft, I was less attentive to his actions during the landing than I am with students who are unfamiliar with retractable landing gear operation. I expected the CFI candidate to be able handle the aircraft competently. I was concentrating more on his teaching techniques (what he was saying and how he was describing what he was doing). Because I was not expecting him to retract the gear on landing like I do when training a pilot who is inexperienced in complex aircraft, I was not ready to stop his hand from going to gear handle. Supplemental information from acn 208226: the gear up caused the plane to settle to the runway. Only the propeller was damaged, no injuries occurred. My plan of attack to assure it does not happen again is to change all myrecovery checklists to: full power, flaps up, 'positive rate of climb,' gear up. Additionally, I won't retract the gear until there is no more runway left in front of me for me to land on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR IN TRAINING INADVERTENTLY PULLED UP LNDG GEAR HANDLE DURING LNDG ROLLOUT. GEAR RETRACTED ACFT DAMAGED.

Narrative: DURING THE STALL RECOVERIES THE CFI CANDIDATE FLEW THE ACFT AND VERBALIZED HIS ACTIONS. THE PROC USED AND VERBALIZED DURING THE STALL RECOVERY WAS 'PITCH DOWN, FULL PWR, LEVEL YOUR WINGS, CARB HEAT COLD, FLAPS UP, GEAR UP, CLB TO YOUR ORIGINAL ALT.' I DISCUSSED WITH THE CFI CANDIDATE AFTER THIS DEMONSTRATION THAT FLAPS HE SHOULD INITIALLY RETRACT FLAPS HALFWAY, THEN INCREASE PITCH TO THE CLB ATTITUDE, CHK FOR A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB AS INDICATED BY THE VSI, THEN RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR AND THE REMAINING FLAPS. OTHERWISE, THE MANEUVER WAS EXECUTED WELL, SO WE PROCEEDED TO THE ARPT TO PRACTICE TOUCH-AND- GO'S. IN RETROSPECT, WE SHOULD HAVE REPEATED THE MANEUVER AT THAT TIME TO CORRECT THE ERROR IN THE RECOVERY PROC BEFORE MOVING ON. APCH WAS NORMAL IN ALL RESPECTS. ON DOWNWIND THE CFI CANDIDATE TALKED THROUGH THE PRE-LNDG CHKLIST AND PERFORMED EACH TASK AS REQUIRED. WE MADE A NORMAL APCH USING FULL FLAPS. ON FINAL APCH A FINAL GUMP CHK WAS PERFORMED. THE LNDG WAS EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD. PRIOR TO THIS LNDG THE CFI CANDIDATE WAS LNDG TO THE R OF THE CTRLINE. HE WAS PUTTING A LOT OF EFFORT INTO MAKING A GOOD LNDG BECAUSE THIS FLT WAS PROBABLY THE LAST ONE IN THE COMPLEX ACFT BEFORE HIS CHK RIDE. THE LNDG WAS SO GOOD, I SUSPECT THE CFI CANDIDATE MENTALLY CONGRATULATED HIMSELF ON THE LNDG, WHICH COULD HAVE TAKEN HIS ATTN AWAY FROM THE AFTER LNDG DUTIES. AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE CFI CANDIDATE CALLED OUT 'CARB HEAT COLD, FLAPS UP, GEAR UP' WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PUSHING THE CARB HEAT HANDLE IN, PUSHING THE FLAP SWITCH UP, AND MOVING THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE UP. THE LNDG GEAR RETRACTED IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT SUFFICIENT TIME TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. I SUSPECT THE CFI CANDIDATE BECAME COMPLACENT AND INATTENTIVE AFTER MAKING SUCH A GOOD LNDG. HE MAY HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT HOW WELL THE LNDG WAS RATHER THAN THE TASKS AT HAND. HE THEN CALLED OUT 'CARB HEAT COLD, FLAPS UP,' WHICH BEGAN A MENTAL CHKLIST WHICH WAS REHEARSED OVER-AND-OVER IN PREPARATION FOR STALL RECOVERIES, AND WHICH WAS PRACTICED JUST PRIOR TO THE LNDG. AFTER BEGINNING THIS MENTAL CHKLIST HE PROCEEDED THROUGH TO THE END OF THE CHKLIST WITHOUT THINKING OF HIS SPECIFIC SITUATION. IF HE REHEARSED THE PROPER RECOVERY FROM STALLS, WHICH INCLUDES A CHK FOR A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB, THE INCIDENT MAY HAVE BEEN AVERTED. ONE METHOD OF OPERATING A COMPLEX ACFT IS TO ALWAYS DO FULL STOP LNDGS AND NOT TO TOUCH ANYTHING UNTIL AFTER EXITING THE RUNWAY. ALTERNATIVELY, IF A FLT INSTRUCTOR IS IN THE ACFT THEN TOUCH-AND-GO'S CAN BE DONE, BUT THE INSTRUCTOR HANDLES THE FLAPS. THIS METHOD MINIMIZES THE INADVERTENT RETRACTION OF THE LNDG GEAR ON THE GND DURING INSTRUCTION IN COMPLEX ACFT, BUT DOES NOT TRAIN THE STUDENT TO BE ABLE TO HANDLE A GAR AFTER TOUCHDOWN. FOR SAFETY REASONS, WHEN INITIALLY TRAINING A PLT IN THE OP OF RETRACTABLE LANDING GEAR I ALWAYS DO FULL-STOP LNDGS AND DO NOT ALLOW TOUCH-AND-GO'S. THIS IS THE POLICY OF THE FLT SCHOOL AND A DECISION I AGREE WITH. BUT, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO RECONCILE THE FACT THAT THIS TRAINING DOES NOT COMPLETELY PREPARE THE PLT FOR THE SITUATION WHEN HE HAS TO DO A GAR AFTER TOUCHDOWN. FOR THIS TRAINING, I RELY ON PROCS ESTABLISHED FOR AND PRACTICE OF GARS WHILE AIRBORNE. ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE THE PLT WAS A CFI CANDIDATE WHO WAS CURRENT AND COMPETENT IN THE OP OF COMPLEX ACFT, I WAS LESS ATTENTIVE TO HIS ACTIONS DURING THE LNDG THAN I AM WITH STUDENTS WHO ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH RETRACTABLE LNDG GEAR OP. I EXPECTED THE CFI CANDIDATE TO BE ABLE HANDLE THE ACFT COMPETENTLY. I WAS CONCENTRATING MORE ON HIS TEACHING TECHNIQUES (WHAT HE WAS SAYING AND HOW HE WAS DESCRIBING WHAT HE WAS DOING). BECAUSE I WAS NOT EXPECTING HIM TO RETRACT THE GEAR ON LNDG LIKE I DO WHEN TRAINING A PLT WHO IS INEXPERIENCED IN COMPLEX ACFT, I WAS NOT READY TO STOP HIS HAND FROM GOING TO GEAR HANDLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 208226: THE GEAR UP CAUSED THE PLANE TO SETTLE TO THE RWY. ONLY THE PROP WAS DAMAGED, NO INJURIES OCCURRED. MY PLAN OF ATTACK TO ASSURE IT DOES NOT HAPPEN AGAIN IS TO CHANGE ALL MYRECOVERY CHKLISTS TO: FULL PWR, FLAPS UP, 'POSITIVE RATE OF CLB,' GEAR UP. ADDITIONALLY, I WON'T RETRACT THE GEAR UNTIL THERE IS NO MORE RWY LEFT IN FRONT OF ME FOR ME TO LAND ON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.